Competition Law and State Aid for Failing Banks in the EU and its Specific Implications for CEE Member States

• Authors: Blazsek Virag
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the long-run however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.

FR

Les sauvetages bancaires consécutifs à la crise financière mondiale de 2008 ont été soumis à l'approbation préalable de la Commission européenne (CE), l'autorité de la concurrence de l'Union européenne. Les CE étaient réticentes à rejeter les efforts de sauvetage dirigés contre les banques défaillantes et ont donc approuvé de manière cohérente toutes les demandes présentées par les États membres. Sur les vingt premières banques européennes, la CE a autorisé des aides d'État au moins douze entités. Dans ce contexte le document souligne l'évolution progressive de l'interprétation des règles de l'UE en matière d'aides d'État, les « règles temporaires et extraordinaires » introduites à partir de la fin de 2008 et l'extension de la catégorie « sans aides d’État ». Les changements susmentionnés montrent que la CE elle-même a dévié des lois pertinentes de l'UE afin de sauver systématiquement d'importantes banques en Europe et de rétablir leur stabilité financière. L'article soutient que les plans de sauvetage bancaire et les plans de sauvetage bancaire de l'État ont eu des effets différents sur les structures du marché et sur le bien-être des consommateurs dans les zones de la zone euro et hors zone euro, principalement dans les segments orientaux de l'Union européenne. En tant que tel, il est soutenu qu'ils sont incompatibles avec le marché commun européen. Bien que les CE aient essayé de minimiser les distorsions de concurrence créées par la jurisprudence susmentionnée, principalement par l'application du principe d'exception et des mesures de compensation différentes, ces efforts ont été au moins partiellement infructueux. Les paquets massifs d'aides d'État, le traitement préférentiel des banques les plus importantes ou systématiquement importantes par le biais des mécanismes d'aide de l'UE - presque aucun d'Europe centrale et orientale (CEE) - ont entraîné une distorsion de concurrence sur le marché commun. Cela est dû principalement à la priorité accordée à la stabilité du secteur financier et de l'euro. Le document fait valoir que les aides d'État pour les banques en faillite peuvent avoir eu des effets positifs importants à court terme, comme la promotion de la stabilité du système bancaire et de l'euro. Toutefois, à long terme, elle a contribué à l'endettement souverain sans précédent en Europe et a contribué à accroître l'instabilité économique et politique de l'UE, en particulier dans son segment d'Europe centrale et orientale le plus vulnérable.

Keywords

EN

EU Competition Law; Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); financial crisis; State aid; bank bailouts; Eurozone; sovereign debt; European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 9(14)
• Pages: 145-158

Dates

published

2016-12-31

printed

2016-12-31

Contributors

author

Blazsek Virag

• Virág Blazsek, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Legal Studies, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

References

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Identifiers

ISSN

1689-9024

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.6