Pojęcie tzw. przepisów o charakterze represyjnym — uwagi na tle dotychczasowego orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego
THE NOTION OF THE SO-CALLED PROVISIONS OF REPRESSIVE NATURE: REMARKS BASED ON THE JUDICIAL PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL
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The article deals with the notion of the so-called provisions of repressive nature, addressed from the perspective of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal. In one of its early judgments in this area, the Tribunal defi nes them as provisions whose aim is to subject a citizen to a form of punishment or sanction. Indeed, in the system of law one can fi nd a group of legal regulations whose application is connected with imposition of something that is intended to be undesirable or painful, reaching sometimes such intensity that could be compared with application of sanctions prescribed by criminal law. Nevertheless, those regulations have not been formally defi ned by the legislator as aspects of criminal responsibility. This includes, above all, disciplinary responsibility, responsibility of collective entities, responsibility exercised under the Lustration Act or responsibility for administrative penalties. This situation raises questions on how the constitution specifi es the minimum standard of guarantees for the individual subjected to these regulations and whether they are covered by the constitutional notion of criminal responsibility. The article provides an analysis of almost twenty-year long judicial practice of the Constitutional Tribunal in relation to establishing the meaning of the said notion and determining its scope and content. The conclusions arising from these remarks indicate that no satisfactory or uniform concept has been so far developed in this respect. As a result, doubts have arisen as to the application of appropriate constitutional patterns, including those connected with criminal responsibility.
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