Performance based compensation – a practical guidance on remuneration of corporate executives

• Authors: András Kecskés , Vendel Halász

Title variants

PL

Wynagrodzenie zależne od efektów – praktyczne aspekty wynagradzania osób zarządzających spółkami kapitałowymi

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

W ostatnich dziesięcioleciach nastąpiły istotne zmiany w zakresie wynagrodzeń osób zarządzających firmami. Nie tylko tendencja wzrostu tych wynagrodzeń, lecz także znaczące przejście w kierunku uwzględniania czynników opartych na wyniku i (szczególnie) wartości rynkowej firmy, sprawiły, że zjawisko to zwróciło uwagę prawników i ekonomistów. W artykule tym autorzy, w oparciu o obowiązujące regulacje prawne, chcieliby rzucić światło na praktyczne aspekty określania wysokości uposażeń osób zarządzających korporacjami.

Keywords

EN

CEO (Chief executive officer); corporate governance; executive; option; remuneration

PL

prezes zarządu; zarządzanie spółkami kapitałowymi; członek zarządu; opcja; wynagrodzenie

• Publisher: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, Stowarzyszenie
• Journal: Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne
• Year: 2014
• Volume: XCII (92)
• Pages: 69-90

Dates

published

2014

Contributors

author

András Kecskés

• Faculy of Law, University of Pécs

author

Vendel Halász

• Faculty of Law, University of Pécs

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