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2020 | vol. 64, nr 10 | 107-117

Article title

Regulatory decisions in the context of risk and uncertainty

Content

Title variants

PL
Decyzje regulacyjne w kontekście ryzyka i niepewności

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
The purpose of the article is to identify the propensity of decision-makers of the regulatory authority on the telecommunications market in Poland (Office of Electronic Communications, OEC) in making decisions under risk and uncertainty conditions and comparing them with a group of non-experts. The research outcomes reveal that decision- -makers of the regulatory authority make in most cases decisions that are consistent with the prospect theory. In addition, OEC decision-makers in circumstances of uncertainty, retain the status quo and maintain a lower risk tendency in a decision-making situation with the same expected value but different variance. It was pointed out, at the same time, that their decisions did not differ from those taken by the group of non-experts. The findings presented in the article contribute to the discussion on the propensity of public decision-makers to make decisions under conditions of risk and uncertainty.
PL
Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja skłonności decydentów organu regulacyjnego rynku usług telekomunikacyjnych w Polsce (Office of Electronic Communications, OEC) w podejmowaniu decyzji w warunkach ryzyka i niepewności oraz ich porównanie z grupą nieekspertów. Wyniki badań wskazują, że decydenci organu regulacyjnego w większości przypadków podejmują decyzje, które są zgodne z teorią perspektywy. Ponadto decydenci OEC w warunkach niepewności zachowują status quo i przejawiają mniejszą skłonność do ryzyka w sytuacji decyzyjnej o tej samej oczekiwanej wartości, ale różnej wariancji. Jednocześnie wskazano, że ich decyzje nie odbiegają od tych podejmowanych przez grupę nieekspertów. Ustalenia zawarte w artykule stanowią wkład w dyskusję na temat skłonności decydentów publicznych w podejmowaniu decyzji w warunkach ryzyka i niepewności.

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-dd86c843-5266-436a-b1ab-170a66b00f48
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