Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems

• Authors: CARRERAS Francesc , FREIXAS Josep , MAGAÑA Antonio
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.

Keywords

EN

voting systems; simple games; weighted majority games; Shapley–Shubik power index; dimension; egalitarianism, decisiveness

• Publisher: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Journal: Operations Research and Decisions
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 31-52

Contributors

author

CARRERAS Francesc

• Departament de Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Spain

author

FREIXAS Josep

• Departament de Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Spain

author

MAGAÑA Antonio

• Departament de Matemàtiques, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Spain

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5277/ord160203