2013 | nr 23 | 45-70
Article title

Dwie (anty)filozoficzne „gramatyki” Ludwiga Wittgensteina

Title variants
Two (anti)philosophical Grammars of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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Wittgenstein is the author of two conceptions of “grammar”, that were meant to be tools of reaching the same goal: discrediting of the traditional, i.e. “metaphysical” questions of philosophy. His early conception concerns logical grammar being the language of logic notation, which is devoid of logical constants. This idea was supported by the ontological thesis that there are no logical objects. In fact, it was not indispensable for achieving the intended purpose, since the elimination of philosophical problems was provided by the semantic argument that the only sensible statements are those of the natural sciences. The second concept of grammar, presented in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, seems more ambiguous. Grammar is a set of rules of the language game, having a status of grammatical statements. Examples of such statements are diverse, and desirable, according to the authors, reformulation of them all into concrete orders or prohibitions seems problematic. In the Investigations Wittgenstein distinguishes between deep and surface grammar, which serves to determine the proper task of philosophy as description of the deep grammar (especially the grammar of philosophically relevant words). In this sense New Philosophy is a kind of philosophical grammar. Wittgensteinian grammar is also anti-philosophical, as it aims at the elimination of erroneous (pseudo)metaphysical claims derived from misleading forms of surface grammar. Despite the differences in the concepts of language and grammar in the early and late Wittgenstein, he has not changed his critical approach to the traditional philosophical questions.
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