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ORGANIZATION OF PROVIDING UNITS AND FORMATIONS WITH MISSILES AND AMMUNITION IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Wars and armed conflicts of the postwar period were a kind of grounds for testing new means of armed fighting and significantly influenced the development of tactics and the theory of operational art, and, consequently, the objectives and principles of equipment support for the troops.

One of the most important questions of equipment support is the organization of providing with missiles and ammunition [1].

The organization of providing with missiles and ammunition in the course of operations will be carried out taking into consideration basic principles, such as:

- primary providing troops, carrying out the most important tasks, acting at the direction of the main attack;
- consumption rate of missiles and ammunition in all links of the troops;
- responsibility of higher authorities for ensuring subordinate troops;
- responsibility for providing troops, attached to the support, entrusted to the commander;
- providing troops, as a rule, *from top to down* and on themselves.

The availability of features in providing troops (forces) with missiles and ammunition objectively necessitates some theoretical propositions of providing and the prevailing views on formation of value needs with missiles and ammunition, standards of stepping-up provision of missiles and ammunition, opportunities and placing artillery stores of units and formations, stations of ammunition supply, as well as structure, order, and the use of delivery by units and sub-units and their possibilities.

However, while planning and organization of any operation there are a number of factors that will influence the organization of missiles and ammunition providing.

One of the factors affecting the organization of missiles and ammunition is the order of providing.

The regulations are determined that Deputy Commander for equipment support is responsible for missiles and ammunition providing. However, there is also specified that Deputy Commander for logistics support is

responsible for the delivery of ammunition. So it turns out that material resources (in this case – ammunition) are subordinated to one commander whereas the transport of its delivery to another one. It seems that no one should explain how frustrating could be the consequences of such "bifurcation". It is necessary to remove the delivery of missiles and ammunition from the logistics support and reassign it to the Deputy Commander for equipment support, involved in the staff closing to bases and stores.

The fighting in Grozny and other settlements of Chechnya again confirmed that mechanized infantry units require special armoured means such as the delivery of ammunition. In our opinion, one of the solutions to this problem – the creation of TSM by the type of military equipment (to APC, IFV) equipped for the delivery of ammunition.

In the light of the transformation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan these questions have been considered by superiors.

One of the problem questions is the organization and providing with missiles and ammunition and a stepping-up provision of missiles.

As approved by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, norms of army ammunition reserves to the combined arms of weapons designs do not take into account the possibility of raising the ammunition reserves in the battalion.

Based on this, it is necessary to plan and carry out the providing of missiles and ammunition in the following way:

- to provide field stores of missiles and ammunition in each direction in order to supply troops;
- to accommodate basic areas of Logistics Brigade from stationary stores and bases – by the vehicles of chief commander "top – down" and also if it is necessary, by the vehicle of tactical level;
- to combat sub-units, posts and fire positions of artillery – by the vehicle of logistic brigade;
- delivery of missiles and ammunition carried out by all types of vehicles: road, rail and air [2].

Any armed conflict, particularly an internal one, characterized by the absence of defeat means necessitates the placement of stores outside their actions. However, possible assaults on posts of logistics and equipment support have to be taken into consideration. Such circumstances, combined with the desire to reduce the distance of delivery caused the placing stores of ammunition at all levels of troops in the nearest distances from combat orders of its troops.

The Field Artillery Brigade store is located at a distance of 3-5 km, battalion ammunition supply points – to 1,5 km, and in some cases – in the immediate vicinity of combat orders.

One of the outputs in the current situation to ensure artillery ammunition is a transition from a towed artillery to self-propelled, i.e. the execution

of tasks on the fire defeat can be produced by the surplus of ammunition laid out on the ground, without usage of combat store [3].

Thus, all this requires a careful consideration and informed decisions, the practical implementation of these measures will contribute to the more effective organization in providing of ammunition in the subdivisions.

References

1. Yernazarov K. A., *The modern approach to the problem of bringing missiles and ammunition in the form of completely loading*, Bagdar, no. 4, 2007, p. 25.
2. Materials of interdepartmental conference on the topic *Improving the forms and methods of preparing the compounds and the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations and their full support in military conflicts of varying intensity*, Astana, 2008, p. 194-197.
3. ru/www.crime-rehear, *Separation of missiles and ammunition*, Vestnik, no. 2, 2003.