2013 | 49 | 4(198) | 321-333
Article title

Cartwright’s Approach to Invariance under Intervention

Title variants
Cartwright ujęcie niezmienniczości przy interwencji
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Ustalenia N. Cartwright dotyczące niezmienniczości przyczynowości w przypadku interwencji (2003) są przedyskutowane w artykule. Proceduralne podejście do przyczynowości skontrastowane jest z jednym z filozoficznych założeń twierdzenia Cartwright w celu ukazania konsekwencji jej rezultatów. Podejście proceduralne legitymizuje tylko w ograniczonym zakresie pojęcie interwencji, a w konsekwencji jej niezmienniczość ogranicza do pewnej klasy przypadków, których dotyczy twierdzenie Cartwright. Z kolei druga część omawianego twierdzenia opiera się głównie na założeniach modelowych, które okazują się trudne do sprawdzenia w praktyce i są często ograniczone niezależnie od podanych dowodów.
N. Cartwright’s results on invariance under intervention and causality (2003) are reconsidered. Procedural approach to causality elicited in this paper and contrasted with Cartwright’s apparently philosophical one unravels certain ramifications of her results. The procedural approach seems to license only a constrained notion of intervention and in consequence the “correctness to invariance” part of Cartwright’s first theorem fails for a class of cases. The converse “invariance to correctness” part of the theorem relies heavily on modeling assumptions which prove to be difficult to validate in practice and are often buttressed by independently acquired evidence.
Physical description
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