Michael Inwood,
University of Oxford
Marcin Rychter
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw

Refashioning the Spirit.
Michael Inwood's New Translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology*

In March 2018 Oxford University Press will publish a new English translation of Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. It was translated anew, annotated and commented by Michael Inwood, a renowned authority in the field, author of *Hegel* (1983), *Hegel's Dictionary* (1992) and *A Commentary on Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (2010). We thought this was a very good occasion to talk about this major work in the history of philosophy, the challenges faced by its translators and the nature of translating philosophical texts in general.

We are honoured to present an interview with Michael Inwood who also kindly provided a short dictionary of the key concepts of Hegel's work in his new translation, explaining why he changed some of the English terms from the previous translation by Arnold Miller (1977).

Storming Hegel's Citadel

Michael Inwood interviewed by Marcin Rychter

Eidos: Why do we seem constantly to need new translations of classical works of philosophy? Is a definitive translation of any philosophical text possible or desirable?

Michael Inwood: A cynical answer to the first of these questions might be "cupidity and vanity." Both the publisher and the translator profit from a new version of a classical work, regardless of whether it is really needed by its purchasers. My own translation began as a "revision" of Miller's version. This would have been

a simple exercise if I had restricted myself to a light revision, making what were, to my mind, a few obvious improvements (such as rendering *Begriff* as "concept" rather than "notion" and removing such of Miller's capitalizations as seemed unnecessary), but once I started revising I found it difficult to restrain myself and ended up by producing what is in effect a new translation. The labour involved in this enterprise is unlikely to be adequately recompensed by whatever enhancement of my income or reputation I may receive. So for me the exercise was largely its own reward, enabling me to delve more deeply into a work that I had read several times but never felt that I thoroughly understood. Whether my readers profit from it as much as I have in producing it is for them to judge.

As for the second question, a definitive translation of a work does not seem to me possible. For one thing, the English language changes over time and so every so often a new translation will be needed for speakers of c u r r e n t English. (One might, of course, insist that a definitive translation of Hegel into English would be a translation into the English of H e g e l ' s time rather than our own, but this seems excessively purist.) A second consideration is that a translation faces competing demands, notably readability, or intelligibility, and accuracy. These are not always easy to reconcile. Take, for example, the sentence: "*Die menschliche Wahrnehmung ist immer schon begrifflich artikuliert*" (which is not a sentence from Hegel!). A literal translation of this would be: "Human perception is a l w a y s a l r e a d y conceptually articulated." But "always already" is not an ordinary English expression. So in the interests of intelligibility, we might prefer to sacrifice accuracy and write: "Human perception is conceptually articulated f r o m t h e s t a r t ." A complication here is that a translation may affect the recipient language. Under the influence primarily of literal translations of Heidegger, the expression "always already" has begun to creep into even non-Heideggerian philosophical English and to be, or at least seem to be, intelligible to the educated English reader. (Another example of this is the word "*Dasein*", which, again thanks to Heidegger, is on the way to becoming a naturalized inhabitant of the English language.) There are many Hegelian words and expressions which similarly began life as foreign intruders but have now become more familiar in English: "in itself, for itself, in and for itself", "sublate" (for *aufheben*), and so on. Nevertheless, there remains a tension between intelligibility and accuracy that is unlikely ever to be completely resolved. It looks as if there is a continuum ranging from an entirely literal and accurate translation to a paraphrase in lucid, everyday English. A paraphrase will naturally introduce interpretation into the translation, interpretation that is inevitably controversial, while my own translation lies towards the literal end of the spectrum – without, I hope, an excessive sacrifice of intelligibility. The conclusion I draw from these considerations is that there really is no definitive or ideal translation, but that there is a place for different translations, steering a different path between the competing purposes that a translation might serve. One might suggest that a definitive translation would be one that has the same effect on an English reader as Hegel's original text does on a German reader. But that faces several objections. Is the hypothetical German reader a German reader contemporary with Hegel himself? In that case the translation should be in modern English. Or is the German reader a modern contemporary of our own? In that case the translation should employ an archaic brand of English comparable with Hegel's German. Moreover, it is rumoured that German students often prefer Norman Kemp Smith's translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* to the German text, because it splits up Kant's overlong sentences. This suggests that the question should not be confined to definitive t r a n s l a t i o n . Is there even a definitive text of the original? Perhaps there is room for a German edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* that, among other things, splits its sentences into shorter ones. However, this is a liberty that scholarly etiquette accords to the translator, but denies to a mere editor.

Eidos: How much attention would you say a translator of philosophical works should pay to the literary aspects of the work being translated? In your experience is literary elegance of a translation reconcilable with its accuracy, and can it adequately convey the literary style of the original?

Michael Inwood: Hegel's early biographer, Karl Rosenkranz, described the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a "genuine work of art", explaining it as follows: "with the sharpest determination of expression there is at the same time combined a sublime poetry, which embodies even the hardest material in original images to the point, as it were, of microscopic distinctness." Rosenkranz highlighted in particular Hegel's accounts of the unhappy consciousness, pleasure and necessity, the law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit, virtue and the course of the world, and absolute freedom and terror. Naturally, an accurate translation must retain such vivid passages as these and also such striking images as the description of the succession of shapes of consciousness as a "Bacchanalian frenzy in which no member is sober." However, when it comes to the passages in between such high spots, and to the details of Hegel's literary style, the word "elegance" does not readily spring to mind. I am not a native German speaker and my reading in German has largely been confined to German philosophy – which mercifully has a smaller vocabulary than, say, a work of history or of fiction. So I am not best qualified to assess Hegel's literary qualities. But the impression I derive from my own reading and from the comments of German speakers (such as Professor Fred Beiser, who has said that reading Hegel is like chewing gravel) is that Hegel is not an elegant stylist of the stature of, say, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Hume or Russell in their own different ways. Clearly to translate Hegel in a way that made him as elegant as any of these writers would involve an intolerable sacrifice of accuracy. However, because of some deficiencies of the English language or, as one might alternatively put it, some peculiarities of the German language, strict accuracy requires a dilution of even such elegance as Hegel displays. For example, German has pairs of words that are near synonyms, but not exact synonyms. Every language has such cases, but not necessarily the same ones as other languages. For instance, English has "recognize" and "acknowledge", whereas Hegelian German, as far as I know, has only *anerkennen*, Conversely, German, like many other European languages, has two words for "law", *Recht* and *Gesetz*, while English has only one, though we sometimes awkwardly translate *Recht* as "right". Hegelian German, like French, has two words for "know" – *erkennen* and *wissen* – whereas normal English has only one, though again we awkwardly call on the rebarbative word "cognize" to stand for *erkennen*. Again, German has two word-groups for "individual" – *individuell*, *Individuum*, etc. and *einzeln*, etc. These are sometimes used synonymously, but sometimes not: for example, Napoleon was a world historical *Individuum*, not a world historical *Einzelperson*. In the interests of accuracy, I have resorted to English words "single, singular, singleton, etc." to render *einzeln*-words, even though to an English eye "individual, etc." looks more natural. This occasionally produces strange results. For example, the word "singleton" now commonly refers to a person with no sexual partner. But here I feel that the English language can be "bent" and rescued from its vulgarizers.

Another such case is the pair *Sache* and *Ding*. *Ding* incontestably means "thing." So does *Sache* sometimes, but only sometimes. It is roughly a thing that matters, a thing in question or at issue, and sometimes amounts to "subject-matter." It is, however, a word of great importance to Hegel, and so I felt that it needed to be translated in the same way throughout the book. I have resolved this dilemma by translating *Sache* as "Thing", in contrast to *Ding* as "thing". This has invited some encouragement, but also some protests, especially as "the Thing" sounds like something from a 1950's science fiction film, or perhaps the Italian mafia (*cosa nostra*).

Eidos: What are the most characteristic features of Hegel's German, and what is the relation between his ideas and the way they are expressed? For example would you say that his style differed from that of other German philosophers of his time, and if so was this because he needed to experiment with language to convey his ideas?

Michael Inwood: Hegel's literary style developed throughout his career. Apart from his student notes and essays, it begins with what are called the "Early Theological Writings" that he composed while he was a house tutor in Bern and later Frankfurt. As far as I can see, there is nothing especially remarkable in the style of these essays, though some of his ideas and his treatment of such concepts as "spirit" and "love" do foreshadow

those of his later works. When he moved to Jena with the help of a legacy from his father and began to teach at the university there, he renewed his relationship with his younger, but more precocious friend Schelling. In his first book, *On the Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Philosophies* (1801), he supported Schelling against Fichte and, in writings and lectures of this period, adopted some of Schelling's stylistic mannerisms, such as the application of scientific or mathematical terms – for instance, *Potenz* – to philosophical ideas. (He also adopted some of the vocabulary and mannerisms of Fichte, though he hardly ever uses Fichte's triad of "thesis, antithesis, synthesis".) By the time of the *Phenomenology*, however, he has begun to develop his own vocabulary and, in the Preface to this work, criticizes Schelling's fanciful scientific analogies in a manner that led to a lasting breach of their friendship. (A similar breach had already occurred in the relationship between Fichte and Schelling: Fichte began by regarding Schelling as a loyal disciple, but fell out with him when Schelling began to develop ideas of his own.)

These are, however, quarrels within a family of rather similar philosophers – Schelling later accused Hegel of having stolen many of his ideas. It will help to locate Hegel's place on the philosophical map if we consider two quite different models of philosophy. On the one hand, there are philosophers who begin with clearly defined terms that are supposed to retain the same meaning throughout the course of their work. These terms are deployed in true premises and from these premises conclusions are deduced by logically legitimate procedures, such that the conclusions must be true, given that the premises are true – and, of course, that the words do not change their meanings. Hegel's prime example of such a philosopher was Christian Wolff. But many other philosophers have aspired to this ideal, notably Spinoza and, to some extent, even Kant himself – though with great philosophers such as these the deductive method begins to burst at the seams. On the other hand, there are philosophers who begin not with true premises and clearly defined terms but with a rough, provisional idea, which is then subjected to criticism and, as a result, turned into something less objectionable, though this in turn reveals defects of its own which need to be corrected – and so it goes on until they reach a conception that satisfies their requirements. In the course of this process, words may well change their meanings. Hegel falls into this second camp. But this model has a longer history. Plato himself often followed such a procedure, especially in his early dialogues. A definition of, say, virtue or piety or justice is proposed by one of the interlocutors, but is then shown by Socrates to involve a contradiction, either within itself or with the proponent's other beliefs, a contradiction that is admitted by the proponent of the definition himself. An interlocutor, either the same or another one, then proposes another definition, which avoids the defects of the first, but displays new defects of its own. Sometimes a dialogue ends with a solution that satisfies the disputants; sometimes the dialogue is said to have ended by returning to its beginning, so that the inquiry has simply come round in a circle; in other cases, such as the *Republic*, Socratic dialogue is abandoned and a solution is sought on an altogether higher level.[1]

Many of these features appear in Hegel too. His thought develops by the discovery and resolution of contradictions. The words he uses do not have sharp, well-defined edges, but acquire new meanings as he proceeds. His whole system, he tells us, forms a circle, or rather a circle of circles. At the end of the *Phenomenology*, which proceeds in a somewhat Socratic manner, he ascends to the higher level of "absolute knowledge" or "logic", which resembles some of Plato's later works, such as the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*, more than it does his early works. Hegel resembles Plato (and also Aristotle) in that he does not simply reject his philosophical predecessors and start with a clean slate, but takes them on board and incorporates modified versions of them in his own system. Hegel has, however, accumulated a wider range of philosophical predecessors than Plato

---

1) Evangelia Sembou, in her '*Midwifery' and Criticism in G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Sankt Augustin: Akademia, 2012), has given a detailed account of the similarity between Hegel's method and that of Plato in his Socratic dialogues.

and Aristotle had available, and also a far wider knowledge of history in general than they could have had. So that is an important difference of Hegel, not only from the ancients, but also from most of his contemporaries – that Hegel took history very seriously, not only the history of philosophy, but political and cultural history, the history of art and the history of religion. Most of this appears not in his published works, but in his lectures, which have been transmitted to us by his loyal pupils. I should also mention that whereas Plato seems to have regarded the circularity of a discussion as a sign of failure and of the need to approach the question in a different way, Hegel regarded circularity as a virtue of his system. Unlike other philosophers, including not only the ancients, but his British admirers such as Francis Herbert Bradley and John Ellis McTaggart, Hegel did not regard the aim of philosophy as a stable system, free of tensions and contradictions, but as a continuous movement of thought, thought that is essentially dynamic rather than static. Hegel seems to have more awareness of the complexities of philosophical method than most of his predecessors have had. He came as close as anyone to the philosophical ideal of "thinking about thinking".

As for your question about the relationship between Hegel's ideas and the way in which they are expressed, this is immensely difficult to answer in more detail, because Hegel's language is often so strange and impenetrable. As I indicated in my answer to your first question, translations of Hegel lie on a continuum between an accurate (or as near accurate as possible) rendering and a lucid paraphrase in ordinary English. I have tried to use ordinary English in my commentary on the *Phenomenology*. But the problem with that is that one cannot be confident that it captures what Hegel is saying or, at least, that it doesn't miss something that was important to him. And as we move closer towards the other end of the spectrum, it often becomes ever harder to see what Hegel means.

Eidos: Which amongst Hegel's ideas or concepts would you say will continue to inspire future thinkers, and have proven to have lasting value for our understanding of the issues Hegel tackles?

Michael Inwood: I doubt whether there are any fully fledged Hegelians today, in the way that there are still fully fledged Marxists and fully fledged Wittgensteinians. Nevertheless, various strands in Hegel's thought have been taken up by later thinkers – in both the "continental" and the Anglo-American traditions – and either inspired their ideas or provided a noble pedigree for ideas they already had. One example of this is his "end of art" thesis, which was taken up, sympathetically and fruitfully, by Arthur Danto and by Edgar Wind.[2] Another example is Hegel's distinction between *Sittlichkeit* (roughly, social morality) and *Moralität* (roughly the morality of the conscientious individual). This has helped to inspire a whole school of communitarian philosophers – such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair Macintyre – who stress the importance of social institutions in the formation of the self – in opposition to the liberal individualism associated with Kant. More generally, I've already mentioned the idea that the words we use do not have sharp, impermeable boundaries and that they resist the attempt to impose them. This seems to me both true and important, and it led John Niemeyer Findlay to say that "dialectic represents a fairly definite, very valuable method of higher-level comment on previously entertained notions and positions."[3] Findlay was himself a skilful practitioner of such dialectic. In the passage from which I have quoted he mentions his own "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel,"[4] but I would also recommend an article of his that is not specifically about Hegel, but nevertheless displays Findlay's bold inventiveness and dialectical virtuosity: "The Notion of Infinity."[5] I should also mention more recent attempts to make sense of Hegel and, in doing so, to make sense of the world, the mind and language, notably those of

---

2) Edge Wind, *Art and Anarchy*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1985).

3) John Niemeyer Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), 354.

4) John Niemeyer Findlay, *Language, Mind and Value* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 271–231.

5) Ibid., 146–164.

Robert Brandom and John McDowell. McDowell enlists Hegel's support in his battle against "bald" or "reductive naturalism," which cannot accommodate moral values among the furniture of the world. Brandom finds in Hegel an "inferential role semantics," the idea that the meaning of a word or expression depends on its relationships, especially its inferential relationships, with other words and expressions – in contrast to the commonly held theory that their meanings depend on the truth conditions of sentences in which they occur. Hegel has also played a part in the emergence of "dialetheism," the doctrine that, despite Aristotle's objections, there are true contradictions.

As for my own case, I think that I have learnt a lot from my interaction with Hegel and that much of his thought has rubbed off on me. But I would hesitate to say that I am a convinced Hegelian. In my earlier work I tried to make general sense of Hegel, which I like to compare with taking a city by carpet-bombing. More recently I have tried to storm his citadel by fighting house by house, that is, examining particular passages in detail to find out what he is saying, where he is right, and, if need be, where he goes wrong. I feel that I managed this with some success in my commentaries on his introduction to aesthetics and on his *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind*. The *Phenomenology* is written in a more expansive and often more opaque style. So I would not have been able to subject the whole of it to the thorough dissection it deserves before the next millennium. But I think I have had some success, particularly with some sections of the Preface and Introduction, and some other passages, such as his brilliant but, in my view, flawed critique of physiognomy and phrenology. However, it is again my readers who will have the final say on this.[6]

I must decline to make any prediction about Hegel's effect on "f u t u r e thinkers" or about the "l a s t i n g value" of the ideas I have listed. As Hegel himself said, "the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk."

Eidos: What is the best use of philosophical dictionaries (for example the Hegel and Heidegger dictionaries which you have written)?

Micheal Inwood: As far as I recall, the Hegel dictionary is virtually a book about Hegel and it could be used as a substitute for reading another book about him or even for reading Hegel himself. There are, of course, many omissions in both dictionaries. For example, I often mentioned other philosophers in them in order to fill in the background to the thought of my two protagonists, but I did not have separate entries on other philosophers to whom they are importantly related – Aristotle, Plato, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and so on. (However, I was under some pressure from the publisher to keep the books fairly short.) In both cases the use of the Index is crucial; a word (or word-group) is essentially related, if only by contrast, to other words, and these relationships are often illuminated by its occurrences in entries other than that specifically devoted to it. A dictionary of this type does not, of course, tell one everything one needs to know to in order to understand a text. Apart from the inevitable omissions of words that might give rise to difficulties, it cannot explain the use of every word in all the contexts in which it occurs. For that one needs a commentary rather than a dictionary. I conclude by mentioning two other dictionaries. One is the excellent Hegel dictionary by Glenn Magee, the other is Farrell's *Dictionary of German Synonyms*, a work that I constantly consulted when writing both my dictionaries and from which I learnt more about the English language as well as the German.[7]

---

6) The books referred to are Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics* (London: Penguin, 1995) and *Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). My account of Hegel's criticism of physiognomy and phrenology in the commentary of my new book is an abbreviated version of a longer essay, "Hegel's Critique of Physiognomy and Phrenology," in *Hegel's Philosophical Psychology*, ed. Susanne Herrmann-Sinai and Lucia Ziglioli (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 3–19.

7) Glenn Magee, *The Hegel Dictionary*, (London: Continuum, 2010) and Ralph Barstow Farrell, *Dictionary of German Synonyms*, third edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

The Phenomenology of Spirit – A Concise Dictionary of Key Terms

Michael Inwood

I have undertaken an extensive revision of Arnold Miller's 1977 translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. I recognize the considerable merits of Miller's version, its intelligibility and its literary elegance. However, I believe that there is room for an English translation that pays more respect to the subtlety and intricacy of Hegel's German than Miller does. My translation policy differs from Arnold Miller's in at least three respects. In the first place, Hegel's own punctuation and italicization often get lost in Miller. I have attempted to restore them in the belief that, while they often strike us as eccentric, it should be left for the reader to decide what effect they have on Hegel's meaning and not imposed on the reader by the translator. I have, however, moderated this policy when intelligibility seemed to require it. Secondly, Miller usually capitalized words that he took to have a significant technical meaning for Hegel. Thus he has "Notion" for *Begriff* (which I transform into "concept"), "Understanding" for *Verstand*, and so on. This has no justification in Hegel's text and, in my view, it draws an unwarrantedly sharp distinction between what is a technical use and what is not. Again, it should be left to the reader (or to a note) to decide this question and not imposed by the translator. I myself capitalize words only where grammar requires it, and also for the purpose of disambiguation: to distinguish between grammatically different uses of a word (especially between its use as a plain adjective or adverb and its use as a noun) and between different German words that have to be translated by the same English word, between, for example, "self" for *sich* and "Self" for *das Selbst* or again between *(das) Sein* ("Being") and *seiend* ("being, that is, in being") or *das Seiende* (sometimes "beings"). I have been encouraged in this by the time-honoured practice in English prose, even non-philosophical prose, of differentiating a "state" in the sense of "condition" from a "State" in the political sense, and a "church" as a building from a "Church" as an institution. Finally, despite his exaggerated respect for some of Hegel's technical terms, Miller nevertheless dissolves others into various paraphrases, especially in the case of *an sich, für sich, an und für sich, das Ansich*, etc. I have restored such terms in the form of "in itself", etc, leaving it to the reader (or a note) to decide what Hegel means in the context. I have been especially concerned to preserve Hegel's distinction between what are for him near-synonyms, but not exact synonyms. An example of this is the distinction between *individuell*, etc. and *einzeln*, etc., a distinction that gets lost in Miller, but is preserved in the French translations, especially that of Jean Hyppolite (1947), and in the 1991 Geraets-Suchting-Harris translation of *The Encyclopaedia Logic*. Below I give some examples of words that, in my view, need to be translated carefully and consistently, especially in order to differentiate them from other words:

Actual(ity): *wirklich*, *Wirklichkeit*. **Real, reality**: *real*, *reell*, *Realität*. For Hegel, *wirklich* is a more weighty term than *real* or *reell*. Everything actual is real, but not everything real is actual. *Wirklich* "means 'existing in actuality and effect' as opposed to something which exists in name or in mere possibility".[8] It is thus similar to *wahr*, "true", in the sense of "'corresponding to the prototype' and 'conforming with the real idea of the thing as it should be,' opposed to the false and apparent".[9] In *PS* §47 "the actual" (*das Wirkliche*) is equated with the "Being-there" of a concept. Thus, e.g., an acorn is not actual, since although it involves the concept of an oak-tree, the concept is not yet realized, but merely potential. Equally a deformed or stunted tree is not actual, since it is not an adequate realization of the concept. A stray piece of wood or speck of dust is not actual, even though it is there, since it does not realize anything that Hegel would recognize as a concept.

---

8) Ralph Barstow Farrell, *Dictionary of German Synonyms*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 271.

9) Ibid.

Alienate, alienation: *entfremden, Entfremdung.* **Estrange, estrangement:** *(sich) entäussern, Entäusserung.* These are near synonyms, and are used synonymously in e.g. §488. But they are not exact synonyms. To alienate something is to make it strange or alien. Thus in alienation something becomes a stranger to itself. To estrange something is simply to part with it or dispose of it. It might also be translated as "externalize, exteriorize", and sometimes it is the counterpart of *(sich) erinnern, Erinnerung,* "recollect(ion), internaliz-e, -ation."

Appear, appearance: *erscheinen, Erscheinung.* These words, like their English counterparts, have two main senses: (1) "emerge, come into view, become manifest," where there is no contrast with reality; (2) "seem, look (as if)," where something may appear to be other than it really is. (Compare: "He appeared on my doorstep yesterday" and "He appeared (to be) depressed") *Erscheinung* can sometimes be translated as "phenomenon", which, like the word "Phenomenology", comes from the Greek word for "appear", *phainomai,* which has the same ambiguity.

Being: *(das) Sein.* The infinitive of the verb "to be" is *sein.* Hegel often uses it as a noun and then it is capitalized as *Sein.* I have retained the capital in order to distinguish it from the present participle, *seiend,* especially when it is nominalized as *das Seiende,* "the being", "beings", or "that which is", as in §53. A special problem is the use of the participle *seiend* as an attributive adjective, as in *das seiende Wesen* (§718), where English does not allow "the being essence" and *seiende* cannot be translated as "existing", since *Sein,* in Hegel's usage, indicates the bare minimum of reality and is quite distinct from *Existenz* and from *Dasein,* "Being-there". In §718 I resort to a paraphrase, "the essence that simply is", and I adopt similar devices elsewhere.

Being-there: *Dasein.* This word was coined, from *da* ("there") and *sein* ("being, to be"), as a Germanic alternative to the Latinate *Existenz.* Heidegger used it to mean roughly "human being" and "being human", and also stressed its derivation from *da* and *sein.* Hegel does not use it in Heidegger's way, but he nevertheless differentiates it from *Sein* and *Existenz,* which in Hegel (as in Heidegger) retains the flavour of its Latin ancestor, *exsistere,* "step forth, arise, emerge". In Hegel, *Dasein* might also be translated as "determinate Being" or, sometimes, as "embodiment". In §47 it is the embodiment or realisation of a *Begriff,* "concept", and the combination of a concept and its *Dasein* is *das Wirkliche,* "the actual". But in §187 the *Dasein* from which self-consciousness displays its detachment does not correspond to any particular concept. Hegel also uses *dasein* as a verb, especially its present participle as an attributive adjective, and also the combination *da ist,* "is there". The latter gives some licence for my hyphenated rendering.

Comprehend, conceptual(ize): *begreifen.* This verb has the same ambiguity as "comprehend", meaning both "understand" and "include", but is also associated with *Begriff,* "concept". It denotes what is, for Hegel, the highest level of thought, grasping things in terms of pure concepts. It contrasts, in particular, with *Vorstellung,* pictorial "representation". Whereas *Vorstellung* tends to separate things, *Begreifen* brings them together as interacting activities or processes, and hence combines inclusion with abstraction.

Concept: *Begriff.* A concept, for Hegel, is abstract and non-empirical. Thus e.g. Being is a concept, but redness is not. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider a concept in terms of Hegel's botanical analogy. A concept is comparable to the plan or programme embodied in a seed. Thus the concept of something is often just the undeveloped beginning of it, as in §78. But this concept generates and controls the subsequent growth of the plant. Hence the concept is not simply our way of looking at things, but is an active force within them, a "subject". When the plant is fully grown, its concept is fulfilled. Hence the concept of something is often its fully developed state. A concept is an active process, interconnecting and embracing different stages of a plant's growth. Hegel's concepts are similarly interconnected, moving from one to the other. Hence concepts form one overall concept, t h e concept. Cf. t h e category in §235.

In itself: *an sich.* **For itself, for self:** *für sich.* These expressions, often together with *Sein,* as in e.g. "Being-for-itself", are usually contrasted with each other. They express three ideas, firstly that of mere potentiality

(*an sich*) in contrast to actuality (*für sich*), secondly that of self-awareness or self-consciousness (*für sich*) in contrast to unawares (*an sich*) (as in §186), and thirdly that of separation (*für sich*) from its context (the In-itself or what is *an sich*). In the latter sense *für sich* might often be translated as "by itself" or "on its own": e.g. in §130 "Being-for-itself" amounts to Being by itself, independence. I sometimes translate "*Sein-für-sich*" as "Being-for-self" instead of "Being-for-itself", especially when the gender of the reflexive pronoun is indeterminate.

Infinite, infinity: *unendlich, Unendlichkeit.* In later works, e.g. *Encyclopaedia* I §§94f., Hegel explicitly distinguishes between true or good infinity and spurious or bad infinity. True infinity differs from bad infinity in two respects: first, bad infinity excludes and contrasts with the finite and is b o u n d e d b y the finite and therefore not really infinite or "unbounded", while true infinity embraces the finite. Secondly, bad infinity proceeds in a straight line in an endless progression or regress, while true infinity is self-enclosed and comparable to a circle rather than a straight line. It is, we might say, finite but unbounded. Hegel does not explicitly draw this distinction in *PS*, but he tacitly operates with true, rather than bad, infinity: see e.g. the final sentence of §161. The infinite is therefore akin to the absolute, which must also be all-embracing and include its finite manifestations.

Know, know-ing, -ledge: *wissen, Wissen.* **Cognize, cognizing, cognition**: *erkennen, Erkennen, Erkenntnis.* The most general term for "know" is *wissen*, while *erkennen* and its cognates are more weighty terms, applied to philosophical and scientific knowledge. In accordance with its derivation from a defunct verb for "see", *Wissen* tends to be immediate, whereas *Erkennen* is based on reasoning and involves a process of getting to know something. However, W.A. Suchting, argues that Hegel uses *wissen* in a lower and a higher sense[10]. In the lower sense *Wissen* is simply immediate, while in the higher sense, it is mediated, but its mediation has been "sublated" or overcome. *Erkennen* lies between the two, still burdened with mediation and still only on the way to ultimate truth. Hence chapter VIII can be entitled *Das absolute Wissen*, a bird's-eye view of the truth that has left its mediation behind. *Wissen* is a close relative of *Bewusstsein*, "consciousness", and of *gewiss*(*heit*), "certain(ty)", but distinct from both. In Hegel's usage certainty is subjective and may be at odds with the truth: see §798. *Wissen* aims at truth, but this does not entail its truth in the ordinary sense, or in Hegel's sense(s): see §§39, 76 and 83. This coheres with Hegel's view that truth and falsity are not sharply distinct from each other: see §§38f. There is a further ambiguity in *Wissen* when it is used as a noun. Like the word "knowledge", it may refer either to what is known (as in "His knowledge is inexhaustible") or to the knowing of it (as in "He did it without my knowledge"): see §85.

M e d i a t e, **mediation**: *vermitteln, Vermittlung*; **immediate**: *unmittelbar*;. Both things and thoughts may be mediated. Things are mediated causally, whereas thoughts are mediated epistemically and/or logically. An oak tree and an acorn are mediated causally, the tree by the acorn from which it grew, the acorn by the tree on which it grew. By contrast, my belief in, say, God may be either immediate – depending on no proof or evidence – or mediated by proofs or evidence. The immediacy and mediation here are epistemic or logical, since an e p i s t e m i c a l l y immediate belief can hardly be c a u s a l l y unmediated. As with all sharp distinctions, Hegel sublates the distinction between causal and logico-epistemic mediation. He does so, because in his view reason and concepts are immanent in things, and the relations and development of things are the actualisation of their logical content. He systematically transposes logical forms, notably the mediating syllogism, into the world. Nothing, in Hegel's view, is purely immediate or purely mediated. Logical mediation does not, as it does in traditional logic, relate items whose content is fixed independently of their mediation. Hence, an "immediate" belief in God owes such content as it has to its residual mediation; but its content remains thin

10) W.A. Suchting, "Terminology," in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), xl–xlii.

and indeterminate without mediating proofs. Conversely, the determinate content that something has acquired from mediation can be considered in its concrete immediacy: I can contemplate an oak tree without thinking of the acorn. See *PS*, §§21f., 189, and 597.

Moment: *Moment*. A "moment" is a moving force or impetus. In *SL*, p.82, Hegel illustrates this with the lever, a rigid bar rotating about a fixed point, a fulcrum or pivot. In lifting a weight on one end of the lever, there are two relevant factors or "moments": the force applied to the other end of the lever, and the distance between the application of this force and the fulcrum. If either of these is decreased, then the other needs to be proportionately increased. Either alone is ineffectual. This explains why moments taken separately are "static": see *PS* §32. Hegel uses this idea widely. In logic, for example, pure being and pure nothing are moments of becoming: becoming would not occur if there were only pure being or only pure nothing. In particular, it applies to the shapes of consciousness in *PS*. A shape collapses because it consists of different moments that enter into conflict with each other.

Morality: *Moralität*; **Ethical life, order**, etc: *Sittlichkeit.* Hegel's distinction between these is comparable, though not identical with, with Bertrand Russell's distinction between "positive morality", a "social institution analogous to law" (*Sittlichkeit*), and "personal morality", which is a "matter for the individual conscience" (*Moralität*)[11], and also to the distinction drawn by Peter F. Strawson between "social morality" and "individual ideal".[12] *Sittlich* and *Sittlichkeit* come from *Sitte*, "custom", and for Hegel have the flavour of "customary morality". He associates *Sittlichkeit* especially with the ancient Greeks, who, he said, "had no conscience," and *Moralität* with Kant and his successors, but a modern society must accommodate both.

Reason: *Vernunft*; **understanding**: *Verstand*; **reason(s)**, **ground(s)**: *Grund*, *Gründe*. Understanding and reason (*Vernunft*) are different ways of thinking. Understanding sets up clear-cut and stable distinctions between things and between concepts, between e.g. truth and falsity (see §39), while reason, in its negatively rational form, shows how the distinction breaks down, and, in its "speculative" or positively rational form, displays the emergence of a unity that "sublates" the understanding's initial distinction. See especially *Enc.* I, §§79–82. "Reason" as *Vernunft* is quite different from "reason" as *Grund*. *Vernunft* is the reason or rationality immanent in concepts or things, and only needs to be brought to light by the philosopher. A *Grund*, in one of its several senses, is a reason, or o n e ' s reason, for doing or believing something, and may be quite extraneous to what is done or believed. Moreover, appeal to reasons, or *Räsonnement*, is generally inconclusive: there are, in Hegel's view, reasons for, and reasons against, doing or believing almost anything. See *PS*, §§48, 58ff. In view of this, the connexion sometimes drawn between Hegel's *Vernunft* and Wilfred Sellars's conception of the "space of reasons" is problematic.

Recollect(ion), internaliz-e, -ation: (*sich*) *erinnern*, *Erinnerung*. In ordinary German, *erinnern* means "remind" and the reflexive, *sich erinnern*, "remind oneself, remember, recollect". However, Hegel often uses the verb in accordance with what he takes to be its root meaning, "to internalize, interiorize", often combining this with its standard meaning. So in e.g. §47 the reflexive *sich erinnert* means not simply "recollects, remembers", but "recollects/internalizes i t s e l f ". Especially in §§753 and 808 *Erinnerung* is the converse of *Entäusserung*, estrangement, externalization. It is tempting to hyphenate the words as "re-collect(ion)". But this is excluded by the fact that while in §§753 and 808 Hegel writes *Er-innerung* to emphasize its novel sense, he usually leaves the word unhyphenated.

Represent; representation, idea: *vorstellen*, *Vorstellung*. **Idea**: *Idee*. A *Vorstellung* is a "mental picture of a thing. It draws attention less to the thing in its objective aspects than to the state of mind of the subject, particularly with regard to the intensity, vividness, clarity, persistence or otherwise of the image".[13] Moreover,

11) Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 186.

12) Peter Frederick Strawson, "Social Morality and Individual Ideal," in *Philosophy*, vol.36 (1961): 1–17.

13) Farrell, *Dictionary of German Synonyms*, 156.

in Hegel's view, *Vorstellung* tends to separate things, while *Begreifen* brings them together in a comprehensive movement. In ordinary German *Idee* is often used, like *Vorstellung*, for an idea in the mind, but Hegel normally uses it for an objective "Idea" in something like Plato's sense: see e.g. §55. (Contrast "Plato had some bright ideas [*Vorstellungen*]" with "Plato worshipped the Idea [*Idee*] of the Good".) However, Hegel differs from Plato in regarding an Idea not simply as a concept, but as a concept realised, together, that is, with its Being-there or objectivity. But this becomes explicit only in later works: see e.g. *Enc*. I, §213. In *PS* §47, the combination of a concept and its Being-there is equated with "the actual", not with the Idea. The contrast between *Vorstellung* and *Idee* gives rise to two different senses of "idealism". Kant and Schopenhauer are *Vorstellung*-idealists, while Hegel is an *Idee*-idealist. I translate *Vorstellung* as "representation", especially when it contrasts with "concept", "thought", etc., but occasionally as "idea", when it is used informally. I capitalize "Idea" when it renders *Idee*.

Singular, singleton, singularity: *einzeln, (der) Einzelne, Einzelheit*. **Individual (adj.), individual, individuality**: *individuell, (das) Individuum, Individualität*. These groups of words are near-synonyms, but not exact synonyms. *Individuell*, etc. are more weighty terms than *einzeln*, etc. *Einzeln* "translates 'separate(ly)' in reference to the individual parts of a whole or a group"[14] and "means 'individual', i.e. taken separately, by itself, in relation to the parts of a whole or to a number"[15], while *der Einzelne* is "the general term for 'the individual'. *Das Individuum* is used in more strictly philosophical contexts, and not like English 'individual' in the sense of 'person'".[16] By contrast, *individuell*, etc. cannot be applied to the parts of a whole, only to a complete whole: see e.g. §266, where a whole organism is an "individual", while its parts are "singular". The three "moments" of the concept in Hegel (see *Enc.,* I, §§163ff.) are the universal (i.e. generic), the particular (i.e. specific), and the individual or singular. But here "individual" is *Einzelne*. It cannot be *Individuelle*, since in *PS* §28, and often elsewhere, Hegel speaks of *das allgemeine Individuum (*"the universal individual"), where *das allgemeine Einzelne* would make no sense. *Individualität* does not contrast with universality and particularity, but may embrace them. When Hegel, in his lectures on history, speaks of the "world-historical individual" (such as Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon), this must be an *Individuum*, not an *Einzelner*.

Self: *(das) Selbst*. **I**: *(das) Ich*. "The Self" is *das Selbst*, the nominalization of the pronoun *selbst*, which means "itself, myself", etc., used for emphasis, as in "I did it myself". It is distinct from the reflexive pronoun, *sich*, etc., though it is often used to strengthen the reflexive pronoun, *sich selbst*, "its, one's, etc. own self". (Thus, for example, 'for itself' is *für sich*, and often *für sich selbst*, but never *für selbst*, and 'relate itself to itself' is *sich auf sich beziehen*.) As pronouns, "self", *selbst*, and *sich* can apply to almost any entity: "The city itself is beautiful, but the people are not", "It shows itself at its best in the winter", and so on. Moreover, nouns with the reflexive prefix "self" or *selbst*, such as "self-preservation" (*Selbsterhaltung*), also apply to a wide range of entities. But as free-standing nouns, "Self" and *Selbst* are closely related to "the I" and are restricted to humans or more generally to spiritual things. I have capitalized "Self" when Hegel uses *(das) Selbst* as a noun.

Selfish, selfless: *selbstisch, selbstlos*. *Selbstisch*, like "selfish", ordinarily means "egotistical, concerned with one's own desires and interests, regardless of others". But Hegel reverts to its literal meaning of "pertaining to the Self, oneself" or "self-like". Correspondingly, *selbstlos* normally means "self-effacing, -sacrificing", but Hegel uses it in the sense of "lacking, devoid of, a Self", as in §602, where nature is "selfless". Hegel likes to use words in a literal sense without the accretions that they acquire in informal discourse. I have followed him in my translation in order to preserve his tendency to use words in unusual, literal, ways.

---

14) Ibid., 296.

15) Ibid., 315.

16) Ibid., 297.

Speculation, speculative: *Spekulation*, *spekulativ*. These words derive from the Latin *speculari*, "to spy out, examine, explore". In philosophy they originally referred to theoretical philosophy in contrast to practical philosophy. But Hegel appropriates them to characterise to his own dialectical method, especially the third, "positively rational", stage of it, where the "fixed determinacies" set up by the analytical understanding (*Enc.* I §80), which have been broken down by the dialectical, or negative, reason (*Enc.* I §81), are restored in a satisfying unity-in-difference (*Enc.* I §82). The words occur frequently in the Preface, but rarely in the rest of PS, since they are associated primarily with Hegel's logic. The Latin verb also gave rise to *speculum*, "mirror", and Hegel's usage is often said to involve mirroring: see e.g. *Enc.* I, p.82, n.41. But *speculum* is only a minor member of the *specul*-family, and there is no trace in Hegel of a link between "speculation" and mirrors. *Enc.* I, §112 Addition associates mirrors with "reflection" rather than speculation.

Spirit: *Geist*. In *Enc.* III, Hegel explicitly distinguishes three stages of spirit: "subjective spirit" (roughly, the individual mind), "objective spirit" (the collective social life of a people), and "absolute spirit" (art, religion, and philosophy). He does not draw this distinction explicitly in *PS*, and tends to call the individual mind the "soul" (*Seele*) rather than the "spirit": see §77. *Geist*'s wide range of senses (including the "Holy Spirit") and its tendency develop from one to the other, as well as its tendency to embrace what is other than *Geist*, make it an especially suitable candidate for the status of the absolute.

Sublate, sublation: *aufheben*, *Aufhebung*. *Aufheben* has three distinct senses: "to pick up, raise", "to preserve", and "to eliminate". In ordinary German, *aufheben* has only one of these senses on any given occasion of its use. However, in his later works, Hegel often uses it in at least two of its senses at once, "preserve" and "eliminate", and sometimes in all three senses. The idea is conveyed by our expression "kick somebody upstairs", that is, to promote them to a rank or position that is officially superior but in fact carries less power and influence. The Latin verb *tollo* has a similar ambiguity and its irregular past participle *sublatus* gave rise to the coinage "sublate" in translations of Hegel. In *PS*, Hegel's later usage is not yet fully developed and he often uses *Aufhebung* in the sense of "elimination" alone. But in §113 he explicitly uses it in his later sense.

Substance: *Substanz*. **Subject**: *Subjekt*. Sometimes in the Preface, and once in the Introduction, *Subjekt* is the counterpart to *Objekt*. But the central contrast, even in the Preface, is between *Subjekt* and *Substanz*, as in §17. Here Hegel has in mind Spinoza's substance and his supposed neglect of the subject, but he also applies the contrast to social orders, ancient Greece having a predominance of substance over subject, while the French revolutionary order has a predominance of subject over substance: see e.g. §587 on the alternating interplay between substance and subject. Substance is the cultural background from which individuals emerge, while the subject is the active individual(s) emerging from it. Substance is comparable to *langue* and subject to *parole*: as there can be no speakers without an underlying language, and no language without speakers, so there can be no coherent agents without an underlying culture and no culture without agents to create and sustain it. Hegel explores and exploits different aspects of the word "subject", especially the grammatical subject, which is a passive recipient of predicates, but which may also be a dynamic subject, performing the activity denoted by a verb and so converging with the human subject: see e.g. §66.

Syllogism: *Schluss*. Hegel's conception of "extremes" united by a "middle term" derives from his conception of a syllogism. A simple traditional syllogism is:

Major premise: "All men are mortal"

Minor premise: "All Greeks are men"

Conclusion: "All Greeks are mortal".

The middle term is the term that appears in both premises, but not in the conclusion, in this case "man/men". It is called the "middle term", because it links together the two "end terms" or "extremes" appearing in the conclusion. Hegel applies this terminology to the link between any two opposites, which need not be, and

usually are not, terms in propositions, though he does not hesitate to refer to their relationship as a "syllogism", a move facilitated by the fact that the Germanic word for "syllogism" is (*logischer*) *Schluss*, which also means "conclusion" or "closure". In Chapter III, the middle term is often little more than the unity or contact between two opposing forces (§§136, 141). For example, a balloon retains its size and shape owing to the interplay between the air pressure within the balloon (which tends to expand the balloon so as to become equal to the pressure of the air outside) and the elasticity of the material from which the balloon is made (which tends to contract the balloon). The stable balloon itself is then the middle term. In §146 the middle term is more substantial: it is the "appearance" between the understanding and the "interior", that is, the scientifically postulated laws and entities underlying perceptible appearance. See also §184, where the middle term is self-consciousness, which links together the two self-consciousnesses that emerge from it.

Thing, thing: *Sache, Ding*: German has two words for "thing", *Ding* and *Sache*. They are often used interchangeably, as in §73. But this is not always so. *Ding* is as neutral as the English "thing", though in Hegel it often has the derogatory flavour of a m e r e thing, in contrast to higher entities such as the mind, as in "He treats me as a thing!" The thing with properties in §§111ff. is a *Ding. Sache*, by contrast, suggests objectivity and importance. It is the thing at issue or at stake, somewhat as in "That's the thing!" and "The thing is that..." or "The play's the thing!" Hegel often stresses this by speaking of *die Sache selbst*, "the Thing itself", e.g. in §1. *Sache* resists any single, consistent rendering in English, but is readily translatable into French as "*Chose*" and Italian as "*Cosa*" (as in '*cosa nostra*'). In some contexts, such as §1, *Sache* is roughly equivalent to "(subject-) matter", but not in all. In §409 *Sache* is used in two ways: *die Sache selbst* is the thing that matters, while the simple *Sache* does not matter, and is roughly equivalent to *Ding*. I have therefore chosen to capitalise *Sache* as "Thing", in order to differentiate it from *Ding* ("thing"), while preserving its semantic affinity to it. The word *Sache* is sufficiently potent in Hegel's usage to require a uniform translation throughout.

Thinking: *Denken*. **Thought**: *Gedanke*. In English "thought" is ambiguous: it means both the activity or process of thinking (as in "I was absorbed in thought") and its product (as in "I have had a brilliant thought"). I have translated the verbal noun *Denken* as "thinking", even where "thought" would be a more natural rendering, and reserved "thought" for its object or product, *Gedanke*. Several English words, such as "work" and "education", are ambiguous in his way between the process and the product. But "thinking" or "thought" has ambiguities of its own. See, for example, §30, where Hegel distinguishes between a narrower sense of "thinking", where it contrasts with "representation", and a wider sense, in which it includes representation.

True, truth: *wahr, Wahrheit*: Hegel uses these words in a variety of ways, and not only, or even primarily, in the sense of "corresponding to the facts". In the Preface, *das Wahre*, "the true", is generally something like "the absolute," the complete and undiluted truth (e.g. §17), while elsewhere it is often what is regarded as the truth by a particular shape of consciousness. The truth of something is often its fulfilment or what it amounts to. The "truth of" any given stage in the growth of a plant is the immediately following stage, e.g. the truth of a bud is the leaf or flower. The truth *simpliciter* is the fully grown plant. Similarly, the truth of any given shape of consciousness is its immediate successor, but only at the final stage do we get undiluted truth. See note to §798. "(Un)true" sometimes amounts to "(un)real", as in §§76 and 78.