Patent Races and Institutional Solutions of Health Care Policy in Developed Countries

• Authors: Biga Bartłomiej
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Objectives: To identify the methods of the state’s influence on health care system through intellectual property law mechanisms. Research Design & Methods: Literature review based on the economic analysis of law. F indings: An active role of the state in innovations in the pharmaceutical branch could bring benefits in the health care system. This role does not have to be limited to being a shareholder in selected projects (as a capital supplier). Implications / Recommendations: The state is able to influence the speed, the structure, and the direction of patent races b y setting a real width of the patent (court verdicts) and patent height (patent office’s decisions) as well as the manner and the scale of compulsory licences usage. Contribution / Value Added: Making changes in the speed, the structure, and the direction of patent races has got a strong impact on health policy. Appropriate influencing of the state on innovation activity in the pharmaceutical branch allows one to generate large benefits in the health care system.

Keywords

EN

health care policy; patent; intellectual property; innovation; pharmacy

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, Małopolska Szkoła Administracji Publicznej
• Journal: Zarządzanie Publiczne / Public Governance
• Year: 2019
• Issue: 4(50)
• Pages: 15-22

Contributors

author

Biga Bartłomiej

• Cracow University of Economics

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Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.15678/ZP.2019.50.4.02