On the Relative Size of Direct and Indirect Tax Evasion

• Authors: Soldatos Gerasimos T.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Modifying the standard analytical apparatuses for direct and indirect tax evasion to incorporate forward indirect tax shift in a monopolistically competitive environment, this paper maintains that indirect tax evasion would exceed for sure direct tax evasion only under consumer risk neutrality and a tax policy zeroing the tax shift. Also, in the presence of tax evasion, there cannot be optimal direct-indirect tax mix, because tax evasion is accompanied by uncertainty and hence, nonlinearities in the tax schedules that cannot be dealt with at least practically.

Keywords

EN

Direct and indirect tax evasion; forward indirect tax shif; consumer risk neutrality

Discipline

• ECONOMICS: ECONOMICS

• Publisher: University Service Publishing, Prague, Czech Republic
• Journal: International Economics Letters
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 3
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 45-48

Contributors

author

Soldatos Gerasimos T.

• is a Professor at the Department of Administration, American University of Athens