TEMPORARY FUNDING IN THE RESOLUTION PROCESS

• Authors: Pawłowicz Leszek , Borsuk Marcin
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

Following the default of Lehman Brothers, governments around the world had to mobilise enormous rescue packages to cope with widespread financial panic. In these efforts a fundamental flaw in the international financial architecture became apparent, namely the inability of national supervisors to orchestrate orderly bank resolutions across borders. Since then, the international regulatory community has made efforts in devising the best approach to resolving large and cross-border banking groups. This article presents reflections on the recent regulatory initiatives in the field of loss-absorbing capital buffers and temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution of a global systemically important bank (“G-SIB”).

Keywords

EN

resolution; resolution funding; capital buffers; G-SIBs; TLAC; MREL; burden sharing

• Publisher: Bankowy Fundusz Gwarancyjny
• Journal: Bezpieczny Bank
• Year: 2016
• Issue: 4 (65)
• Pages: 60-74

Contributors

author

Pawłowicz Leszek

• Wydział Zarządzania Uniwersytet Gdański

author

Borsuk Marcin

• Wydział Zarządzania Uniwersytet Gdański

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Identifiers

ISSN

1429-2939