2010 | 19 | 3 | 195–242
Article title

Can concepts be defined in terms of sets?

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The goal of this paper is a philosophical explication and logical rectification of the notion of concept. We take into account only those contexts that are relevant from the logical point of view. It means that we are not interested in contexts characteristic of cognitive sciences, particularly of psychology, where concepts are conceived of as some kind of mental objects or representations. After a brief recapitulation of various theories of concept, in particular Frege’s and Church’s ones, we propose our own theory based on procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) and explicate concept in terms of the key notion of TIL, namely construction viewed as an abstract, algorithmically structured procedure.
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  • VŠB-Technical University Ostrava, Ostrava, Czech Republic
  • Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic
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