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Modes of Organizing Knowledge in Language.
A Contribution to Logopedic Diagnosis

The object of knowledge is not the individual but the general

Aristotle

Understanding of language becomes a part of understanding the world, and within the latter - a part of understanding man and his/her place in this world

Tokarski 2001:129

SUMMARY

The article discusses the active role of language in the perception of reality and development of cognitive processes, from von Humboldt's thesis to the assumptions of cognitive linguistics to the methodology of the linguistic picture of the world and the concept of cognitive definition. The issues presented in the study concern the role of cognitive definition in the process of logopedic diagnosis. This type of definition provides insight into the store of knowledge that a subject (a studied person) has, enables showing differences between the child's structure of concepts and the concepts used by adult language speakers. It illustrates the character of conceptual knowledge (e.g. the presence of only some categories in the conceptual structure) and the specificity of how words are defined (e.g. the poverty of. lexical devices) in the definitions formed by a person with an intellectual disability. The features of a cognitive definition are presented by means of polar antonyms, such as: *beauty – ugliness, love – hate*.

Key words: structure of knowledge in the mind, cognitive definition, logopedic diagnosis

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary linguistic inquiries are based on the thesis of linguistic relativity and determinism. Linguistics utilizes the term "the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis", proposed by Benjamin Lee Whorf[1], but the issue of the impact of language on human thinking was already present in the writings by Johann Gottfried Herder, and then by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Herder was without doubt a precursor of the conception of the active role of language in shaping human perception and cognitive processes (cf. M. Marody, 1987: 33). The basic assumptions and wording of the thesis of the linguistic picture of the world and its influence on human thought were formulated by Wilhelm von Humboldt in his 1836 book *The Diversity of Human Language-Structure and its Influence on the Intellectual and Spiritual Development of Mankind* [another version On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species] Humboldt's ideas were expanded and deepened by the twentieth-century German language theorists Leo Weisgerber and Jost Trier, particularly with regard the conception of linguistic fields[2], and then, in their numerous studies, their continuators analyzed and described the picture of the world contained in one's native language, showing its detailed impact on the perception of the world and intellectual processes[3].

As a result of empirical research, American ethnolinguists – Sapir and Whorf – concluded that different languages differently categorize reality, therefore the image of reality depends on the language in which it is created (cf. Kępa–Figura 2007: 12), because, Adam Schaff wrote, "our perception of reality and the picture of the world depends on structure of the language within which we conduct this

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[1] B.L. Whorf explained the term "linguistic relativity as follows: we segment nature following the trails defined by our mother tongues. We divide the world into parts, structures it by means of concepts, and assign sense to it in a specific way because we are signatories to a contact that we do it the way we do; a contract that is binding in our language community and has been codified in the patterns of our language. We made this contract implicitly and it was never written down but its terms are absolutely binding – we are not able to speak without accepting the classification of data it established and their structuring (after the Polish translation of Language, *Thought and Reality* 1957: 284).

[2] Proponents of the theory of linguistic (conceptual, semantic) fields argued that the meaning of a word depended on the interrelation (system) of other lexical units in the field. In reference to Humboldt's ideas, they assumed the existence of "an invariable, abstract conceptual framework, different for every nation, superimposed upon reality" (Tokarski 1984:11). On linguistic fields see Buttler 1967, Pisarek 1967, Miodunka 1980, Tokarski 1984.

[3] The presence of von Humboldt's thesis can be seen in various philosophical currents, e.g.: in L. Wittgenstein's relativism, A. Korzybski's "general semantics", K. Ajdukiewicz's relativist conceptions, and in E. Cassirer's reflections. For more on the subject, see the studies by: A. Schaff (1964), J. Anusiewicz (1990, 1994), S. Grabias (1997).

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perception and create that picture of the world" (Schaff 1982:6). According to Sapir, since language is "a symbolic guide to culture" (Sapir 1978:88), "we see, hear, and experience the way we do because the language habits of our community predispose us towards certain choices of interpretation"(Sapir 1978: 89). Whorf represented more radical convictions, believing it is impossible to investigate and get to know reality: it is language that we study (after: Kępa-Figura, op. cit.:13), because language organizes our experience. We usually think that language is simply a technique of expressing thoughts and we do not realize that at the same time it classifies and structures the stream of sensory sensations, thereby producing a certain fragment of reality, which can be easily expressed by symbolic linguistic means. (cf. Whorff 1982:96-97 [in Polish translation]).

The acceptance of basic theses of linguistic relativity does not mean "being passive slaves of our languages"." According to Norbert Morciniec, we should:

"realize that language, its lexicon and grammar, lays out only the channels of our perception and thinking. (…) at any moment we can leave the routes determined by language, perceive phenomena and their features that our languages do not name, we can think and express the content for which there are no grammatical categories in our language. If this was not the case, the development of human cognition or any scientific progress would be impossible"[4].

Morciniec, an expert on and student of German and Dutch, goes on:

"users of different languages have different pictures of the world, and differently interpret and classify its features and phenomena. Born in a specific language community, a person adopts its linguistic picture of the world – a product of countless generations. Each new generation leaves traces of its experience in the language (…). A child grows into the language of his/her environment, which (language) becomes his/her native language and from now on the language will be the child's only road on which his/her intellectual and emotional life will grow. His/her native tongue accompanies a person from birth to the end of his/her life, providing ready-made concepts and grammatical structures through which s/he learns the world and expresses his/her thoughts, feelings, and desires. With every new language we learn, we gain insight into a new picture of the world. It is only when this picture of the world becomes ours that we will be able to understand the ways of thinking and feeling of people for whom this language is their native tongue"[5].

The direct continuators of the linguistic relativity theory are representatives of contemporary cognitive linguistics because they link human linguistic abilities to thinking. Cognitivists try to define the ways of knowing the reality by including in this cognition the human cognitive processes and human attitudes towards the surrounding world, as well as values and emotions. According to James Fife, cog-

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[4] http://www.morciniec.eu/22,o_jezykowym_obrazie_swiata_czyli_czym_roznia_sie_jezyki, Accessed 06 December 2018

[5] http://www.morciniec.eu/22,o_jezykowym_obrazie_swiata_czyli_czym_roznia_sie_jezyki

nitive grammarians propose a view that the semantic structure depends on a given language. Its character is determined by conceptual processes, the language user's experience, the degree of conventionalization of language structures (and expressions) as well as on the way of representation (cf. Fife 1994: 11).

Representatives of cognitive linguistics, Fillmore, Lakoff and Langacker, accept the thesis of linguistic relativity, different ways of categorizing the reality in different languages, and combine it with their conviction about the "universalism of human cognitive characteristics[6]" (cf. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996: 51, Kępa-Figura 2007: 16). According to Kępa-Figura (ibid), both the universal and relative character of human thinking can be discovered by analyzing language because one of the essential assumptions of cognitive semantics is about the identification of meaning with conceptualization (a mental state), therefore linguistic analysis should concern the description of thoughts and concepts[7]. What seems extremely important from the standpoint of logopedic inquiries based on cognitive semantics is the fact that meaning treated as a conceptualization "is necessarily presented as a product of the subjective and individual mental activity of the cognitive subject (…) to Langacker and to the proponents of cognitive semantics, it is subjective character that is important[8]" (Muszyński 1994: 119). "The content of a mental state" (ibid) "includes sensory, emotive and kinesthetic sensations; and extends to our awareness of the physical, social, and linguistic context" (Langacker 1988: 50) and is determined by "the content of experience experienced by the subject" (Muszyński 1994: 119). When describing meaning in terms of cognitive grammar, it should be remembered that it is closely connected with "a human as a biologically, physiologically and psychologically (cognitively) determined being, which in turn determines the essence of language" (Muszyński 1993: 185). Renata Grzegorczykowa's position regarding the subjective aspect of language also coincides with the foregoing propositions[9]. The thesis of cognitive linguistics, with which almost all proponents of this theory agree, says [cognitivism incorporates – U. J.] …a range of different approaches, methodologies and

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[6] According to Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk "language, as interpreted by Whorf, plays an **active** role and influences human thoughts and behavior; this process, which neither Whorf nor Sapir noted, proceeds in accordance with human universal perceptual and cognitive preferences. These conclusions do not distinctly separate the universalist position from the relativist one – they rather combine them" (1996: 50–51).

[7] In one of his lectures Ronald W. Langacker said that "meaning equals conceptualization". Therefore, linguistic semantics has to attempt the structural analysis and distinct description of such abstract entities as thoughts and concepts (cf. Langacker 1991: 2, after: Muszyński 194: 119).

[8] John R. Taylor, while discussing cognitivist assumptions, said, "meanings are cognitive structures, embedded patterns of knowledge and belief" (Taylor 1989: 83, after: Kępa- Figura 2007: 17).

[9] D. Kępa-Figura wrote: "(…) the adoption of the thesis equating meaning with conceptualization decides about laying emphasis on subjectivity as being part of language" (Kępa – Figura 2007: 17). R. Grzegorczykowa, in turn, spoke of subjectivism in sign interpretation (2001: 81).

tendencies, all of which share a key assumption: "the belief that language forms an integral part of human cognition and that **any insightful analysis of language phenomena will need be embedded in what is known about human cognitive abilities**[10] [my emphasis – U. J.]. That is why cognitive linguistics makes it its aim to provide an answer consistent with the cognitive theory, to the questions what it means to know a language, how people acquire and use it (cf. Taylor 2007: 7). Consequently, the task of cognitive linguistics is to investigate the ways of understanding the world but it should be remembered that what we have in mind is "the world processed (projected, experienced) by our senses" (Kardela 1999:37). The presented positions illustrate a certain way of thinking about language. Language is perceived as "the outcome and tool of 'acquiring' the world by humans" (Kępa-Figura 2007: 33).

THE ANALYSIS OF COGNITIVE STRUCTURES
IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LINGUISTICS

A continuation of this mode of thinking is the methodology, proposed by Lublin linguists, of the linguistic picture (image) of the world (LPW [Polish JOS]), which enables reproduction of the way of seeing the world and its components, functioning in a given language[11]. I adopt Jerzy Bartmiński's definition:

> "the linguistic picture of the world is a language-entrenched interpretation of reality contained in language, which can be expressed as a set of judgments about the world, people, things and events. It is an interpretation, not a reflection; it a subjective portrait rather than a portrait of real objects. This interpretation is the result of a subject's perception and conceptualization of reality by the speakers of a given language; it is therefore distinctly subjective and anthropocentric, at the same time being intersubjective in the sense that it is socialized and unites people in a given social environment " (Bartmiński 2009: 23).

Linguists refer to psychological explanations of the ways of organizing knowledge and shaping the mental worldview in the form of cognitive representation. Conclusions arising from the investigations by cognitive psychology presuppose "a diversity of cognitive representations or a multitude of conceptual forms" (Filar 2013: 45). This diversity is proof of the abundance of the ways of organizing the knowledge of the world as there are "many types of concepts and ways of

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[10] According to Zbysław Muszyński, "contemporary semantics »consumes« psychological and philosophical accomplishments (…) is concerned with research into the structure of cognitive processes, organization of semantic memory, natural classification, artificial intelligence, fuzzy sets, and semantic families" (Muszyński 1996: 28).

[11] The concept of the linguistic picture of the world (linguistic worldview) is functioning within the so-called Lublin ethnolinguistics (a team of scholars gathered around Jerzy Bartmiński and linguistic semantics, its co-founder being Ryszard Tokarski).

acquiring them" (Chlewiński 1999: 1). This multitude and diversity of cognitive constructions evidences huge capabilities of the human mind in categorizing the phenomena of reality. Since the nineteen-seventies empirical studies have developed as part of cognitive science, which proves that linguistic processes, like the other human cognitive processes, are subject to general laws of information processing by the human mind (Kurcz 1987: 71), the models of cognitive and linguistic functioning being created. According to scholars, the knowledge accumulated in the human mind and the semantic layer of language is described using the terms like cognitive schemas, scripts, framework, models, domains and concepts[12]. The knowledge we have, its store and content, is directly linked with the process of categorization of the world by man. In simplest terms, categorization is a process consisting in "distinguishing elements of reality, similar in some respects and at the same time different from other elements in these respects" (Trzebiński 1981: 54). Creating a category, ultimately its form and structure, depend on the subjective assessment of the importance of features selected by a given user, which features result both from the individual's experience, acquired knowledge and social relationships, they can have a form of classical (Aristotelian) categories or natural (prototypical) ones[13]. **Popular categorization is subjective because it refers to individual cognitive and sensory experiences; it is intersubjective because categories develop in interaction.** They refer to the individual's sensations, experiences and notions while at the same time they have to go beyond individual experiences because they become the basis of communication. **Categories become established in language, first of all in colloquial words, conceptual metaphors and linguistic stereotypes**[14] (cf. Szadura 2017: 52). According to

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[12] On the basic units of knowledge presentation cf. for example: F. C. Bartlett (1932, after: I. Kurcz 1992); M. Minsky (1980: 1–25); D. E. Rumelhart (1980: 33–58); R. Schank, R. Abelson 1977; R. Langacker 1991; Z. Chlewiński 1999; D. E. Rumelhart (2007: 431–455).

[13] Until the publication of empirical studies by E. Rosch, the dominant conviction in science was that the categorization process (the process of organizing the reality) was a matrix one (classical or Aristotelian categorization). The inquiries by E. Rosch gave rise to the model of categorization via prototype (the best specimen of a concept) and the affiliation of the next specimens based on family resemblance (after: Wittgenstein 1972). E. Rosch's experiments were discussed in detail by J. Trzebiński (1981) and J. R. Taylor (1989). Describing the role of categorization in the linguistic picture of the world, J. Maćkiewicz equates a logical category with a scientific one and a natural category with non-scientific. In her view, the structure of natural concepts is associated with the non-scientific organization of the world based on similarity to stereotyped examples and counterexamples, with the complex nature of popular cognition and its anthropocentrism. Natural categories (tend to) have fuzzy, blurred limits. They are open and can systematically expand (Maćkiewicz 1990: 51–52).

[14] With reference to J. Bartmiński's statement: "(…) a good categorization should be most banal, one that would maximally approximate the experiences, feelings and intuition of a simple, low-class person, a carrier of folk culture" (Bartmiński 1980: 21).

Stanisław Grabias, "the factor capable of making interpretations of reality uniform is language with its semantic and grammatical categories that impose upon an individual the way of looking at the world" (Grabias 2002: 5).

A characteristic "cognitive revolution" in psychology took place much earlier than in logopedics because this happened in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, inter alia owing to Jean Piaget's cognitive development theory, Lev Vygotsky's socio-cultural approach, and Jerome S. Bruner's socio-cultural conception. The fundamental and linking element of this program was meaning and its close connection with the mind. In the seventies, despite cognitive declarations, psychology chose the direction of seeking the model of the mind as a computational program, and "the computational model soon became the model of the mind, and the concept of computationality (the computational) replaced meaning" (Wierzbicka 2006: 22). The approach to logopedics as the science of biological determinants of language and linguistic behavior (Grabias 2012: 15–71) opened the possibilities of diagnosing cognitive functions through analysis of lexis, the shape of conceptual structures in the human mind and the manner of narrative (ibid 60), since "the central idea of diagnostic procedure in logopedics is to learn the relations between the state of language/linguistic behaviors and the state of biological processes that determine the development and effective use of language, and subsequently, to program remedial measures" (Pluta-Wojciechowska 2015: 50).

In the context of the foregoing considerations on the connection of language with the conceptual systems in the mind, of special importance are Danuta Pluta-Wojciechowska's words with regard to the categories of logopedic testing (e.g.: realization of phonemes, efficiency of the speech organs, telling a picture). According to this scholar, "depending on which categories have been adopted, certain features of the studied object remain in the background. This may pose a risk of disregarding the data that are outside of the adopted testing criteria. (…) In some logopedic tests, individual research areas are 'filled' in various ways (…). The concept of figure and background, borrowed from psychology, prompts us therefore to ask the following questions: What do we distinguish and highlight in the testing, and what do we leave in the background? What do we hide through the distinguished research categories and the ways of testing?" (Pluta-Wojciechowska 2015:50-51).

COGNITIVE DEFINITIONS IN LOGOPEDICS

The author believes that it is necessary to introduce into logopedic diagnosis the description of the meaning of lexical units contained in definitions that might be called cognitive in order to assess the semantic competence of intellectually

normal children and intellectually disabled children and adults[15]. The creation of such a definition by the studied person provides insight into his/her scope of knowledge concerning the described fragment of reality; to put it simply, it allows assessing what a person thinks when s/he uses a given lexical unit[16].

In the course of diagnosing linguistic competence at the level of semantic and lexical skills the logopedist should bear in mind that the defining process is entirely different from creating concepts[17]. A child or an adult may have a well-formed concept that, as an element of knowledge, can be used in various situations and allows accurate identification of its referents, while at the same time s/he may have problems with providing its definition. The form of conceptual structures contained in the minds of an intellectually normal person and an intellectually handicapped one illustrates the store of knowledge that the subject has, its organization, the way of presenting the world, and the wealth of experiences concerning the analyzed fragment of reality. The ability to define also results from education and social maturity. Therefore, the answer to the question: "what do children and adult language users think" (when they use a specific word) provides a lot of significant information on the cognitive and linguistic functioning of the person studied. It allows assessing the content of his/her lexis, "provides insight into the internal structure of a concept, taking its relationships with other concepts into account" (Hrycyna 2017: 80), thereby enabling the programming of logopedic therapy in a complete and methodical way (ibid).

The logopedist diagnosing the child's abilities to define should be aware of the existence of literal and metaphorical meanings in the child's language, and bear in mind that two developmental tendencies clash in children's utterances: towards the originality of linguistic associations (in metaphor and anthropomorphizing conceptualizations) and towards schematic imitation of adult language (Niesporek-Szamburska, 2004: 8). Moreover, children's cognitive interpretations make it possible to show changes occurring with the subjects' age in their language and thinking – from the popular cognitive base to typical scientific (school) reinterpretation to their own, original approach, or to imitating interpretations from the language of the adults (which is evidence of its socialization) (ibid, 16). The conceptualizations of concepts gained from the subjects should certainly be treated "as one of the kinds of data, taken into account together with the data of

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[15] For more on the role of cognitive definitions in the process of diagnosing linguistic competence (at the level of semantic, lexical and syntactic skills) in normal children and in intellectually handicapped persons, see the article: U. Jęczeń 2019, "Prace Językoznawcze" XX/2 (in press).

[16] The authors of the "Logopedic Screening Test [Logopedyczny Test Przesiewowy" (Grabias, Kurkowski, Woźniak 2007) discussed the testing of semantic skills through creation of cognitive definitions (in the case of the above-mentioned it was a story about a gnome), which entailed the testing of narrative skills – the structure of narrative.

[17] On the cognitive definition in logopedic diagnosis and therapy - see Hrycyna (2017: 73–88).

other types. […] The answers of informants should never be taken on trust; they should rather be interpreted and explained" (Wierzbicka 1999: 415), because "language awareness" has several different levels, there are facts that are very close to the surface but also facts hidden deep, or even very deep under the surface" (ibid).

The author of the article believes that the described type of definition is an appropriate tool serving to explicate words used by intellectually disabled children and adults, because it is in principle an open definition, thus it is not confined to providing necessary and sufficient features. The scientific character of the definition has been "rejected" for popular knowledge, i.e. what language users know, think or mean when they use a particular word. In the model of cognitive definition, attention is drawn to cognitive subjectivism because meaning is not a true reflection of features of an object but the result of selection and interpretation, consequently, the meaning of a lexical unit is made up of characteristics with different degrees of intensity (cf. Wójtowicz 2013: 74–75). When creating this type of definition, it is essential to take profiling into account, i.e. subjective conceptualizations of a given object, which, however, are not separate meanings. The subject of description is the idea of a typical object (prototypical – with reference to Rosch's research (1975: 192–234) or stereotypical – with reference to the studies by Bartmiński and Panasiuk (2001: 371–395)). According to these scholars, the basic unit of our thinking is not concepts but prototypes and stereotypes of concepts.

Why then a cognitive definition in logopedic diagnosis? Because it relates to popular, informal knowledge, a knowledge we acquire while learning the language, and thereby a specific way of categorizing the world and general ways of thinking about reality. These rules are handed down to the child in the course of so-called "primary" socialization: in the process of our development they are extended and transformed as a result of so-called "secondary" socialization (school, social contacts, and mass media). However, Mirosława Marody argues, "the language acquired in the course of primary socialization produces a characteristic filter that selects information coming to us from the external reality" (1987: 183). And here we arrive at an extremely interesting conclusion, which contributes a lot of indispensable information to programming the logopedic treatment of intellectually normal children. If we treat language as a "tool" of imparting different ways of thinking, we may come to believe that "**the intellectual functioning of the individual is determined not so much by the language that s/he uses but rather by the language used by persons who socialize him/her since it is *their* language that becomes a tool for constructing *my world*** " (ibid).

Cognitive methodology allows analyzing that which is important for a person, established in his/her language, and substantiated by observations, perceptual experiences and reflections to the best of his/her ability. This methodology

can certainly be applied in research into the capabilities of intellectually disabled persons with regard to understanding (conceptualization of) concepts because it enables representing how a person with less developed cognitive functions interprets the world, what type of knowledge organized in the form of cognitive representation s/he uses in order to establish the meaning of a word. In the context of this type of considerations, apparently significant is also the conception proposed by Basil Bernstein (1980: 27–40), concerning the division of linguistic codes into the so-called restricted code (found in the working-class group) and the elaborated code (the language of the middle-class, the intelligentsia). This distinction is extremely important from the standpoint of semantic competence and skills, because "to persons who use the restricted code, language *describes* the world whereas to persons who use the elaborated code, language is *a tool for describing* the world, or that the former *think through language* while the latter *think in language* " (Marody 1987: 186).

Strategies for creating definitions by intellectually disabled persons should be combined with their cognitive capabilities[18]. The literature on the subject says that thinking in this group of people manifests itself inter alia in difficulties in expressing connections between phenomena, in inaccurate observations, and in diminished abilities related to visual analysis and synthesis. There are observable difficulties in accumulating knowledge on a subject, and in drawing conclusions. This is combined with a poverty of linguistic means, difficulties in generalization – showing the *genus proximum,* as well as problems with constructing longer texts. Utterances by intellectually disabled persons, Katarzyna Kaczorowska-Bray believes, are often chaotic and put together based on loosely attaching successive elements. These persons do not hierarchize events they are talking about, they often repeat the things already told, omitting essential issues (Kaczorowska-Bray 2012, 36: 64). Their linguistic behaviors are characteristic of the restricted code, and do not allow them "to go beyond language" while semantic explications of words are constructed based on popular, informal knowledge gained on one's own – (by "individual effort"). However, it is not a type of "isolated" knowledge because, according to Alfred Schütz's sociological theory of "popular thinking", each individual carries unique experiences resulting from his/her life story, but s/he lives and is active in a social group in which s/he is socialized and gains knowledge of the world, which (knowledge) is the collective outcome of the group. It is popular knowledge because it arises from "a natural attitude" that forms a social group, an attitude that generates the worldview based on the principle that "things are what they seem to be". It is popular knowledge, Schütz argues, that underlies effective

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[18] Defining concepts by intellectually disabled persons is the subject of considerations by M. Michalik. The synthesis of his achievements in this field is his following studies: (2001, 17–21; 2002, 469–480).

interactions, for the participants in social life accept the principle of "mutuality of perspectives" as self-evident: it allows them to believe that they interpreted phenomena and their features in an "identical", i.e. sufficiently similar, way (cf. Schütz, 1984: 137–192).

ANALYSIS OF THE MATERIAL

The material I have chosen to illustrate the abilities to create cognitive definitions by mildly intellectually disabled persons is somewhat special: these are examples of polar antonyms naming abstract concepts like: 'beauty – ugliness" 'love – hate'[19].

The semantic explications of '**beauty'** are constructed based on several aspects. It appears that the algorithm, a specific point of reference for this category, is a human. "Beauty" is defined first of all in reference to a person: his/her esthetic appearance – *że mamy czyste ubranie, ktoś ma ładną twarz;* behavior connected with his/her tidy image - *że dbamy o siebie, myjemy się;* proper manner and bearing – *ta osoba nie jest agresywna, nie jest wulgarna,* and through our attitude to this person, the attitude stemming from the foregoing features - *można na niego mile spojrzeć, uśmiechnąć się, że chce się z nim przebywać, że chce się z nim rozmawiać.* The subject (male) also notices "beauty" in the surrounding world – *to jest to, co widzimy za oknem.*

In the conversation, a photograph[20] was used which, according to the testing person, is a visualization of the concept of "beauty". When looking at it, the male subject pointed out the most characteristic elements of the landscape - *jest śnieg leży, zima na pewno jest, tutaj są góry widać, zachód słońca, tutaj jest tak bardzo kolorowo.* He referred to emotions - *no na pewno tutaj jest przyjemniej, tu są góry, można pochodzić, zobaczyć można zachód słońca*, *ładnie tu jest.* He did not use such words as "beautiful/beautifully or beauty", etc."

The definition in the *Dictionary of Contemporary Polish* (Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego [SJP]), ed. B. Dunaj (1996), is focused on the superordinate category. The term in question is defined as:

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[19] The language material was collected for a thesis by one of the female students attending the BA seminar. The subject was a 38-year-old man with a mild intellectual disability, participant in the Occupational Therapy Workshop. Paweł is a person responsible for himself, lives in a protected accommodation, and travels around town on his own He has many interests: reads a lot, especially adventure novels, watches films and listens to music. He is active: likes swimming, playing ball, and cycling.

For more on the relation of opposition see the article by: Jęczeń, Saj (2018, 65–83)

[20] The photos used while collecting the material showed: persons, places, and situations, which, the testing person believes, can be identified with the concepts analyzed.

"a set of features evoking a pleasant esthetic impression, also: special moral value: *Beauty of the mountains [Piękno gór]. Beauty of the surrounding nature [Piękno otaczającej przyrody]. Admire beauty [Podziwiać piękno]. Beauty of the soul, character [Piękno duszy, charakteru]*". (SJP, 790)

Similarly, in the *Different Dictionary of Polish* (Inny słownik języka polskiego ISJP)[21], ed. M. Bańka (2000):

"a set of characteristics of the beautiful; *Many have been enchanted by the Beskidy landscape with its beauty [Krajobraz beskidzki niejednego urzekł swym pięknem]* (…). *He had an innate love of beauty [Miał wrodzone umiłowanie piękna]* (ISJP, 67)

Therefore, worth noting is the different level of generality in the definitions in question (the popular/informal provided by the patient and those in the dictionaries). The patient's utterances are characterized by a low level of generality: "beauty" is defined mainly by means of specific epithets referring to human appearance and behavior. We can agree that they are within the scope of the name but are they definitional features? It appears that the features "tidiness" and "politeness" are peripheral in the hierarchy of semantic features of the studied word. On the other hand, "beauty of the soul and character", referred to by the author of the *Dictionary …* (SJP) corresponds with the expression from the male patient's definitions: *ta osoba nie jest agresywna, chce się z nią przebywać* etc.; while the dictionary's "beauty of the surrounding nature" corresponds with the patient's construction– *to jest to, co widzimy za oknem.*

The lexical material provided by the man is proof of difficulties in verbalizing thoughts; at the same time, this incomplete cognitive definition refers highly "perversely" to the century-old problems with explaining universal values. Plato himself said: "Beautiful things are arduous", while the Russian novelist Anton Chekhov wrote, explaining the essence of beauty, "Everything should be first-rate in a person, his face, clothes, soul and thoughts." (1971). It is surprising that the semantic features of "beauty", named by the writer, were present in the patient's utterance, but they are not definitional characteristics, being rather the verbalization of demonstrational, individual associations resulting from personal experience.

The semantic explication of the concept of '**ugliness**' is also constructed in reference to a person, his/her external appearance – *jest nieogolony, jest nieumyty, śmierdzi od niego, niezadbany;* his/her behavior and negative features of character – *jest wulgarny i prymitywny, wywyższa się nad kimś, jest osobą, która nie chce pomóc.* The kind of those features is rather of facultative character. These are

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[21] Definitions in the *Inny słownik języka polskiego*, ed. Mirosław Bańka, present the point of view of "the average language user".

not the traits relevant to the meaning of the word in question. At the same time, the male patient's considerations are accompanied by evaluative reflection: *Bo tu powiedziałem, że człowiek zadbany czasami jest wulgarny i prymitywny, ten zaniedbany może być pomocny, może być bardziej otwarty dla ludzi, może być bardziej taki miły (…) można na nim polegać, można mu zaufać.* In the cited paraphrase, the subject repeats connotational features that function in the consciousness of language users in reference to the well-known proverb "All that glitters is not gold".

The conceptualization of the concept also takes place in relation to the external world, i.e. the weather: *… a wokół nas, jak z oknem pada deszcz, to to jest brzydki dzień, że się nie chce wychodzić na dwór, bo jest zimno, nie chce się chodzić na spacery,* and the pervading mess: *tak, że są śmieci porozrzucane, że leżą na ziemi jakieś odpadki jedzenia, papierosy, butelki, po wódce, po winie, takie rozbite.*

While defining the concept of "ugliness", the man refers not only to crucial features, which identify the phenomenon, but also to additional characteristics. The stereotypical determinants such as "rainy, gloomy day" and "litter" reflect the naïve idea of the characteristics of the concept, molded through the acquisition of verbalized social experiences[22].

The *Dictionary of Contemporary Polish* defines "ugliness" and the uses of the word as follows:

> "1. a physical object or something abstract that provokes negative esthetic feelings, a monstrosity/ugly thing, hideousness (…). 2. A set of characteristics of something (…) provoking negative esthetic impressions; the opposite of beauty. *Repulsive, disgusting ugliness [Odpychająca, odrażająca brzydota]. The ugliness of a dirty town [Brzydota brudnego miasta]*". (SJP, 124)

The foregoing definition contains prototypical features, which characterize the essence of the phenomenon.

The definition in the *Different Dictionary of Polish* in turn reads:

> „1.a feature of that which looks ugly. *Luckily, the ugliness of his features was relieved by his captivating, warm smile [Brzydotę jego rysów na szczęście łagodził zniewalający, ciepły uśmiech]…The ugliness of tight alleys and dark backyards was off-putting [Ciasne uliczki i ciemne podwórka odstręczały brzydotą]. 2. Ugly objects. He was a poet wallowing in ugliness [Był poetą pławiącym się w brzydocie]. 3. An ugly object or person. A colloquial word. In my office, there are only ugly ones [U mnie w biurze same brzydoty], no one to look at [nie ma na kim oka zawiesić]*". (ISJP, 132)

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[22] See the reflections by M. Wiśniewska-Kin (2007) on how children understand the meaning of mental concepts.

The definition that we can obtain from the conversation with the male patient in question is richer in secondary components referring to the description of a person, his/her appearance and behavior. We will not find the superordinate category in it. Describing a picture concerning "ugliness", the subject said that: *ten obrazek jest bardzo ponury, ta dzielnica, taka, że aż strach wejść*; *kamienice stare, tutaj jest taka szarość.* The man's utterance is closer to the definition in the *Different Dictionary of Polish* (Inny słownik języka polskiego), which has been "constructed" from the standpoint of the average language user.

The analysis of the concept of '**love**' from the perspective of the intellectually disabled adult in question looks as follows: *miłość to jest jak ktoś się zakocha w drugiej osobie, jak widzimy jakąś parę zakochanych.*

When trying to define, the subject easily uses a metaphor like: *szybciej bije serce* or a collocation/idiom: *można dostać zawrotu głowy* (because of love)*.* He categorizes "love" with respect to the object of his feeling, e.g.: *...jest jeszcze inna miłość braterska, jest miłość do siostry, jest miłość rodzicielska, jest miłość do dziadków i jak dziadkowie kochają wnuki; i do zwierząt, i do roślin.* In his utterance the male subject particularly expands stereotyped associations connected with emotion, e.g.: *...z czym mi się kojarzy słowo miłość... na pewno z sercem czerwonym, na pewno z Walentynkami, z nocnymi spacerami o zachodzie słońca, na pewno z kolacją przy świecą, na pewno z zabawą, z filmem o zakochanych, z piosenkami o zakochanych.* He makes a rich description of the behaviors of a person in love e.g.: *…no nie widzi się poza tą osobą świata* (collocation), *staje w jej obronie, może wdać się w bójkę* i *może się obrazić na kogoś, jak ktoś coś złego powie o tej osobie,* and, in his summation, he expresses an interesting and contentful point: *osoba troskliwa, opiekuńcza, na pewno to jest osoba, która wie, co to jest miłość.*

The *Dictionary of Contemporary Polish* contains the following definition of 'love':

> „1. a profound feeling towards another person, usually combined with a strong desire to be with him/her all the time and a wish to give him/her happiness; readiness to be disinterestedly devoted to or to serve someone; brotherly or sisterly love. 2. A strong attachment to an animal (…); 3. Feeling an emotional bond with a place (…)" (SJP, 568).

The *Different Dictionary of Polish* reads:

> "love is a feeling we have to someone we love or to whom we feel deep attachment and respect" (…); love of God, mother country, nature (…), Love of some object or some occupation means a deep attachment to and pleasure we find in them; (…) love is a physical association of two people (…); self-love" (867).

On the basis of the semantic features distinguished by the subject, it can be said that his definition is complete, rich in connotation features (associations), deprived of the superordinate category only – the genus proximum.

The photo which was a contribution to the conversation on 'love' was described as follows: *tutaj jest para zakochanych, leży na plaży. Jest na pewno wieczór, bo zachód słońca widać.* (…) *Można nadać tytuł temu obrazkowi »Zakochani są wśród nas«.* The title of the photo probably echoes a well-known song by Helena Majdaniec "Zakochani są wśród nas, zakochani pierwszy raz (Those in love are among us, in love for the first time)", whose trace was recalled from memory while the subject was looking at the photo.

The exemplification material, which served to distinguish the definition of '**hate (hatred)**'is very scanty. This concept turned out to be difficult to define. The question "What is hatred"was answered by: *when we hate someone* [*jak kogoś nienawidzimy.]* Hatred is associated by the subject with the following emotions: *anger, aggression, braw*l*, quarrel,* and with i*nsults*, *being offended* i.e. with the emotional states that belong to the common semantic field.

CONCLUSION

The application of cognitive methods, especially the cognitive definition, for analyzing utterances of children and adults at different stages of mental development appears to be justified for several reasons. The main one is that the cognitivists believe that "language is an element of the human cognitive apparatus, which also consists of the abilities to perceive and categorize, of emotions, processes of abstraction and processes of understanding. All these cognitive abilities work in tandem with language and are influenced by it" (Tabakowska 2001: 11). Our studies have shown that definitions are molded by personal and social experiences: they contain subjective and intersubjective contents. They are structures that represent and organize the subject's knowledge related to the described phenomena of reality. Like cognitive schemas, they are "packages of knowledge", which contain there is "packed knowledge" recorded in memory and recalled through language. The presented linguistic material, gained from one person, is too scanty to draw out far-reaching conclusions from it, nevertheless, it can be the beginning of further empirical studies conducted in a larger group of subjects.

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