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FEUDAL INTERNATIONALISM? FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: SEE CHINA CHANGE FROM BACK THEN TO NOW TO WHAT NEXT?

Summary

Sovereign territory that is called the People's Republic of China at present has existed for some 5,000 years or longer across several dozen dynasties, several periods ruled by "warlords," at least two Republics including the current People's Republic of China. Over such a long time period, "China" has changed remarkably, evidenced by revisions in its language, arrival then departure of various forms of governance and leaders, prosperity during the Ming Dynasty, poverty from the "Great Leap Forward" of the 1950s through the "Cultural Revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s, to the present period the authors have termed "feudal internationalism." This article will focus on China's changing foreign policies: from the dynastic periods, across the post-dynastic *Ming Guo* period (1911-1927), to the Republic of China period controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Guomintang*), (1927-1949), to the People's Republic of China controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (*Gongchartang*) that has changed its own foreign policies several times since taking power in 1949, mostly during or since China's "opening" to the West during the administration of Deng Xiaoping as China's "paramount leader" (1978-1989) that ushered in "four modernizations", the third of which upgraded China's national defense. Changes in China's foreign policy have continued under its current president, Xi Jinping, most noticeably with China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative that involves building infrastructure across Eurasia and Africa at the cost of billions of dollars estimated to turn into trillions of dollars as China endeavors to resurrect then put to new uses the ancient "Silk Road" overland plus the maritime "Silk Route" with cutting edge airports, highways, railways, seaports needed to connect China with raw materials including energy sources from Africa and consumer markets in Europe.

Key words: China, "feudal internationalism", foreign policy, OBOR, Silk Road, Silk Route.

JEL codes: F5

Introduction

Chinese foreign policy exhibits many characteristics of what each author of this article has called “Feudal Internationalism” (Jones 2015a, p. 344; Liu 2016, pp. 173-175). In recent years, China seems to have collected a series of vassal states across parts of Africa and Eurasia, binding them together economically instead of (or in addition to) militarily, at least at the present time.¹ When states receive mega-investment, whether that be by gift or loan, an obligation for their allegiance arises therefrom. Some neighboring states will resent both the investments and the allegiance they expect to follow, unless of course they receive a similar largesse, and from China usually they do. China’s foreign policy is not necessarily good or bad in itself, although United States and other Western officials have decried much of it as being neo-colonialism (Lederman 2018). This is more feudal internationalism, because China’s objectives are to continue the flow of raw materials and to maintain consistency in political support such as within the United Nations, rather than to provide additional colonial citizens.

If China or the recipients of its investments, loans especially, over extend themselves, the risk is that a regional or global economic recession may follow. As with most policies, the devil lies in the details. In 2015, an author of this article wrote a proposal calling for China to relocate its USD 50 Billion deep water port, intended as an entry point for Chinese goods being shipped into the European Community, from Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula occupied by the Russian Federation since 2014 to Piraeus, near Athens Greece (Jones 2015b). In August 2017, China announced its plan to go forward with a deep water port at Piraeus, Greece, much to the chagrin of Western European leaders (Horowitz, Alderman 2017). This plan makes sense and should be risk free because it will transfigure Greece from rags to riches by making Piraeus a gateway into Europe for goods made or assembled in Asia. This facet of OBOR should inaugurate a new *Golden Age of Greece*.

What will be next as China embarks upon reconstruction of the ancient *Silk Road* into its *One Belt, One Road* or “OBOR” initiative, overland across Eurasia and by sea across the Indian Ocean to Africa? Does China or should China launch parallel initiatives in the Western Hemisphere? Is “Feudal Internationalism” as an economic paradigm likely to evolve into a military paradigm and, if so, will that provoke resistance from China’s competitors such as the United States, European Community, Russian Federation, China’s Asian neighbours such as India, Japan, Korea, the ASEAN block of countries? Or, will

¹ At the present moment, China is endeavouring to operationalise an African military base in Djibouti, a country located in Africa’s Northeastern “horn” not so far away from the United States African command base at Camp Lemonnier, also located in Djibouti, very close to its border with Somalia. French and Japanese military bases are nearby, just across from the Arabian Peninsula and at the entrance to the waterway that leads to the Suez Canal (Woody 2017).

Chinese “Feudal Internationalism” merely inspire competitor nations to follow the same example, collecting fiefdoms, exploiting resources, contriving a pattern of neo-colonial influence across Eurasia as it did across Africa?

John T. Fairbank, highly regarded Harvard University sinologist of the 20th century, raised then attempted to answer recurring questions concerning Chinese historical foreign policy across 2,000 years of different dynasties and post-dynastic governments:

If we ask the long- term question-What is China’s tradition in foreign policy?-our query may provoke two counter-questions: Did the Chinese empire ever have a conscious foreign policy? Even if it did, hasn’t Mao’s revolution wiped out any surviving tradition?

To answer these questions is easy in theory, difficult in practice. Theoretically, since China has had two millennia of foreign relations (the longest record of any organized state), her behavior must have shown uniformities -- attitudes, customs and, in effect, policies. In fact, however, the Chinese empire had no foreign office, and the dynastic record of “foreign policy” is fragmented under topics like border control, frontier trade, punitive expeditions, tribute embassies, imperial benevolence to foreign rulers and the like, so that it has seldom been pulled together and studied as an intelligible whole (Fairbank 1969, p. 449).

Hopefully, China’s 21st century OBOR initiative will not become “benevolence to foreign rulers” across Africa or Eurasia in a 21st century form. That would be a waste of the Chinese people’s assets accumulated from hard work across very many generations.

Imperial Chinese Foreign Policy

Across all dynasties in the history of imperial dynasties that ended on 12 February 1912 upon the coerced abdication in childhood² of His Late Imperial Majesty the Xuantong Emperor (afterwards known as Aisin-Gioro Puyi),

² Interestingly, The Xuantong Emperor (Puyi) coined the phrases “Republic of China” and “People’s Army” although he was eight years old and probably his abdication document was written by the Dowager Empress Longyu, formerly Empress Xiaodingjing, in Chinese traditional, who signed it on Puyi’s behalf:

The Whole Country is tending towards a republican form of government. It is the Will of Heaven, and it is certain that we could not reject the people’s desire for the sake of one family’s honour and glory.

We, the Emperor, hand over the sovereignty to the people. We decide the form of government to be a constitutional republic.

In this time of transition, in order to unite the South and the North, We appoint Yuan Shikai to organize a provisional government, consulting the people’s army regarding the union of the five peoples: Manchus, Han Chinese, Mongolians, Mohammedans and Tibetans. These peoples jointly constitute the great State of Chung Hwa Ming-Kus [a republic of China].

Chinese emperors maintained only tributary relations with foreign states because they deemed foreigners to be “barbarians”, receiving envoys at the imperial court in whatever happened to be China’s capital city at the time, but without reciprocating by sending Chinese envoys abroad, because China believed its emperor was the center of the universe (Worden, Savada, Dolan 1987). This is in accordance with Fairbank’s observation (1969, p. 449). Notwithstanding the criticisms by Fairbank and others that imperial China lacked an exchange of envoys that we consider to be fundamental to foreign policy nowadays, we do know that many foreign nationals came to study in China, evidenced by the statues of 61 foreigners at the Qianling Mausoleum of the Tang Dynasty near Chang’an [Xi’an]. Most ethnic features have disappeared, but on two statues the heads remain and reflect features of Central Asians instead of East Asians (“Qianling Museum”, n.d.). In the Ming Dynasty, bilateral exchanges of diplomats occurred, very notably Chen Cheng to Samarkand, currently a city in Uzbekistan, and to Herat, currently a city in Afghanistan, both then Persian, with Ghiyath al-din Naqqash dispatched to China (Rossabi 1976), an early example of China’s concern for securing its periphery, whatever territory that included at any given time.

Nevertheless, China came to develop what one might consider to be sequential missions from foreign states, and foreign envoys sent to China seem to have been concerned primarily with educational exchanges in addition to commercial exchange of products. Between 630 and 894, as an example, Japan dispatched 19 missions to China, 14 of which completed the arduous round-trip journey, following the consolidation of China into a single nation in 589 with formation of the Sui Dynasty (Fuqua 2017). Little evidence exists to document that Chinese envoys were sent to Japan or elsewhere during the Tang Dynasty, besides their accompanying “punitive” expeditions such as the second Tang emperor, Taizong, launched to quell warring states in Korea (D’Haeseleer 2016), as Fairbank reported (1969, p. 449). Arguably Chinese foreign relations were one-sided not bilateral across its imperial period until the Qing Dynasty commenced to decline following the death of Emperor Qianlong in 1799, with limited exceptions during the Ming Dynasty when “China also dispatched diplomatic missions east to Japan and Korea, west to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, north to the great Mongolian Desert, and south to Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and Malaysia” (*Sino-Foreign Relations During the Ming Dynasty* 2005), as the map in Figure 1 above confirms. Part of the reason for the Ming interest in forging diplomatic relations in general undoubtedly was because, during the Ming Dynasty, China was the richest country on earth and as now required markets within which to sell products.

“We now retire to a peaceful life and will enjoy the respectful treatment of the nation” (Alpha History. n.d. “The Abdication Decree of Emperor Puyi (1912)”. <http://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/abdication-emperor-puyi-1912/> [access: 15.09.2017].

Figure 1. Expeditions of the Ming Dynasty

Chen Cheng's voyages in the context of military and diplomatic activities in the Yongle era of the Ming dynasty. Chen Cheng's approximate overland route (as based on the list of destinations in Goodrich & Tay 1976) is in green, along with the maritime route of Zheng He (in black) and the riverine route of Yishiha (in blue).

Source: <https://infogalactic.com/w/images/e/e3/Ming-Expeditions.svg> [access: 15.09.2017].

Another reason, explaining its diplomatic relations with Muslim states of Eurasia is likely because in the Ming Dynasty China was constantly threatened by invaders from across its northern borders, as pointed out by Crossley in her book on the succeeding Qing Dynasty (1999, p. 57), itself an invading force. Ming diplomatic relations with the early Muslim world attest to its historical concern for securing what has been articulated as China's "strategic periphery" as that frontier has expanded (Mitchell, McGiffert 2007). Examples such as this contradict accounts by some 20th century and contemporary scholars that China never was concerned with diplomatic exchanges (Fairbank 1969, p. 449).

In the 19th century in the Qing Dynasty ruled by occupying Manchurians, China came to develop what one might consider to be rudimentary foreign relations with key powers, most notably with Great Britain and the United States following the First and Second Opium Wars followed by the signing of "Unequal Treaties" between China and Western nations including Great Britain and the United States that prompted the rise of Chinese nationalism that had

not occurred before, according to Suisheng Zhao, executive director of the University of Denver Center for China-US Cooperation and a research associate at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, who forecasts the rise of a similar Chinese “pragmatic nationalism” in the early 21st century that Zhao contends “is fundamentally interest-driven, reactive and flexible” (Li 2007). In studying China since 1750, meaning since the 15th year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong, Westad concludes that a fundamental difference between Qing and previous Chinese dynasties is that the Qing Dynasty was a “trading empire” (2012, p. 35). Other scholars have noted that because the Qing rulers and their entourage were Manchus, thus not of Han ethnicity, they felt burdened to over-glorify the Han culture although at the same time obligated to court favor with China’s ethnic minorities ranging from Mongols to Muslims to the Tibetans in order to legitimize Manchu rule and to render China stable from within, from without, as a form of both domestic security and protection within the tributary states including Korea, Ryukyu Islands, Burma, Vietnam, that were not colonies in the European mold (Jian 2013, pp. 8-9).

Unequal Treaties necessitated by China’s wartime losses became additional Qing burdens. They included the Treaties of Nanking (1842, revised 1843) with Britain, Wangxia (1844) with the United States, Guangzhou Convention (1846) with Britain, followed by the Treaty of Tianjing (1858), Beijing Convention (1860), Alcock Convention (1869), Zhifu Agreement (1876), Convention Related to Burma and Thibet [Tibet] (1886), and the Chungking [Chongqing] Agreement (1890), all with Great Britain. In 1844, the United States sent its first ambassador, Caleb Cushing, to sign the “Treaty of peace, amity, and commerce, between the United States of America and the Chinese Empire,” known as the Treaty of Wanghia [Chinese traditional] or Wangxia [Chinese simplified] because it was signed on 03 July 1844 inside the Kunlam Temple in the village of Wang in the north of Macao Island. Both authors visited the Kunlam Temple, noticing that the room where the treaty was signed is conspicuously tiny, lacking the opulence of the imperial palace, reflecting China’s disdain for the West at that time. It was signed for Chna by Qiying (Kiyeng in Manchurian), viceroy of Liangguang [of the two Guangs, Guangdong (East) and Guangxi (West)], then newly appointed to that post, holding his position as a member of the ruling Aisin-Gioro family. United States President John Tyler then ratified the Treaty of Wangxia on 17 January 1845, and Prince Gong ratified it as regent of China (Westad 2012).

Chinese rank and file citizens rose up against the Qing Dynasty late on the 18th century as part of what became labeled the “Boxer Rebellion,” the objective of this insurrection being to drive all foreigners out of China. Predictably, the response by the foreign powers was to close ranks and help the tottering Qing monarchy repel the revolutionaries. Once victorious, European and Japanese

authorities came close to carving up China into colonies. To preclude that from happening, the Qing government agreed to an “Open Door” policy proposed by United States secretary of state John Hay with his “Open Door Notes” sent to the European powers dated 06 September 1899, to which the European powers except Imperial Russia acquiesced *sub silentio*, with Great Britain and Imperial Germany signing the Yangtze Agreement on 06 October 1900, on which Germany subsequently reneged. In principle, the “Open Door” policy gave the European powers and the United States an equal access to China’s lucrative trade, dividing parts of China’s Pacific coastline into “spheres of influence” that would become headquarters of trading companies from different foreign countries. Said differently and from a Chinese viewpoint more negatively, those “spheres of influence” contributed heavily to hastening the Qing Dynasty’s fall, casting the territory of China into chaos for decades.


China’s “Accumulative” Foreign Policy During the Cold War Period

During the “Cold War” period, 1945 to 1989 or 1991, China viewed itself caught up between both the United States and the Soviet Union in foreign policy and other international respects. Chinese leaders concluded they had to keep the United States and the Soviet Union divided not only from each other but in the perceptions of developing country leaders, especially in Africa (Chen 2001). Its over-arching foreign policy during that time frame was to accumulate enough votes in the United Nations General Assembly to transfer the “China Seat” on the United Nations Security Council to Beijing and away from Taipei. This strategy worked when, by 1971, China had accumulated enough partner states in the developing community of nations to gain that seat as a permanent member of the Security Council, with unilateral veto powers (Tanner 1971).

Accumulation of Tangible “Hard” Interests became China’s next foreign policy goal once it had gained the “China Seat.” Experts have identified four “hard interests” China harbored in Africa:

1. Maintaining or increasing access to energy, minerals, timber, and agricultural products.
2. Developing good relations with all African countries so that China can count on their support in regional and international forums.
3. Increasing significantly China’s exports to Africa, especially as the economies of African states become more robust and Africans increase their disposable income.
4. Ending Taiwan’s official diplomatic presence in Africa and replacing it with recognition of Beijing (Shinn 2011, p. 1).

Figure 2. Distribution of Chinese Outward FDI Across Africa



Source: Zhou, Leung (2015).

China's efforts to gain and then retain "hard" interests on the African continent have brought it into competition with other state actors: the United States and the Soviet Union [from 1991 the Russian Federation] that already were in Africa, then India, China's next principal competitor, followed by smaller competitors that have gained strength collectively and sometimes separately including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey from the Islamic Middle East, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand from the ASEAN Block, and Cuba (Shinn 2011, pp. 8-9). Undoubtedly, it is this fierce competition for resources that motivated China to launch its "New Maritime Silk Route" initiative in the Xi Jinping presidency since 2012, and to increase its velocity thereafter. Even before that initiative, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the top 15 recipient African nations increased by factor six between 2004 and 2010, according to the World Bank (*Foreign Direct Investment Flows 2014*). That FDI was distributed across sub-Saharan Africa as Figure 2 below reflects, with the largest share to "core" countries of the continent's center, many landlocked, with vast mineral resources that have been called China's "Bamboo Corridor" across Africa from Ethiopia to Angola (Jones 2011, p. 62). Theoretically, FDI should increase each recipient country's access to education and healthcare, but many recipients of Chinese FDI in the 21st century have fallen below the 25th percentile on the Human Development Index (HDI),

meaning their access to education and healthcare has declined instead of increased, with a World Bank report contending this trend could have been averted if Chinese FDI had been “more broad-based and not confined to resource enclaves” (*Foreign Direct Investment Flows*, 2014, p. 3). That said, of course, China has used significant portions of the mineral resources it has harvested from Africa to manufacture products the West consumes. Making China the scapegoat is unfair in part when Western countries have become the beneficiaries of its production capacity and, consequently, may be said to have acted in complicity with its feudal internationalism.

Some scholars question whether “foreign aid” actually benefits recipient nations at all, or at least sustainably, whether this be in cash or loans or infrastructure construction, arguing that “Like the US, China gives aid for three reasons: strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit, and as a reflection of society’s ideologies and values. The broad brush-strokes of foreign aid policy are set by political leaders, who shape aid as one of many instruments of foreign policy” (Brautigam 2011, p. 15). Clearly, she seems to feel that these three reasons explain *The Real Story of China in Africa*, the subtitle to her 2011 book, *The Dragon’s Gift*. From this perspective, Chinese aid to Africa must be witnessed skeptically to determine if it is any “gift” at all in the ultimate analysis. This position is in accordance also with the book *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa* (Moyo 2009). That “better way” includes weaning countries off aid dependency that actually has yielded negative economic growth and between 1970-1998 witnessed poverty in aid-dependent countries of Africa rising from 11 percent to 66 percent (Moyo 2009, p. x). Alternatively, Moyo advances four recommendations: African countries should take advantage of international bond markets, attract Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), utilise microfinancing, and developed countries should end their practice of subsidising domestic farmers (Moyo 2009, pp. x-11). This ignores the fact that much of China’s FDI in Africa is really a form of foreign aid in disguise because it maintains autocratic political leaders in power, and it ignores the reality that China is the world’s leader in providing domestic subsidies, across most economic sectors, not merely for agriculture. This does not mean that foreign aid is good. It means that FDI in the African environment becomes a form of foreign aid and becomes as bad as other forms of international subsidies. Foreign subsidies of one kind or another do maintain some benefits to donor and recipient countries alike. They converge to form what the authors term China’s feudal internationalism, that system of economic dependency that expects recipient nations to repay China’s financial largesse with raw materials in an endless steady stream, and unquestioned political allegiance within international organisations such as the United Nations. As a given, China expects vassal states to engage in diplomatic recognition of and relations only with Beijing and not with Taipei, Republic of China, that

Mainland China deems to be its province and not a sovereign state in any respect. It remains to be determined whether China will expect support from countries in which it has invested to construct huge infrastructure. When that day arrives, as inevitably it will, that China decides to stop toying with an untenable corridor across Pakistan and simply seizes Myanmar (Burma) to become its West coast, much as the United States took its Pacific coastline in the 19th century as part and parcel of its own “Manifest Destiny” at that time, very likely China will rely upon its African vassal states to provide support in the United Nations, much as it did when Beijing won a vote to replace Taipei as holder of the “China Seat” in the United Nations generally, on its Security Council specifically (Thrall 2015). Trouble is, some of China’s traditional feudal internationalist support in Africa is unraveling.

China’s “Calculative” Foreign Policy of the 21st Century

Over the past 25 year period, increasingly most of which has been in the 21st century, Chinese foreign policy has been aimed at reassuring its partners in the international community that, alongside of its continuous economic growth, China is capable of achieving “Great Power” status “that shapes, rather than simply responds to, the international system” (Goldstein 2001, p. 836). In doing so, according to Goldstein, since 1996

Beijing has forged a diplomatic strategy with two broad purposes: to maintain the international conditions that will make it feasible for China to focus on the domestic development necessary if it is to increase its relative (not just absolute) capabilities; and to reduce the likelihood that the U.S. or others with its backing will exploit their current material advantage to abort China’s ascent and frustrate its international aspirations.³ These considerations have resulted in efforts to reassure potential adversaries who had grown increasingly worried about China’s rise and also efforts to encourage the other major powers to view China as an indispensable, or at least attractive, international partner (*Ibid.*).


Goldstein credits and seems to adopt much of the posture of Swaine and Ashley that this course of conduct constitutes China’s late 20th century “calculative strategy” (2000, p. xi), apparently presuming with Swaine and Ashley that earlier Chinese strategies have not been calculative, that inference being rather dubious at best. To be sure, current economic and military strategy of China is “calculative” and becoming more so every moment. Then the question becomes what should be the response of the West and of China’s neighbors across Asia: alliance, containment, confrontation, benign neglect?

An observation has been made that conflict worldwide tends to be related to energy:

[E]nergy is the main cause of war and the main determinant of the geopolitical landscape. However there are other factors, of minor importance of course, which affect the geopolitical landscape[,] i.e. arms sales, disputes about the waters of shared rivers etc. The railways and highways of the New Silk Roads, which are promoted by China, are one such factor. It is true ... that railway and highway networks are related to energy, because they make easier the transportation of energy resources. Remember that the Baghdad Railway, which would connect Germany with the oil fields of Iraq, which at the time was under Ottoman control, was one of the major causes of the First World War.

...The New Silk Roads are a network of railways, highways and ports, which will bring to China resources from around the globe, and which will allow China to export her products to the rest of the world much faster (Alhadoff 2015).

Figure 3. Loans and Roads Along China's "One Belt, One Road" Network



Source: Alhadoff Iakovos (2015).

Energy does seem to be close to the core, if not actually the core itself, of much conflict globally, alongside of related variables such as the exercise of political influence over territories containing or thought to contain energy resources. This is documented in part at least by Figure 3 below that depicts locations of huge Chinese loans, connected to each other and to China by land roads and waterways, together harbingers of feudal internationalism. Chinese fugitive billionaire Guo Wengui alleges that China's ruling communist party has been usurped by a "Kleptocracy" of "Mafia like" hooligans bent on

weakening the United States by infiltrating it and its Allies with spies, stealing its property, breaking or weakening Western alliances across the community of developing nations much as it did 45 years ago with Taiwan in Africa (Mangan 2017). If it is “Kleptocratic” as Guo contends, China may be designing its OBOR to gain territory, influence, and even property for itself or for segments of its leadership privately. Eventually, such a strategy will pit China in battle with not only the United States and its Western Alliance but also, potentially even more deleterious, with the Russian Federation, India, and Japan as China’s immediate neighbors. That is not to mention the “Democratic” People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that China may soon regret not having occupied at the height of nuclear tensions there, in the wake of an approaching rapprochement between the DPRK and the United States with talks between President Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong-un (Diamond, McKirdy 2018).

Conclusions

Foreign policy is enigmatic in the People’s Republic of China, as are many variables. In one sense 21st century Chinese foreign policy is a continuation of its millennia-old “Middle Kingdom” posture, expecting neighbors in its region to pay homage to it. In another respect, foreign policy is changing to meet new expectations: “Feudal Internationalism” is emerging to suit one pretext after another: between 1949 and 1971, to accumulate sufficient votes to capture the “China Seat” in the United Nations, most useful on the Security Council; upon collapse of the Soviet Union, China turned its turrets toward the Eurasian “Commonwealth of Independent States” that once were Soviet provinces, intent upon luring them into its sphere of influence. Most recently, this is evident from the calculative architecture of China’s *One Belt, One Road* initiative, extending investment and loans to Eurasian states in a transparent effort to attract their political support, undoubtedly also as part of a plan to harvest their energy resources. This aspect of 21st century Chinese foreign policy is a replica of its 20th century African foreign policy, and the question is whether it will be sustainable and if so for how long? Is Chinese Feudal Internationalism waning on the African continent just as it appears to be rising across Eurasia? Then these two questions converge to form an overall question: will China’s Feudal Internationalism be sustainable for very long in any location? Only time will tell, probably China’s maritime component of OBOR will last longer than its overland component, and if so that will be good for Eastern Europe.

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Feudalny internacjonalizm? Polityka zagraniczna Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej: obraz Chin z przeszłości, spojrzenie na teraźniejszość i prognozy na przyszłość

Streszczenie

Suwerenne terytorium nazywane obecnie Chińską Republiką Ludową istnieje od ponad 5000 lat. W tym czasie doświadczyło rządów kilkudziesięciu dynastii, kilku gubernatorów wojskowych i przynajmniej dwóch republik, w tym Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej. W tak długim okresie Chiny przeszły olbrzymie zmiany, co miało swoje odzwierciedlenie w zmianach języka, przyjmowaniu i odrzucaniu różnych form rządów i przywódców, czasach dobrobytu za panowania Dynastii Ming, biedy spowodowanej „Wielkim skokiem” w latach 50. XX wieku i „Rewolucją kulturalną” lat 60. i 70. XX wieku, aż po obecny okres, który autorzy nazywają „feudalnym internacjonalizmem”. Praca poświęcona jest zmianom polityki zagranicznej Chin: od okresów dynastycznych, przez post-dynastyczny okres Ming Guo (1911-1927), Republikę Chińską kontrolowaną przez Chińską Partię Narodową (Guomingtang), (1927-1949), po Chińską Republikę Ludową pod przywództwem Chińskiej Partii Komunistycznej (Gongchantang). Po przejęciu władzy w 1949 r., Chińska Partia Komunistyczna wielokrotnie zmieniała swoją politykę zagraniczną, głównie od momentu lub podczas „otwierania się” Chin na Zachód za czasów administracji Deng Xiaopinga jako „najwyższego przywódcy” Chin (1978-1989), który rozpoczął „cztery modernizacje” (z których trzecia zmodernizowała chińskie siły obronne). Zmiany w chińskiej polityce zagranicznej miały swój dalszy ciąg pod przywództwem jej obecnego prezydenta, Xi Jinpinga, szczególnie w postaci inicjatywy „Jeden pas, jedna droga”, która pociągała za sobą stworzenie infrastruktury w całej Eurazji i Afryce. Inwestycja warta miliardy dolarów, które mogą urosnąć do trylionów, jest próbą wskrzeszenia starożytnego „Jedwabnego Szlaku” wiodącego zarówno przez ląd, jak i trasy

morskie, zaopatrzone w najbardziej zaawansowane technologicznie lotniska, autostrady, kolejki i porty morskie, mające dać Chinom dostęp do surowców naturalnych, źródeł energii z Afryki oraz rynków konsumenckich w Europie.

Słowa kluczowe: Chiny, „feudalny internacjonalizm”, polityka zagraniczna, OBOR, Jedwabny Szlak.

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