PL EN


2016 | 25 | 1 | 73-82
Article title

Informal Fallacies as Abductive Inferences

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
All who teach logic are familiar with informal fallacies such as ad ignorantium (appeal to ignorance) and ad populum (appeal to popularity). While it is easy to give clear examples of poor reasoning of this sort, instructors are also cognizant of what might be called “exceptions”: when it is legitimate to appeal to popularity or to an absence of evidence. The view I defend here is that appeals to popularity and ignorance (and some other fallacies) should best be viewed as instances of abductive reasoning, or inferences to the best explanation. Thus, determinations of whether these types of arguments are good ones will rest on the criteria that determine good reasoning for abductive arguments generally.
Year
Volume
25
Issue
1
Pages
73-82
Physical description
Dates
online
2016-02-25
Contributors
author
  • Miami Dade College, 500 College Terrace, Homestead, FL USA 33030, akreider@mdc.edu
References
  • R. Fogelin and W. Sinnott-Amstrong. Understanding Arguments. Harcourt, Fort Worth, 2001.
  • P. Lipton. Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge, London, 2004.
  • C.S. Peirce. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Volume 5. Harvard lectures on pragmatism, 1903.
  • B. Van Fraassen. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
  • D. Walton. Informal Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-c6cf0b53-f9f9-4f86-835a-da011c299378
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.