The effect of international experts on company financial performance

• Authors: Kravchenko Grygorii

Title variants

PL

Wpływ zagranicznych ekspertów na wyniki finansowe spółek

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Objective: The article aims to evaluate the influence of international supervisory board experts on firm financial performance, based on the impact of international experts’ characteristics, such as their knowledge, experience, independence, and connections. Methodology/research approach: The empirical study is based on a unique handcollected dataset covering a final sample of 256 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) and which operated on the market during the observation period 2010- 2015. The Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression model with a random effect is employed to test the hypotheses. Findings: The findings strongly suggest that the presence of supervisory board members with an outside perspective and international experience may exert a positive impact on companies’ operational outcomes. Research limitations/implications: The research has practical implications for Polish governmental agencies, as it verifies the usefulness of the recommendations for supervisory board composition presented in the Best Practices for WSE Listed Companies. Originality/value: The study contributes to the existing literature on the factors that affect company performance. Consequently, great value is added to the research on supervisory board characteristics that are crucial for effective monitoring and advisory roles, enhancing the quality of corporate governance.

PL

Cel: Celem artykułu jest ocena wpływu zagranicznych ekspertów, będących członkami rad nadzorczych, na wyniki finansowe przedsiębiorstw, uwzględniając przy tym cechy charakte-rystyczne ekspertów, takie jak: wiedza, doświadczenie, niezależność oraz kontakty. Metodyka/podejście badawcze: Badanie empiryczne opiera się na wyjątkowym, ręcznie zebranym zbiorze danych, obejmującym końcową próbę 256 spółek notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych (GPW) w Warszawie, które prowadziły działalność na rynku w la-tach 2010–2015. Postawione hipotezy zostały sprawdzone przy wykorzystaniu Uogólnionej Metody Najmniejszych Kwadratów (UMNK) z efektami losowymi. Wyniki: Wyniki badania jednoznacznie wskazują, że obecność członków rad nadzorczych z doświadczeniem międzynarodowym może pozytywnie wpływać na wyniki finansowe spółek. Ograniczenia/implikacje badawcze: Badanie ma praktyczne implikacje dla polskich agencji rządowych, dostarczając analizę weryfikującą zasadność rekomendacji dotyczących różno-rodności rady nadzorczej, zawartych w Dobrych praktykach spółek notowanych na GPW. Oryginalność/wartość: Artykuł wnosi wkład do istniejącej literatury skoncentrowanej na identyfikacji czynników determinujących wyniki przedsiębiorstw. Ponadto, wartością dodaną badania jest rozpoznanie znaczenia cech charakterystycznych członków rad nadzorczych, kluczowych dla skutecznego monitorowania i pełnienia funkcji doradczych, które podnoszą jakość ładu korporacyjnego.

Keywords

EN

corporate governance; international experts; company financial performance

PL

ład korporacyjny; zagraniczni eksperci; wyniki finansowe przedsiębiorstw

• Publisher: Stowarzyszenie Księgowych w Polsce (SKwP), Zarząd Główny, Rada Naukowa
• Journal: Zeszyty Teoretyczne Rachunkowości
• Year: 2021
• Issue: 45(3)
• Pages: 203-232

Contributors

author

Kravchenko Grygorii

• Kozminski University, Department of Accounting

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