PL EN


2014 | 2/2014 (46) | 99-113
Article title

Wynagrodzenie najwyższej kadry menedżerskiej a etyka. Perspektywa kryzysu finansowego

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
Executive compensation and ethics. Perspective of the financial crisis
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
Wynagrodzenie najwyższej kadry menedżerskiej zalicza się do najważniejszych mechanizmów nadzoru korporacyjnego i, rekomendując określoną wielkość, strukturę i rolę poszczególnych komponentów płacy, odgrywa istotną funkcję motywacyjną. Pomimo iż dorobek płacy menedżerskiej wraz z jej funkcją motywacyjną stanowi jedno z najistotniejszych osiągnięć dla łagodzenia konfliktu między pryncypałem a agentem, praktyki przedkryzysowe wskazują na poważne słabości stosowanych rozwiązań. Słabości dotyczące kwestii wielkości pakietów wynagrodzenia, polityki przyznawania premii, konstrukcji programów motywacyjnych i udziału komponentu ruchomego są uznawane za czynniki, które przyczyniły się do wybuchu kryzysu finansowego. Celem artykułu jest zidentyfikowanie głównych słabości praktyki wynagrodzenia najwyższej kadry menedżerskiej oraz odniesienie ich do aspektów etyki biznesu. Intencją autorki jest wykazanie, iż nieodpowiednia implementacja rozwiązań w zakresie płacy menedżerskiej stanowi nie tylko problem nadzoru korporacyjnego, lecz także obejmuje poważne dylematy etyczne i kwestionuje fundamentalne założenie funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstwa.
EN
Executive compensation is one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms which plays an incentive function suggesting the adequate size, structure and various components of the pay. Despite the fact that the evidence of executive remuneration motivational function is viewed as the crucial solution to the principal agent conflict, its pre-crisis practice indicated severe shortcomings. The inefficiencies of executive compensation practice related to the package size, bonus policy, incentive programs and the proportion of the variable component are viewed as the significant contributor to the outbreak of the financial crisis. The aim of the paper is to identify these elements of executive compensation which proved to be detrimental for shareholders and to relate them to business ethics. The article intends to show that that the misuse of executive remuneration is not only the corporate governance problem but incorporates severe ethical dilemmas questioning the fundamental assumption of the company functioning.
Year
Issue
Pages
99-113
Physical description
Dates
issued
2014-04-30
Contributors
author
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
1644-9584
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-d27e9a75-c13f-43cb-a3a8-723f1a40cd9b
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