Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth

• Authors: Tsohatzidis L. Savas
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.

Keywords

EN

self-reference; truth-theories; meaning-theories; compositionality; natural language semantics

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 22
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 445–452

Dates

published

2013-12-01

online

2013-09-03

Contributors

author

Tsohatzidis L. Savas

• Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Philosophy, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, GR-54124 Thessaloniki, Greece

References

• [Kaplan, 1989] Kaplan, D., “Demonstratives”, pages 481–564 in: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
• [Soames, 2010] Soames, S., What is Meaning?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010.
• [Yablo, 1993] Yablo, S., “Paradox without self-reference”, Analysis, 53 (1993): 251-252. DOI: 10.2307/3328245

Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2013.025