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The Culture of Pancasila. An Indonesian concept that fuses the impossible²

Abstract

This paper offers a brief insight into the history and culture of Pancasila. Called the Indonesian National Philosophy, in force since 1945, it aims to embrace all aspects of life, to provide tolerance and justice in Indonesia to all. Since independence, however, Indonesia has been struggling with intractable problems of religious intolerance and minority communities, despite a functioning democracy today. Pancasila stems from compromises and alliances between the different major religious communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim, but which cause social exclusion of some groups at the same time. For years, during the presidency of Soekarno and Suharto, it served as a political tool to ensure relative peace and control in the state, and today seems to be only a set of phrases repeated in Indonesia without further reflection on their content.

Keywords: Indonesia, Muslim majority democracy, Pancasila, Soekarno, Suharto.

Towards the Indonesian nation-state

Indonesia is one of the most complex postcolonial countries in the world, which before its declaration of independence had only a short pre-colonial history as a united entity. Since it came to being in 1945, Indonesia's leaders faced all kinds of internal divisions and found *Pancasila* a useful strategy to weaken the sense of local and religious identity and emphasize Indonesia as a whole. This state has a long tradition of peaceful coexistence of various groups, supported by *Pancasila*, which largely enforces harmony and tolerance, but its history is also characterised by countless social, political and religious conflicts. The Pancasila philosophy, shared at the national level, seems to be a solution in which religion plays an important role, relying essentially on the interreligious dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. At the time of proclaiming independence by Soekarno, the future first president of Indonesia,³ the country was divided and dividing lines ran across various social, ethnic and religious groups. The idea of integration did not find much understanding

1 Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, KITLV, Leiden.

2 This research paper was funded by the financial grant of the National Science Centre, Poland (Preludium2019/33/N/HS2/02270).

3 Soekarno, together with Hatta, was the proclamer of Indonesia's independence and first President of the Republic of Indonesia. See: Steedly 2013.

among the various ethnic groups scattered throughout the archipelago and speaking in various languages. The tendency of violent reactions by competing of political elites became visible. Power meant not only state control but also the possibility of shaping the nation. Soekarno's overarching goal was to maintain Indonesia's integrity because the "dream of many generations" had just come true and the fight against colonialism and occupation could not be wasted.⁴

The Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies in 1942–1945, although short-lived, put an end to Dutch colonialism.⁵ The Netherlands did not intend to respect Indonesian sovereignty and a growing national identity and offered Indonesia entry to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. For Soekarno, Hatta and Syahrir⁶ this could not be acceptable in any way.⁷ For four consecutive years, starting from 1945, there were bloody fights between Dutch and Republican troops, regional guerrillas, Muslim and communist militias, opposing the former colonisers, the Japanese, and the republican authorities themselves. The unification of such diverse social groups was by no means simple and obvious. This period, known as the Indonesian National Revolution (*Perang Kemerdekaan* Indonesia or *Revolusi*) and also *bersiap* ("get ready" or "be prepared"), plays a significant role in the Indonesians collective memory as a violent, chaotic time.⁸ The treaty acknowledging Indonesian independence from the Netherlands was not signed until 2 November 1949.⁹

Indonesia won freedom, but its socio-economic situation was more like that of a defeated country. The Japanese occupation, fighting with the Netherlands and its British ally, destroyed the colonial economy and exhausted the society. Freedom alone was not enough to reward after such murderous guerrilla warfare. The first decades of independence were very unstable. The *Revolusi* myth was supposed to symbolise not only the fight against colonialism but the fight for new social justice. However, instead of a harmonious society, the clashes within the newly formed state between rival groups, previously suppressed by the coloniser, intensified. It should be clearly emphasised that the independent state existed only in the minds of a narrow political elite. Most

4 Emmerson 2005: 48.

5 See: Bharadwaj 1997.

6 Soekarno, Hatta, Sutan Syahrir are considered the founders of the Republic of Indonesia. See: Steedly 2013.

7 Indonesian historiography ignores Tan Malaka, a legendary communist-national figure, an advocate of violent national liberation struggle and leader of anti-negotiation forces opposing any negotiations with the Netherlands, and at the same time Soekarno's greatest opponent, captured and executed by the president's supporters in 1949. See: Bouchier 2015.

8 Frederick 2002.

9 Friend 2003.

of the population from areas distant from Java initially did not even know about their belonging to a new state or did not recognise it for a long time.¹⁰ Therefore, an idea was needed to unite diverse social groups into a new state, even if it were a very complicated and seemingly illogical setup.

The Indonesian language, adopted from Malay, fulfils an identity-forming function of constructing and consolidating the scattered society on thousands of islands.¹¹ Mandatory usage of Indonesian was applied to shape a common culture, building for the first time a supra-local community, rising above local solidarity. A common language, usually even today not the first language of a child in Indonesia, not only allows people from different parts of the archipelago to communicate, but also creates a common bond between Indonesians from different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds.

The formulation of the national motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, which can be translated as “unity in diversity”¹², expresses the fundamental unity despite the huge ethnic, regional, social or religious differences, and perfectly describes this most extensive archipelago in the world and probably the most heterogeneous in ethnic and cultural terms.¹³ The motto perfectly reflects the Indonesians’ flexibility and their natural ability to syncretise and embrace various religious beliefs, traditions and dimensions of cultures, matching them to local conditions, which for the Western world can be quite astonishing.

Adopting *Pancasila* as the foundation for creating social relations in the state, a neutral Indonesian language to unite all ethnolinguistic groups, as well as rejecting the Islamic religion as a constitutive element, are the three foundations for building the Indonesian nation. This process can be successfully called “Indonesianisation”. The building of Indonesian identity is, therefore, from the beginning the result of a politically and top-down project. From the beginning of the 20th century, Indonesia was a political rather than an ethnic project.¹⁴ In a country with such a diverse heritage and so many local cultures, this process often required limiting local traditions in favour of one “Indonesian national heritage”, which in practice took on a rather top-down and intentional character.¹⁵ From the beginning, it was not just about

10 See the Republic of South Maluku case. Feith & Lev 1963.

11 The Institute for the Indonesian Language (Institut Bahasa Indonesia) in Indonesia reported in 1972 that there are more than 400 local languages (not dialects). Nababan 1991: 116.

12 Choy 1999: 3–4.

13 Based on the 2010 census by Badan Pusat Statistik, the ISAS in Singapore developed a new ethnic classification, distinguishing 119 large ethnic groups, but over 600 ethnic groups in general, see: Ananta et al. 2014.

14 Cribb 2001: 219–39.

15 Cribb 2001: 229.

celebrating nationalism, but also about proclaiming the unity of the nation and legitimising political power.

Pancasila as a binder of state and nation

In considering the process of Pancasila's formation, we should emphasise the ideological tensions that accompanied its creation as derivatives of tensions around the shape of the emerging state. The nation's founders tried to answer this challenge by developing a conception of the "brotherhood state" (*negara kekeluargaan*), based on *gotong-royong*,¹⁶ as opposed to "the individual state" (*negara perseorangan*), as in liberalism, or "the class-based state" as in communism.¹⁷ The mythical, sublime, almost divine process of Pancasila creating is often emphasised, coming basically from one politician, Soekarno, who played a central role.¹⁸

Indeed, Soekarno was confronted with reconciling the various elites' interests and their ideological options, faced with ongoing military operations. Although Soekarno radically referred many economic and social issues, and socialist aspirations show through his writings¹⁹ and speeches,²⁰ he put that socialism aside: Indonesia must first become free from feudalism and imperialism, and the class struggle has been replaced by a national fight.

A tension between Muslim groups and secular state proponents was visible. Soekarno proposed a kind of balance as the solution: Indonesia would not be a secular state with religion banished from public life by legal regulations, or a religious state based on one specific religion.²¹ In Soekarno's mind, an independent republic would provide conditions for the coexistence of many varieties of Muslims and factions and multilingual forms of Islam, so an Islamic politicisation should be rejected. But this did not end the Islamic groups' efforts to base the state on Islam. Non-Muslims defended *Pancasila* too, well knowing that they would quickly become second-class citizens.²²

The name *Pancasila*, proposed by Soekarno, derives from two Sanskrit words: *pañca* (five) and *śīla* (principles), and was certainly intended to evoke former splendour of Hindu and Buddhist empires. Soekarno and

16 Gotong-royong expresses mutual aid usually practiced in local communities throughout Indonesia, traditionally understood as a collective spirit among neighbours to strengthen economic and social resilience. See: Suwignyo 2019.

17 Latif 2018: 209.

18 Latif 2018: 210.

19 See for example: Soekarno 1964.

20 See: *Monash Collections Online. Sukarno Speeches 1965–1966*.

21 Intan 2006: 18.

22 Intan 2006: 18.

Hatta understood the importance of gathering leaders support of all political orientations to create unity. Above all, they wanted to get support from Muslim groups, organisations outside Java, as well as left and right groups in their socio-economic orientation. They wanted to present a broad consensus before independence and the adoption of the Indonesian Constitution. According to Soekarno's reflections, *Pancasila* has always existed in Indonesian communities and had only to be rediscovered.²³

Because, indisputably, Soekarno had the greatest influence on the content of the five principles, we find in *Pancasila* certain aspects of various values and influences of ideologies, such as nationalism, democracy, socialism, as well as religiosity and broadly understood humanism. The rules reflect the impact of so-called universal values were to be common determinants and basis for the upbringing, education and social life of Indonesians. He presented *Pancasila* on 1 June 1945,²⁴ during the meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan).²⁵

The first principle, *Kebangsaan Indonesia*, means belonging to one Indonesian "nation", i.e. nationalism, with belonging of various peoples inhabiting the territory of the country to one great unified nation. Rule two, *Internasionalisme atau peri kemanusiaan*, means simply humanity, neither humanism nor humanitarianism but a nationalism embedded in internationalism. It is a recognition that all humankind bears common attributes, the awareness of belonging to a large family of free ethnic groups, all of which have the right to peaceful coexistence with other nations (which seems, however, somewhat grotesque in the subsequent context attempts to subjugate the neighbouring areas of Indonesia by Soekarno).

Mufakat atau demokrasi, the third rule, is deliberation or democracy. The state cannot express the will of only a specific social, religious, etc. group, but its task is to enable unanimous participation of all citizens. It does not base itself on majority votes, but on a deep-rooted Indonesian custom of councils to reach consensus. *Keadilan (kesejahteraan) sosial*, meant as social justice or social welfare, is the fourth principle, and is a necessity for the state to ensure social well-being by constantly raising the living standards of its citizens. It arose from the view that democracy will not fulfil its role if it does not ensure

23 Friend 2003.

24 The June 1st each year *Hari Pancasila* (Pancasila Day) is celebrated, which along with *Hari Merdeka* (Independence Day), celebrated on August 17, is one of the most important patriotic holidays. From 1965 to 1998, Pancasila Day was celebrated on October 1st.

25 Ricklefs 2001: 258.

a fair share of prosperity and does not guarantee every Indonesian a decent living standard.²⁶

“Belief in One and Only God”, or *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*, is the last principle, establishing religious tolerance, emphasising the community of monotheistic religions and identifying the value of faith in one God regardless of religion. Importantly, it includes a commitment to monotheistic religion but not to Islam specifically and was a compromise between fundamentalist aspirations and the principle of state secularism. J. Menchik calls it “Godly Nationalism”. It allows the government to provide financial and institutional support to religious organisations, but without enforcing Islamic law or giving the state a formal Islamic identity.²⁷

While the first four principles are “secular”, the fifth principle has a purely “religious” dimension. According to Soekarno, these five principles could be condensed into three (*tri sila*): Socio-nationalism, Socio-democracy and Faith in One God. Then these three rules can be referred to one (*eka sila*), denoted to the value of *gotong-royong*, calling Indonesia *Negara Gotong Royong*, the Country of Cooperation. In all these endeavours, Soekarno was not about numbering, but interpreting principles, in which the ideals of democracy, nationalism and morality are realised in social justice as a critique of inequalities in society. Pancasila was supposed to be a critical ideology always updating the social structure towards a fair society. Socio-nationalism should be read as nationalism based on the awareness of oppression and isolation of society; socio-democracy as an idea that realises political and economic rights, freeing citizens from imperialism and capitalism. Belief in One God is imperative to moral respect for people of all religions.²⁸

This last one was not well received by Muslim leaders, who wanted a more explicit reference to Islam. Three weeks after historic Soekarno’s speech, changes were made and “faith in God” became the first pillar along with the duty for Muslims to follow Islamic rules. This version is known as *Piagam Jakarta* (the Jakarta Charter), which, however, never came into force. Pancasila remained the socio-political master glue of state and nation.²⁹ Belief in one God³⁰ is now most often mentioned as the first and basic pillar of *Pancasila*. It must be noted that what was supposed to be a compromise, in practice turned out to be discriminatory against non-believers or animists. This principle, as

26 Gouda & Zaalberg 2005: 127.

27 Menchik 2016.

28 See: Soekarno 1985; Soekarno 2001.

29 Ricklefs 2001.

30 About defining “religion” in Indonesia see: Cholil 2014.

well as Indonesian law requiring the religion to be entered personal ID cards, is discriminatory against them. Also, the followers of non-theistic Buddhism or the polytheistic Hinduism had to look for references in their religious scriptures to justify their views as being not in contradiction with the “belief in one God”. This example denotes a crack in *Pancasila* as uniting the people.³¹

Indonesia’s current religious map shows an overwhelming, over 80 per cent, Muslim majority.³² However, it is important to realise that under the “Muslim surface”, Indonesians’ beliefs are deeply shaped by the religious and cultural heritage of powerful Hindu and Buddhist empires, presented on the archipelago for over a thousand years.³³ We can put forward a similar thesis concerning the still present animism, creating a colourful cultural mosaic. Animist beliefs are spread and incorporated into all layers of Indonesian syncretic culture, including contemporary secular beliefs.³⁴

Pancasila became the basis of the constitution adopted on 18 August 1945, the day after Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesian independence. Thus, the utopian dream of uniting the multicultural archipelago consisting of thousands of islands came true.³⁵

An interesting *Pancasila* interpretation can be presented in the context of specific Indonesian values.³⁶ One of these values is traditional communalism, understood as putting local interests above state interest. The cultural and social patterns of the community in Indonesia are diverse, and laws, customs and political structure show significant differences. Traditional communalism is the ongoing close relationship with ancient and all-encompassing patterns of local functioning focused on the rural community, covering most Indonesians. What is striking here is the close interdependence of all spheres of human behaviour: political, social and economic. Action taken in one of these areas has a direct impact on others. A person is not in itself a separate entity, and his needs are subordinated and conditioned by general cultural patterns in force in his social group. The faith in God implies a constant and undivided concern for the whole supernatural expression as religious, social, economic and political

31 Jonathan 2018.

32 Because of a number of inhabitants Indonesia has the biggest Islamic majority in the world. According to the 2010 census, 87.2 percent identified as Muslim, 7 percent as Protestant, 2.9 percent as Catholic, and the remaining 3 percent as Hindu, Buddhist, or adherents of Confucianism. Lussier 2019.

33 Jones 2005: 24.

34 Kahane 1993: 12.

35 The date of the Proclamation and the five basic principles gained their image in the emblem of Indonesia, Garuda Pancasila. See: Choy 1999: 120.

36 Van der Kroef 1954: 225–251.

life are not separate aspects of the individual's existence as a group member in Indonesia. They are indivisible and the "secular" sphere of human activity does not exist. The third feature of Indonesian communalism is its strong territorial affiliation and lasting relationship. Community members have a close sense of belonging to a community, which is expressed not only by far-reaching and complex patterns of mutual assistance but also by joint ventures.³⁷

Soekarno maintained his vision of a united Indonesia until the end of his rule in 1967. However, 20 years after independence, Indonesia still did not resemble a united state. As a result of internal policy, Soekarno's so-called "guided democracy"; a clash of two powerful forces took place: the right-wing army and the communists (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). Besides, neither of these forces was a monolith, on the contrary, various sections clashed inside them. Next to them, there was a huge number of Muslim organisations, admittedly without a chance for a decisive vote, but more and more numerous and stronger. As A. Heryanto writes, we can read the history of Indonesia in the last century as a story of fierce competition between different major global ideologies with various local contents. He points out that in the interests of national unity, Soekarno tried to reconcile various ideologies, and the Cold War of the 1960s led him to the socialist bloc. According to the author, after the fall of Soekarno, the role of Pancasila ceased to be to maintain the balance between these ideologies to peacefully coexist, and that remains until today.³⁸

***Pancasila* democracy**

In Suharto's regime,³⁹ a priority goal from the outset was economic development by limiting democracy and suppressing diversity, including religious diversity. *Pancasila* day was celebrated, called *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila*, i.e., "Supernatural Power of Pancasila Day" and was regarded as the "holiest" day on the national calendar.⁴⁰ He used Pancasila, among other things, to build a positive image of his rule inside and outside the country, and his government focused on creating and maintaining its legitimacy. Heryanto emphasises that for this purpose he based his politics on five sources: nationalism, *Pancasila*, the 1945 Constitution and its formal implementation, development programmes and propaganda on stability and order.⁴¹ In 1978,

37 Van der Kroef 1954: 227.

38 See: Heryanto 2020.

39 The second president of the RI, took over power bloodily suppressing the coup of 30 September 1965; after 32 years of authoritarian oppressive rules, in 1998 was forced to leave as a result of national protests. See: Budiawan 2000.

40 Lloyd & Smith 2001.

41 Heryanto 1990.

the “P4 Programme” was developed: *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pelaksanaan Pancasila* (Guide to Realization and Implementation *Pancasila*).⁴² Indoctrination was intended not only to strengthen Suharto’s dictatorship symbolically but also to give an ideological tool in the fight against political opponents who allegedly misused *Pancasila*.⁴³ The orders and prohibitions system, assembled in *Eka Prasety Pancakarsa*, formed 45 “bases” created to develop *Pancasila* from 1945. The programme included, among other things, the requirement to attend a mandatory ideological course called “P4”.⁴⁴

State identity, culture, tradition and art became the most important elements of Suharto’s politics, as well as cultural coexistence. This, however, remained only in the sphere of declarations and did not connect with all culture’s equality. A great example are Papuans living in the western part of New Guinea (Irian Jaya), not matching the Indonesian multicultural state image for the Suharto regime. To this day, the Javanese and their culture dominate in Indonesia, and Java is an island making up the geographical, political and cultural centre of the country.

The situation for Indonesian Chinese was difficult since Soeharto’s government banned all expressions of their culture and traditions. To avoid political problems (accusations of being atheists and communists), Indonesian Chinese were then required to adopt one of the official religions (Buddhists, Muslims, Catholics or Christians). After the New Order, followers of traditional Chinese beliefs regained recognition of their identity after the presidency of the KH. Abdurrahman Wahid⁴⁵ authorised Confucianism as an official religion.

The implementation of the “P4” tools was in the most important social sectors, including the education system, media and all cultural and religious institutions. Hence, *Orde Baru*⁴⁶ is sometimes written in literature “*Pancasila State*”, as the five principles were more important than the 1945 Constitution. Intellectuals criticised and ridiculed P4, but undoubtedly programme had a significant impact on many people convinced that *Pancasila* was a unique Indonesian ideology that could lead the state and its citizens, protecting them from threats from both the left and the right.⁴⁷ But the idea was to maintain the

42 II/MPR/1978, see: Darmaputera 1988: 181.

43 See: Ward 2010: 31.

44 McGregor 2007: 87.

45 An outstanding Muslim scholar, politician and reformer, leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim party, the president of the Republic of Indonesia 1999–2001, adored by both Muslims and believers of other religions, an advocate of interreligious dialogue. See: Barton 2002.

46 *Orde Baru* is translated as a New Order, referred to Suharto’s regime 1966–1998.

47 Ricklefs 2001: 373.

state's central position. It was, therefore, necessary for the regime to prevent political shifts left or right using broad means. Both should be within the limits of the floating apolitical mass.⁴⁸

Suharto's politics, using *Pancasila* as a weapon against opponents, led to a kind of "overdose" of this ideology. Everything that did not fit into the regime's policy was described as "against *Pancasila*" and forcefully attacked by state forces. As a result, for a long time, this concept evoked unpleasant associations with mind control from the past, when in 1965 the PKI was accused of acting against this ideology and operating to the state's detriment, which was one of the arguments for the abolition of the PKI.⁴⁹

As Heryanto points out, to be accused of being anti-nation, anti-*Pancasila*, or anti-1945 Constitution was much more serious than to be accused of being anti-development or disrupting stability and order.⁵⁰ Suharto firmly indicated that the state's current basis was final and *Pancasila* was the only legitimate ideology. He maintained that the question of an Islamic form of state had been settled and would not be reopened. Adherence to *Pancasila* became compulsory for all social and political organisations in the mid-1980s but, already in the 1970s, Suharto had ensured that it was learned and followed.⁵¹

Both communist and liberal ideologies were considered dangerous. The regime recognised that communism did not subside after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. The globalisation era and free communication influenced Indonesia's development. The borders between national and international systems were quickly blurred, which introduced a new spectrum of risks in every sphere of national life. In politics, globalisation favoured capitalist penetration, liberal thought and other foreign ideologies, all of which were contrary to *Pancasila*. The free market idea threatened *Pancasila* based on *kemitraan* (partnership), while in religious life globalisation has facilitated the influx of foreign values disturbing religious groups. The military stated that these dangers would harm social harmony and national resilience (*Ketahanan Nasional*). Globalisation, according to the government, exposed an alleged internal menace with the "new style communism" (*komunisme gaya baru, KGE*). *Kewaspadaan*⁵² supposed to ward off these perceived threats, but allowed to infiltrate all social groups and control political ideas in society. The

48 Farid 2005: 14.

49 In particular, the atheism of communists was emphasized.

50 Heryanto 1990: 291.

51 Bertrand 2004: 38.

52 National Vigilance Refresher Course (Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional – Tarpadnas, for the indoctrination of both officers and civilians, who were taught about the widespread "potential" political threats to national stability (Honua 2018: 56).

regime used Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth)⁵³, a nationwide extremely right-wing paramilitary organisation with underworld connections, to terrorise and to discredit any rivals.⁵⁴

The Five Principles today

Over several decades, from 1945 to 1998, *Pancasila* was transformed from a leftist revolutionary utopian dream into a tool for making citizens passive, obedient, floating masses.⁵⁵ Two different regimes applied the same *Pancasila* in completely different ways, causing the political frontier to shift and enabling the social exclusion of specific social groups. Suharto used this philosophy to divide and rule the nation, and an instrument against his political adversaries, while Soekarno saw it primarily as a cementing force for keeping the nation together. It was to be expected that with the *Reformasi*,⁵⁶ the principles of the democratic state would become a real “common denominator”, “common ground”, and “common orientation” for diverse Indonesia.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, *Pancasila* remains unchanged to this day and, as in the Orde Baru, is read rather as a series of sentences deprived of values, and not as a synthesis of ideas intended by the nation’s founders.

The democratic restoration lifted restrictions on Islamist political aspirations. While most major Islamic organisations came to terms with the *Pancasila* compromise in Suharto’s time, the division between pluralists and supporters of Islam’s greater role survived.⁵⁸ The consequence of the society’s liberalisation and pluralisation after Suharto’s fall was the need to redefine the slogan “unity in diversity” and rethink *Pancasila* role in Indonesian social and political life.

Each of the incumbent presidents after 1998 has had their own way of developing the *Pancasila* heritage. Abdurrahman Wahid was an important proponent of this philosophy, opting for Indonesia’s mild secularism: while religion has an important role as a social and moral force, the political arena should be the realm of political parties, which allows Islam to function as a force for morality and the control of authority, and to avoid being entrapped in the ambiguity of power struggles.⁵⁹ For Joko Widodo (president since 2014, known

53 See: Anderson 2001.

54 Ryter 2018.

55 See Baudrillard’s discussion of the uncontrolled silent and deaf mass, Baudrillard 1983. About the floating masses and the free-floating signifier concepts in Orde Baru, see: Heryanto 1999.

56 *Reformasi* was a time of rapid reform after the Suharto’s fall in 1998.

57 Latif 2018: 210.

58 Aspinall & Mietzner 2019.

59 Wahid 2001: 28.

as Jokowi), *Pancasila* is a tool to fight radicalism, extremism and terrorism, phenomena from which Indonesia, in his opinion, is free thanks to *Pancasila*. In the name of *Pancasila*, both past regimes (Soekarno and Suharto) violated human rights, and nowadays under Jokowi's rules, in its name, no human rights activities are undertaken, including the settlement of the troubled past, such as the mass murders in 1965–66, brutal violations against the opposition, crimes against society and the environment in West Papua, the genocide in East Timor, the pacification of Aceh or the Petrus murders.⁶⁰

Human rights activists have condemned the failure of successive presidents to resolve these issues⁶¹ and a lack of concern by Jokowi's administration for civil and political rights.⁶² Indonesia is facing the dilemma of human rights protection in the form of a gap between policy and practice. For this reason, Jokowi's *Pancasila* is a central nervous system or a bastion against the negative phenomena that an increasing number of countries in the world are facing sound unbelievable.⁶³ In his solemn speech to Indonesians on 1 June 2016, in which the echoes of Soekarno's famous speech 71 years earlier, Jokowi clearly emphasized Indonesia with *Pancasila* as a reference point for other countries⁶⁴ and as a system of values that must be practiced and strengthened continuously, a panacea for all social problems. However, we can find many examples of how it contributes to the diminution of democracy in Indonesia.⁶⁵

Today, too, all attempts to change *Pancasila* are met with immediate protests (or even hysteria) from various communities as a threat to national unity. An expression of this is Jokowi's words: "*Pancasila* is our home, we live in it together as compatriots! We will not tolerate anyone who discredits *Pancasila*, anyone who dares to question its values!"⁶⁶ The efforts to mitigate Islamic radicalism and the rhetoric of five rules defence contain an echo of the anti-*Pancasila* discourse of the Soeharto regime, aimed at curbing political opposition and regulating political expression.⁶⁷

60 See for example: Roosa 2006; Tanter, van Klinken & Ball 2006; Heidbüchel 2007; Sangaji 2007; Mietzner 2009; Lee 2020.

61 ICTJ, KontraS 2011.

62 McGregor & Setiawan 2019.

63 Belarminus 2017.

64 *Jokowi: Pancasila benteng melawan radikalisme dan ekstremisme*. BBC News Indonesia. 01.06.2016.

65 For example: Law No. 17 of 2013 on Societal Organizations (Organisasi Kemasyarakatan, "Ormas Law"); Law No. 5 of 2018 on Civil Society Organizations ("Perppu Ormas"). These legal acts are a response to the aggressive behaviour of radical Muslim groups, but contradict the assumption of the state democratization and the assumptions of civil society. See: Wanto & Sebastian 2020.

66 Yasmin 2019.

67 Nuraniyah 2020.

Despite its mixed history, *Pancasila* remains visible today in a transitioning, democratic Indonesia, although it is clear that its principles do not work universally. It is difficult to say that it fulfils its role since the 1965 mass murders and the other regime crimes have not yet been clarified, their perpetrators have not been punished, and the victims are still intimidated. This is enough to show the double face of human rights discourse in post-Suharto Indonesia, offering rights by neglecting it for those who need it the most. However, already in kindergarten, classes on the basics of *Pancasila* philosophy are conducted, focusing primarily on the first principle, faith in one God. As T. Friend says, the compromises between centralists and federalists, Muslims and followers of other religions and laity were imperfect – because how could it be otherwise?⁶⁸ Indonesian political discourse has been disturbed for over half a century and will continue to be.

Conclusion

From the very beginning, *Pancasila* aroused great emotions and was subjected to various interpretations. The path towards its understanding its role as the foundation stone of the state has changed many times since 1945, and it has been redefined, used commonly for political purposes, and its significance questioned. But one thing is beyond doubt, that *Pancasila* has shaped Indonesian history and culture. Just as every country is convinced that it is unique for various reasons, so Indonesians are widely convinced of the uniqueness of their national philosophy, and this is evident in the form of their unwavering devotion to *Pancasila*. P. Iskandar called it the *Pancasila* delusion.⁶⁹ There are also voices that it is time to abandon the unfavourable view of some varieties of ideology, such as atheism, and demonstrate the ability to solve contemporary problems, although this may give alternative views on *Pancasila* to adapt to modern Indonesian society. Amid global convergence of the entrenchment of universal human rights in national constitutions, constitutional development in Indonesia is moving toward parochialism in its promotion and protection of human rights⁷⁰. The high level of intolerance towards ideologies and philosophies other than *Pancasila* may restrict the current political parties and social organizations in addressing the real challenges that face modern Indonesian society. This is a risky approach in a country where the possibility of a conflict breaking out is commonplace. *Pancasila* seems to be still the only viable alternative if Indonesia is to preserve its unity and diversity, even if this unity is a superimposed vision, and religious diversity is limited to religions strictly defined by the state.

68 Friend 2003.

69 Iskandar 2016: 723.

70 Iskandar 2016: 723.

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“Peking Opera Houses” and “Jiqing Opera Exchange” in the Modern Stage Market in China

Abstract

In the sixth year of the Tongzhi (1867), “Peking Opera Houses” and the “Jiqing Opera Exchange” emerged in Shanghai and Guangdong separately, changing the course of Chinese opera history and marking the emergence of a modern stage market in China. As transaction intermediaries of the market, they had an irreplaceable role and meaning in the development of the Peking Opera and the Cantonese Opera. This study argues that they profoundly reflect the influence of the capitalist market economy on Chinese traditional culture in the early age of globalisation and have an important historical position in the history of the modern stage market in China.

Keywords: Jiqing Opera Exchange, modern stage market, Peking Opera Houses.

Introduction

The modern Chinese stage market, which emerged in the Late Qing dynasty, is a major component in the history of the modern stage market in China as the harbinger of a modern Chinese cultural market. It reflects the transformation of Chinese traditional culture, especially theatrical systems and the relationship between audience and performers in a period of social change. In addition, it witnessed the formation of Chinese modern industrial culture and laid a solid foundation for its development. Thus, it is of great academic value to study the emergence of the modern stage market in China for exploring the modern history of the Chinese stage market and modern Chinese opera.

In my opinion, the emergence of the modern stage market in China is part of the modernization, marketization and industrialization of Chinese opera as an important arena for market trade intermediaries, which were represented by “Peking Opera Houses” in Shanghai and the “Jiqing Opera Exchange” in Guangdong. As such, they are important research objects in this study as important milestones in the history of the modern stage market in China and even the history of the modern market.

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But it is worth mentioning that the study on this issue is very little covered in academic circles. According to my statistics, there are no articles at present concerning a comparative study between “Peking Opera Houses” and the “Jiqing Opera Exchange” from the perspective of the history of the stage market. Ching Maybo,² Lu Ling³ and Liao Ben (2014) undertook some research on the “Jiqing Opera Exchange”, and Andrea S. Goldman (2013) studied the theatre market of Beijing in the Late Qing dynasty, but not the trading ports such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. As such, there are research gaps for comparative study on both.

A comparative study will be conducted in this study on the significance and historical roles of these two intermediary organs in the history of the modern stage market in China, starting with analysis of its historical development, specific functions and the historical influence of “Peking Opera Houses” and the “Jiqing Opera Exchange”, based on the specific conditions of the Chinese social-economy and culture in Tongzhi and Guangxu, thus exploring and thinking about the emergence of the modern stage market in China.

The Appearance and Rise of the “Peking Opera Houses”

In 1867, British Cantonese Luo Yiqing came to settle in Shanghai with the introduction of an advanced British theatre broker system to China and founded “Mantingfang” in Baoshan Street and Jingyuan South Street, the first modern opera theatre in China set up by Chinese people. The theatre mainly organised performances of Chinese traditional drama represented by the Peking Opera as the first Peking Opera performance place in Shanghai.

When the theatre was established, Luo Yiqing invited performers who performed Peking Opera from Tianjin, and “people in Shanghai flocked to appreciate the performance at the beginning”,⁴ an unprecedentedly grand occasion. This marked the beginning of the Peking Opera coming to Shanghai and the origin of the Shanghai Peking Opera.

“Mantingfang” represented a modern model of performance of traditional opera in a western-style theatre, that is Peking Opera Houses (also known as Tea Houses). In these Houses, theatre brokers set up a stage, provided a place for performance, sold tickets, advertised and packaged performers with all the income distributed in accordance with the contract provision between the theatre and the performers.

2 Ching 1996: 473–475.

3 Lu 2014: 115–119.

4 Yao 1918: 5.

It was different from the previous opera performance system in China, with Private performances (Tanghui) or temple fairs (Miaohui). Performing in these two traditional performance styles, performers earned little and lived an unsettled life with a low social status. They would reach audiences by shouting, almost no better than beggars, so performers (actors or actresses, in Chinese named Youling) were professionals, but humble.

“Peking Opera Houses” guaranteed stable incomes for the performers, and they would not have to do self-publicity. But in return, they were only required to perform well. The theatre managers were responsible for maintaining the show order, receiving troupes, publishing performance schedules, pasting posters and carrying out other publicity and planning activities, which saved performers much time so that they could concentrate on the performance. The “Peking Opera Houses” mode created by “Mantingfang” was unprecedented in the history of Chinese opera.

It is worth mentioning that there were already “opera houses” in Peking when the Peking Opera came into being, but the performers in Peking tied themselves to the troupes and had nothing to do with these opera houses, which, in turn, were not responsible for publicity and management. They were almost totally unrelated to each other. This was opera houses as inns, and troupes like passing travellers. “Peking Opera Houses” introduced their own employment system, where the revenues from ticket sales to the performance were all owned by the theatre with a percentage to performers according to box office receipts, which was known as “Packet money” (in Chinese Baoyin). At that time, there was a saying: “there are no Tea Houses without opera troupes and no opera troupes without Tea Houses”. “Opera troupes are focused (in other places) but Opera Houses are most valued in Shanghai” (the Institute of Art Studies in Peking, 2005).

Both in China and other countries, the entertainment industry and violent groups often go hand-in-hand. Luo Yiqing brought gangs and violence when introducing the brand modern stage market to Shanghai as he hired roughnecks to “guard his interests” and prevent disputes with performers or any trouble caused by thugs. Luo went by the nickname “Tiger Luo”.⁵ So, Luo was later regarded as the father of the stage market in Shanghai and seen as one of the founders of the Shanghai Gangs.

Shanghai in the Late Qing dynasty was a paradise for investors. As Luo Yiqing’s “Mantingfang” business was booming, many people in Shanghai imitated him. In the same year, another Ningbo native businessman Liu

5 Su & Chen 1991: 40-41.

Weizhong invested in establishing the “Osmanthus Tea House”, intending to compete with “Mantingfang”. As expected, although Luo Yiqing had deep pockets, his product was inferior to Liu Weizhong, who was familiar with the Shanghai consumer mentality. The “Osmanthus Tea House” invited various opera to put on different performances in Shanghai and put “Mantingfang” out of business within a few months. In the following year, “Mantingfang” was announced bankrupt.

Despite the bankruptcy of “Mantingfang”, the mode of “Peking Opera Houses” was inherited by “Osmanthus Tea House”. As a person who was full of forgiveness and generous, Liu Weizhong was good at management and promotion, so many top Peking Opera performers at that time in China were willing to appear on the stage of “Osmanthus Tea House”. For example, Meng Qi (Meng Xiaodong’s grandfather), Shen Yunqiu, Yang Guixiao, Jin Huanjiu and other opera stars came and performed. For a time, the “Osmanthus Tea House” was Chinese Opera’s South centre.

“Mantingfang” was not the only Peking opera house, and the “Osmanthus Tea House” was not either. The mode of “Peking Opera Houses” created by the “Mantingfang” and inherited by “Osmanthus Tea House” such as Jinguixuan (1871), Shengpingxuan (1874), Tianxian Tea House (1875) and so on emerged, and performers of various operas (dominated by Peking Opera) tried all ways possible to compete in Shanghai.

Moreover, these theatres were all “Peking Opera Houses” and there was a total of more than 100 Peking Opera Houses founded in Shanghai up to 1917 when the last Peking Opera House “Guixian Tea House” was closed. These Peking Opera Houses played host to more than 100,000 audience members. Regardless of the fact that Peking Opera originated in Peking, development of the market in Peking was obviously slower than that in Shanghai. Shanghai, with many concessions, became the promised land for the development of the Peking Opera due to its unique geographical location and historic opportunities. These Peking Opera Houses were fashion representatives of Shanghai in the Late-Qing dynasty. At the time, they were described as follows in *The Bamboo Branch Gamut from Theatres*:

*There are concessions anywhere,
For wandering about at leisure,
Opera theaters are founded long roads,
Every night likes New Year’s Eve,
And all theaters are open till late,
There are singings everywhere from street to street,*

*Fresh colors, new light and new roles.
Posters can be seen everywhere,
Because of these,
Audiences spend money like water,*

*Performance will start,
Honored guests took their seats in due order,
Even invited the socialite ladies to accompany them.
All dress circles are all full,
Social butterflies gather here,
For a romantic and romantic performance,
Audiences spend money like water.⁶*

What should not be overlooked is that “Peking Opera Houses” such as the “Mantingfang” and the “Osmanthus Tea House” were opened in the concession area. It is obvious that concession civilisation played an irreplaceable role in promoting the emergence of “Peking Opera Houses”. This mode of theatre “combining Chinese and western content styles” was originally for the “Peking Opera Houses”, which in nature reflected the influence of western civilisation on Chinese modern culture, especially early modern capitalism in China.

In decoration and design, Peking Opera Houses were very different from the traditional opera stages. In these Houses, kerosene lamps instead of candle lanterns were used for lighting, which greatly increased the brightness of the entire theatre, and stage structure was not in the traditional opera stage style but a higher stage like the western-style theatre, with stalls in the audience and boxes upstairs. And there were waiters serving the audience with hot towels, tea, refreshments and snacks, similar to today’s night clubs.

In terms of the level of industrialisation of the stage culture, the “Peking Opera Houses” in Shanghai were well ahead of their time, while Peking lagged, although it was the birthplace of the Peking Opera. Some audiences wrote an “evaluation conclusion” as follows, comparing the Opera Houses in Peking and Shanghai:

Opera Houses in Peking serve no tea for guests, let alone hot towels, although they hang a signboard of ‘Tea House’. Guests bring their own tea and hand over to servers for making hot tea, but they must pay some money for the service. However, teapots and teacups are so dirty that one can’t stand the taste of it. Benches and obsolete tables are arranged for seats, which are the lowest seats in Shanghai. But the costs are quite

6 Anonymus 1872.

*cheap, charging only 130 cents for each seat. But opera performances in Peking are much better qualified than in Shanghai.*⁷

The opera performance in Peking was at a higher level and lower cost than in Shanghai, but the supporting service was worse, for example, there were no hot tea, refreshments or hot towels, instead, guests needed to take tea leaves and pay for tea making. What is worse, Tea Houses could not even wash teapots and teacups clean. The difference in service level between these two places is clear.

Now we may rethink the differences between theatres in Peking and Shanghai. If only in terms of the theatrical quality, Peking was “better qualified than Shanghai” and the price there was lower, but audiences still preferred the Peking Opera Houses in Shanghai. Why? One important reason is that the Peking Opera Houses in Shanghai increased the added value to the opera performance, an industrialisation of opera, hot tea, towels, snacks and attentive service in the theatre, making the performance become a distinctive features of the market.

If we see the emergence of the Peking Opera Houses as a milestone in the history of Chinese capitalism, strictly speaking, it was only one of 3 milestones, as we can see that, via horizontal comparison, the year of 1867 was important in the history of the Chinese stage culture industry. In that year, in addition to the Peking Opera Houses, the Lyceum Theatre was built by the Amateur Dramatic Club of Shanghai of aliens in China and an opera trade intermediary, the Jiqing Opera Exchange, came into being in Guangzhou. These three milestones are independent of one another and have important significance in the history of the Chinese stage market.

As mentioned previously, before the birth of the Peking Opera Houses, opera performers in China were low in status and made a living by performing in private performances held by rich people for celebrations or temple fairs held for weddings and funerals in villages, quite like today’s traveling performers. These performers had to keep their eyes and ears open to find business opportunities and recommend themselves in addition to putting the mind to the performance.

As such, opera performers would go to two different extremes, one is that they would be well-known performers and troupes would be in short supply, the other is that unknown or novice performers or newly established troupes would not receive any offers to perform and barely survive. Obviously, it might lead to a problem whereby senior performers (troupes) would oppress and

7 Anonymous 1927.

exploit the young as they would subcontract the offers to the young performers (troupes) to derive high profits. Evidently, the Peking Opera Houses were the key to solve this problem, as both well-known and new performers were equal in the Opera Houses. With a high popularity, performers should gain more as more tickets were sold, but on the contrary, they would gain less.

The Evolution and Function of “Jiqing Opera Exchange”

Peking Opera Houses were a product of the concession civilisation to a certain extent, largely existing in Shanghai. So, in another port city, Guangzhou, opera performances also faced the problem of modern transformation. In this context, the “Jiqing Opera Exchange” came into being. It appeared simultaneously with the Peking Opera Houses, marking the emergence of the modern stage market in China. Therefore, they not only played an important part in the history of Chinese opera, but also had an important historical value in the history of modern China.

Different from the Peking Opera Houses and the Lyceum Theater, the Jiqing Opera Exchange was not a product transplanted from the west to China by foreigners but a new product completely coming into being and developed at home. The Jiqing Opera Exchange, which began as a guild organisation “Qionghua Club” (located in Foshan) set up for Cantonese Opera performers. During the reign of Emperor Guangxu, the Jiqing Opera Exchange gradually developed into the “Barwo Club”. So, the Jiqing Opera Exchange was only a transitional historical term, hence in the Cantonese opera business there is a saying: “The Jiqing Opera Exchange came into being first ahead of the Barwo Club; and the Qionghua Club appeared first ahead of the Jiqing.”

Liao Ben believed that the Qionghua Club, Jiqing Opera Exchange and Barwo Club were all “Operatic Guilds” in nature, internally in charge of daily affairs of performers, resolving contradictions, reconciling relationships and maintaining orders, while internally in charge of business, attending social affairs as representatives of the performers and safeguarding the common interests of the performers.⁸ I largely agree with this statement. Chinese Opera has a long history, but these guilds were founded after the reign of Qianlong and Jiaqing, and especially began to flourish after the First Opium War, when the stage market developed to a certain extent, and it is of course a reflection of capitalism’s growth. From a geographical perspective, it is inseparable from the fact that the Pearl River Delta is in a coastal area, and Guangzhou, one of five port cities that led the fashion at that time. The “Qionghua Club” was doomed at the beginning of its establishment before its functions were

8 Liao 2014: 12.

defined. The reason is that it suffered an unexpected calamity in its history of Cantonese Opera. In the fourth year of Xianfeng (1854), when the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement broke out, Cantonese Opera actor Li Wenmao ordered his disciples to establish Wenhui, Menghu and Feihu armed forces and started an uprising in Guangdong to support the Movement, which of course offended the Qing dynasty Government, so “Qionghua Club” was burned down and the Emperor Xianfeng, in a huff, ordered elimination of any Cantonese Opera performance.

With the end of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement, the Qing government began to loosen Cantonese Opera performances. Cantonese Opera performers decided to revive Cantonese Opera, hence they collectively demanded a restoration of the “Qionghua Club”. The “Neijiang Troupe” (performing Luntan melodies and Shaanxi Opera besides Cantonese Opera) were willing to lead the work and the senior actor Li Congshan served as the leader for restoration of the “Qionghua Club”. With his efforts, the “Qionghua Club” was restored and renamed the “Jiqing Opera Exchange”, located on Tongji Street of Huangsha (Datong Road, Liwan District, Guangzhou Today). This is the historical reason for the establishment of the “Jiqing Opera Exchange” in one particular circumstance.

The emergent causes and development of the Jiqing Opera Exchange are described above, so I will discuss its specific functions and transactions next. The Jiqing Opera Exchange was set up in line with the demand for a unique local Cantonese Opera. Its troupe had a broker named “Duye”, often served by a retired actor who was only responsible for selling opera, namely soliciting business and finding buyers. It can be said that the livelihood of the theatrical troupe completely depended on Duye.

Where there is a seller, there is a buyer. In the business of traditional Chinese opera (including Cantonese Opera), the buyer is called “Zhukuai”. The so-called Zhukuai refers to the cultural officer in villages or towns who is responsible for buying opera. His duty is to select and contact theatrical troupes to do business with different “Duyes”, namely to buy opera, if a private performance or a temple fair needed it in a village or a town.

Therefore, in the Cantonese Opera industry after the Jiqing Opera Exchange emerged, negotiations and business between Duyes and Zhukuais were carried out at the Qionghua Club and the like. But most of the time supply outweighed demand. Usually when a Zhukuai came several or even dozens of Duyes would start self-marketing. Because of undercutting it often led to brawls between rival Duyes.

This is another reason for the establishment of the “Jiqing Opera Exchange”, as it was necessary to create a place for equality and civilised transactions between Duyes and Zhukuais. The Jiqing Opera Exchange had specific stipulations that Duyes should present the information about their troupes in brief on theatrical unit menu boards (Shui Pai) with gold letters written on black backgrounds and put them up on the wall of the Exchange, so that all Duyes could rest and have tea in special areas. After Zhukuais came into the Exchange, they would choose the appropriate boards according to their primary needs and then make negotiations after recommendation by the Exchange managers. Satisfied parties would then sign a contract. The Jiqing Opera Exchange would take 20% profits (Duye and Zhukuai would take 10%, respectively).

The Jiqing Opera Exchange specifically provided that all business should be carried out on a fair basis, forbidding shouting, buying or selling by force, or fighting to compete for business in the Exchange. Areas for Duyes to rest and the place for Zhukuais to choose boards were not in the same place. If the Zhukuais took no fancy to any troupe and was not introduced by the Exchange managers, Zhukuai and Duye would not be allowed to trade privately.

It was rather like New York Cotton Exchange established in New York in 1870: led by an intermediary and run in brand management for free marketing. However, the difference is that the Jiqing Opera Exchange was engaged in transactions of virtual cultural products instead of goods. The first similar exchange of cultural products emerged in the United States as late as in the 1920s, but another exchange of pure virtual cultural products (non-physical art work) has not yet existed besides the Jiqing Opera Exchange. The emergence of the Jiqing Opera Exchange is evidence that the capitalist market came into being in Guangdong with “western customs spreading into eastern ones”. Fueled by the Jiqing Opera Exchange (renamed as the “Barwo Club” during the reign of Guangxu with scale expansion), there were as many as over 1,000 Cantonese Opera troupes during the reign of Tongzhi and Guangxu.

The historical meaning of “Peking Opera Houses” and the “Jiqing Opera Exchange”

The part above has briefly touched on the emergence, development and functions of Peking Opera Houses and the Jiqing Opera Exchange. As the two different trade intermediaries for the stage market emerged in the same year, their presence also marked the emergence of the modern stage market in China. The following part will start with specific features and historic factors influencing these two institutions mentioned above and then try to explore the

significance of the emergence of the modern stage market in China and its historical position in the history of modern China.

First, “Peking Opera Houses” and the “Jiqing Opera Exchange” were private intermediaries for the stage market, and their emergence was the inevitable result of stage market development to a certain degree, heralding the rise of a modern cultural market in China.

As one of the oldest products, Chinese Opera had enjoyed a history of two or three thousand years up the Late Qing dynasty. Jiaofang operatic guilds and the public place of entertainment set up in the Tang and Song dynasties marked the commercialisation of Chinese Opera, but that is not synonymous with industrialisation, as the latter was at a more advanced stage than the former. Peking Opera Houses and the Jiqing Opera Exchange mentioned above marked the industrialisation of the opera as they were trade intermediaries.

The formation of intermediaries is a very important feature of industrialisation, for intermediaries are based on a sizable market. Anne C. Perry argues that transactions in the preliminary stage include transaction subjects and objects, but advanced transactions includes trade intermediaries besides the two above for two basic reasons: complication of the trade procedure and large-scale profit, besides a fundamental reason, the gradual emergence of the capitalist market economy.⁹

It is easy to see that the three reasons above are important in the formation of Peking Opera Houses and the Jiqing Opera Exchange. Commercial performances of Chinese Opera in the past were based on a simple buyer-seller relationship where the Zhukuai in each town directly found a troupe boss (or Duye) and invited his troupe with pay. It was extremely simple. But with the Peking Opera Houses and the Jiqing Opera Exchange, an intermediary element was added to this trade pattern, so that the whole trade was no longer of the “troupe boss (Duye)-Zhukuai style”, but a mode where the performance should be carried out via Peking Opera Houses or the Jiqing Opera Exchange. Superficially, it was more complicated in terms of procedure, but surprisingly, business transactions did not fall, and intermediaries were not denied or disobeyed by both sides of the deal, like cotton and financial transactions in Venice, Portsmouth and other port cities in early capitalism, thus intermediaries obtained both legality and necessity.

Something that cannot be ignored is that Guangzhou and Shanghai were quickly involved in the globalised market as ports connecting China and

9 Perry 1992: 60.

the world after port opening in the Late Qing dynasty. During the reign of Tongzhi and Guangxu, concessions flourished and foreign merchants gathered in these two places, which to some extent helped develop a capitalist economy. As previously mentioned, the “Mantingfang”, “Osmanthus Tea House” and other Peking Opera Houses were mostly located in the concession area in Shanghai and there was just a river separating the “Jiqing Opera Exchange” and “Shamian Concession” established in 1861 in Guangzhou.

This is an external causal factor, but we also need to discuss the internal reason for the formation of the two intermediary bodies. There were many port cities opened in the Late Qing dynasty, such as Hankou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Tianjin and Xiamen. These cities had their own local opera, but why did intermediaries for the stage market emerge only in Guangzhou and Shanghai?

I think the internal reason is that Chinese capitalism germinated earlier in these two places. Different from most parts of the country, these two places were not based on agriculture but on business as origins of China’s maritime trade. Early in the Tang Dynasty, there was a post of “port office” in Guangzhou served by a eunuch responsible for maritime trade. In the Early Qing Dynasty, there were many Hong Merchants in Guangzhou who connected Chinese and western merchants with proficiency in multiple languages as the earliest trade intermediaries in the history of China. In the 24th year of the Emperor Kangxi (1685), maritime trade was allowed and Guangdong Customs was set up, so that in Guangdong the population of European and American customers increased sharply and the number of Hong Merchants grew dramatically, and thus Thirteen-Hong specialising in sales of foreign goods emerged. In the 38th year of Kangxi (1699), the British East India Company set up an agency in Guangzhou and a large amount of tea was shipped to the United Kingdom. In the 68th year of Kangxi (1719), France set up an agency in Guangzhou. All that happened before the First Opium War.

So, what happened in Guangzhou, and Shanghai was no exception. In affluent areas of Shanghai, represented by Soochow, Taicang and Songjiang, “Bureaus for Foreign Shipping” were established early in the Yuan dynasty; in the late Ming dynasty when the local capitalist economy was budding, Shanghai was the region where the private banking industry was the most developed in China with hundreds of domestic banks existing before the First Opium War. These banks “exchanged savings for silver money and made loans to neighbouring shops and Northern merchants fleets to make profits” (Guo Jixian, 1933). In 1866, shortly after the port opening, stock trading emerged in Shanghai.

The reason why I go into the economic history of Guangzhou and Shanghai is to explain that both Shanghai and Guangzhou have a very profound basis of trade and a mercantilist tradition (especially for overseas trade), which is the intrinsic motivation driving the formation of intermediaries for the stage market. It is an indisputable historical fact that the modern Chinese market started in Guangzhou and Shanghai.

Therefore, under the joint action of these inner and outer factors, the traditional Chinese opera market expanded rapidly in Guangzhou and Shanghai, and the stage market developed to a high level, that one could call industrialisation. As an important component of Chinese culture, opera in China has a long history of performing tradition and a solid mass foundation. Integration of traditional opera and the modern industrial system spawned spontaneous and private intermediaries for the stage culture industry, witnessing the emergence of modern Chinese stage culture and promoting rapid development of the modern stage market in China.

Secondly, managing the ways of Peking Opera Houses and the Jiqing Opera Exchange reflected the capitalistic contract spirit, marketing ideas, operating logic and business rules, which were the basic premises for the modern stage market in China to continue to blossom later.

Let us first talk about managing the Peking Opera Houses. They were managed based on a western-style theatre mode, where audiences had to buy tickets to enter in accordance with strict rules and regulations, not randomly, as in a rural private performance at home. For example, refreshments would be served at the break and the audiences were not allowed to stir up trouble, and so on. Thus, a ticket contributed to the contract between the audiences and the theatre, which had never been seen before. On this basis, theatre etiquette constructed in the theatre was gradually established in the Chinese world, including later movie theatre etiquette. Even today, Singapore Chinese still refer to “watching movies” as “going to theatre”.

Of course, this is only one factor. More important contracts are embodied in the relationships between Peking Opera Houses and opera troupes and performers. During the reign of Guangxu, Peking Opera Houses in Shanghai came into an age of cooperation based on stock between opera performers and businessmen, such as the Guixian Tea House organised jointly by Li Chunlai and Ying Guixin (1890), the Yongxian Tea House organised jointly by Wu Yuexian and Tang Zhuguang (1895) and so on, so that the industrialisation of the property of Peking Opera Houses was further strengthened. Opera performers investing in the theatre became general managers of the theatres as

chief specialists, while the businessman was like the Chairman of the Board. Troupes signed performance contracts with Peking Opera Houses, emphasising their respective rights and obligations and declaring their liabilities for breach of contracts.

The way the theatre paid performers also showed the spirit of the contract. According to the theatre rules, there were four ways to pay the performers: the first was based on a “share in percentage”, that is, the theatre and the performers got income by proportion according to box office returns, which was in general applied to the performance with uncertain returns (especially given by new troupes or new performers); the second was a package reward, that is, the theatre paid a lot of money to troupes or performers and invited them to perform for a month, which was mainly applied to famous actors or actresses based on a common knowledge that the returns were assured; the third was by rent rate, that is, the troupe rented the whole theatre by paying a sum of money and they performed operas within the prescribed period with responsibility for their own profits and losses; the fourth was fixed pay, that is the theatre trained and cultivated new performers and paid them for performances.

Application of the latter two payment methods was spread after the 1890s. The theatre and the troupes (performers) signed contracts based on one of these four payment methods according to concrete conditions and rights and responsibilities included in them. The troupe leader-centered system that had existed for hundreds of years was almost eliminated and it was replaced by an actor-centered system, which became mainstream. In the 1860s, famous performers represented by Sun Chunheng and Xia Kuizhang became the target of competing theatres. In the 1870s and 1880s, theatres in Shanghai even engaged in a lawsuit to compete for Wang Guifen, Yang Yuelou and other famous performers. The “actor-centered system” of Chinese opera performance gradually came into being with the rise of modern stage market in China.

The market, like other kinds of market, was subject to market testing conducted by consumers. Before industrialisation, Chinese opera was mainly performed at private performance or temple fairs, where the Zhukuai decided who to choose and what to perform, and the audiences had no right to make a choice. But theatre gave the audience the greatest power to decide for themselves and the audience became the people that the opera performers relied on for a living within this democracy, so the income and status of these performers greatly improved. But they also began to face the problem of market selection and they had to compromise to the audience.

This mass selection by voting with tickets is a prominent feature of the modern market, for it clearly possesses the rules and spirit of the early capitalist market economy in ideas, logic and rules. The Jiqing Opera Exchange is no exception.

Like Peking Opera Houses, the Jiqing Opera Exchange highlighted the supply and demand relationship in the Cantonese opera performance market at that time: at first, it was a buy-side market with more troupes and fewer performance events, so sometimes Duyes fought over Zhukuais. But it is precisely because it was standardised and orderly, the sell-side market developed, thus reaching a balance between supply and demand. It is easy to see that if there had been no idea or system conforming to the modern capitalist market economy, the Cantonese opera performance market would have been in utter disorder.


The Jiqing Opera Exchange arising spontaneously was not the result of a government executive order. From the perspective of its formation, the execution of contract spirit, namely an external power urgently required by opera troupes represented by Duyes and rural communities represented by “Zhukuais”, made the increasingly large deals orderly, so it could continue to exist. Facts prove that the establishment of the Jiqing Opera Exchange greatly promoted the development of Cantonese Opera in Guangdong, with the total number of troupes from 10 in 1867 to 1,630 in 1909.¹⁰

In conclusion, Peking Opera Houses and the Jiqing Opera Exchange established under the push of the citizen stratum in China in the late Qing dynasty together reflected the maturing of the modern stage market in Shanghai and Guangdong, namely modern performance and trade system of traditional Chinese operas, featured with capitalist commodity trading characters. They effectively proved the emergence of the modern stage market in China. and have an important historical value in the history of the modern Chinese cultural market.

10 Wing 2015: 90.

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The left-hand picture I took shows the site of “Jiqing Opera Exchange” (“Barwo Club”), located on En’ning Road in Guangzhou; the right-hand picture is a postcard I collected, printed in the French concession, which witnessed performance spectacle of “Osmanthus Tea House”.

North Korean orphans in Polish Belles-lettres and literature: An overview

Abstract

Between 1953 and 1959, more than four thousand North Korean orphans were sent to Poland. Their story was told by several Polish authors. This research paper will present these masterpieces, in order to better understand the fate of these young children.

Keywords: Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa, Karolinka z Diamentowych Gór, Kim Ki Dok, Marian Brandys, Monika Warneńska.

Introduction

This historiographical paper is organized into six substantive chapters, following this introduction. It begins with a reminder regarding the presence of North Korean orphans in Poland. Later it presents the major Polish books dealing with North Korean orphans. Later, a comparative analysis is drawn. The last chapter provides some insights about the post-Poland life of these orphans. The conclusion discusses the impact of their life in Poland on these North Korean orphans.

Aim of the article

The aim of this article is to present the available literature in Polish Belles-lettres related to North Korean orphans who were living in Poland. In order to fill this gap, the author proposes a comparative approach between the available publications. The author also provides a short summary of each of these publications for the non-Polish-speaking reader. There is one Korean research paper related to the representation of Korea and the Korean War in the Polish literature,² but as currently there are no similar scientific contributions published in English, I decided to fill this gap, by making a comparison between these Polish publications dealing with North Korean orphans. This Korean publication is also complementary to this current research paper as

1 Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures, Polish Academy of Sciences (IMOC PAS), Adjunct Professor.

2 Choi 2014.

it presents the opinion of an author on the South Korean side. This Korean publication was also prepared by the most prominent South Korean researcher on Polish Studies: Choi Sung Eun. Therefore, the current research paper is an enlargement and an update regarding the Polish literature related to North Korean orphans, especially in Poland.

Hypotheses

The paper proposes two hypotheses. The first assumes that North Korean orphans were known by the Polish population. The presence of North Korean orphans was not a tiny secret made by Polish officials. The second is that the North Korean orphans who went back to North Korea had an impact on the perception of Poland which was transmitted to further generations and which proves that North Korea is not as hermetic a society as it is often purported to be.

An overview of the North Koreans orphans who lived in Poland between 1953 and 1959.

The Korean War was a conflict which caused the death of more than one million of people. Many children lost their parents, families and friends and became orphans.

The USSR, the PRC, European communist countries, and Mongolia agreed on a global project focusing on taking care of Korean children who had lost their parents during the Korean War. This large initiative was not only conducted for humanitarian reasons but for propaganda purposes as well, used to mark the orphans as one of the consequences of the U.S. intervention in the Korean conflict. It is worth to note, that the majority of these countries were destroyed to a large extent during the Second World War, which was why welcoming North Korean orphans was an expensive operation for these governments. In any case, their populations welcomed warmly these young North Korean orphans, who were casualties of a war they did not want to be involved in.

Poland brought about 200 North Korean orphans and placed them in orphanages all around Poland, starting from November 1950.³ Initially after a journey of 14 days, the orphans found a home in Gołotczyzna, close to the city of Ciechanów. However, due to a lack of educational institutions in nearby Gołotczyzna, starting from 23 November 1951 all of the children were moved to various parts of the city of Otwock,⁴ such as Świder (an orphanage

3 Some young North Koreans arrived on 23 November 1950. Cze 1957: 4.

4 In the 1970s, Otwock was a partner city to the North Korean city of Sunchon and a Polish-Korean friendship rural cooperative was located there. Konecka 1989: 49.

on Komunardów Street) and Sopliców. In particular, the construction of the orphanage on Komunardów Street was partially funded by the North Korean embassy in Warsaw.⁵ Before their departure in 1959, the orphans planted pines and birch trees; their journey is also commemorated with a stela.⁶

The orphanage of Świder was visited by Kim Il Sung in July 1956. In the assembly hall of this former orphanage, there was a commemorative tablet that read: “In this house, we gladly exchanged wishes in 1951-1959. Forever we will remember the motherly care of the Polish nation”.

On 1 January 1955, some 1,270 new Korean orphans were placed in Płakowice, near Lwówek Śląski. When North Korean orphans arrived there, they were in touch with other orphans from Greece, Poland, and the USSR. This large institution constituted a school, some dormitories and boarding homes, and two pitches. Korean children were educated by Polish teachers and teachers from North Korea. They were also accompanied by Koreans responsible for their security. These young orphans were taught various classical subjects such as mathematics and biology but also learnt the Polish language. After a few months, many of them were able to speak proficiently in Polish. Some other orphans were placed in Zgorzelec, close to the German border.⁷ Older kids started higher education in technical schools in Warsaw. Some other 2,500 North Korean orphans were placed in other orphanages all around Poland.

Some Polish historians consider that the issue of the North Korean orphans was kept secret,⁸ but that seems to be inaccurate, mostly because the inhabitants of the previously mentioned cities were in touch with these young Koreans, for example, going together to primary school. However, Poles in these cities (such as Lwówek Śląski) signed Non-Disclosure Agreements and were not able to discuss the issue with outsiders. Secondly, this issue was also mentioned in the contemporary Polish press.⁹ For example Li San Hy, who won nationwide shooting competitions for mining schools in 1955.¹⁰ North Korean orphans in Central Europe were also regularly mentioned in the North Korean press.¹¹

5 This building was quickly called the Korean House (*Dom Koreański*).

6 The orphanage in Świder has served since 2012 as the Architecture and Construction Department of the administration of Otwock.

7 Kubrak 2015: 388.

8 Kubrak 2015: 388.

9 Anonymous, 1956: 2.

10 Centrum Edukacji w Zabrze – Kalendarium 2017: 3.

11 *진형제의마음으로*, 1956: 1.

Despite an agreement signed between Poland and North Korea stipulating that all of these children would return to North Korea after they had finished either high school or other studies, their quiet life in Poland was interrupted by the visit on 4-7 September 1959, of Jon In Saen, the North Korean deputy minister of education. This North Korean official came to Poland to discuss the return of North Korean orphans to their home country, though providing unsatisfactory explanations to the Polish authorities. The process of the removal of the North Korean orphans started earlier, in 1958 when all of them were classified according to their Songbun, a North Korean caste system subdividing the population of the country into three classes and 51 categories by trustworthiness and loyalty to the Kim family. A few years later, a minority of them considered to be less loyal toward the Kim family were supposedly either sent to labour camps or killed.¹²

In total, 606 orphans suddenly left Poland and returned to North Korea between 1957 and 1958. Once back in North Korea, some of them continued to live in orphanages but were sent to ones with other orphans from abroad. The orphans grouped themselves based on the country where they had been educated. This created factions, such as one composed of those coming from China, others from Romania, and a Polish one etc.¹³ The largest group was the Chinese one. Not all North Korean citizens who had been educated in Poland were forced to return to their native country. Students in their last year of study remained in Poland until 1959.¹⁴

Initially, some of the Polish orphans wrote letters to their European tutors, but finally, it became too difficult for them to communicate with those who had educated them in Europe. Despite a law forbidding them to do so, some North Korean people formerly based in Poland tried to send letters to Poland, explaining that the North Korean orphans who had lived in Europe were being badly treated in comparison to those who had been in China and Albania.¹⁵

The story of these North Korean orphans was described in Polish Belles Lettres literature through several books, which will be presented in the following chapters of this research article.

We may split these publications into three categories. The first is related to North Korean orphans in Poland. The second category is dealing with North

12 *Sprawozdanie* 1968: 1.

13 Kim & Kim 2009: 24.

14 In 1959, six people obtained a university degree, 89 gained a technical degree, 16 an agricultural degree, six a degree in economics, two an artistic degree, and one person was awarded a medical diploma. Levi (ed.) 2012: 73.

15 *Uzupelnienie notatki* 1963: 2.

Korean orphans in the context of the Korean War, but not based in Poland. There is also a third category of publications dealing with North Korean orphans but only partially in these publications.

These Korean children inspired many books, poems, and articles. The most famous ones were authored by Marian Brandys, such as *Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa* and *Koreańczycy Gołotczyzny*, a shorter version of the previously mentioned book aimed at younger children.

Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa

Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa is a 232-page book for children written by Marian Brandys (1912–1998) and illustrated by Helena Cygańska-Walicka (1913–1989). This book was published for the first time in 1953 and was a compulsory reading in Polish primary schools in the late 1950s. It remains however unclear why the book was compulsory reading in Polish primary schools. One reason may be the popularity of Brandys among young readers.

Marian Brandys was a Polish writer and screenwriter born in Wiesbaden into an assimilated Jewish family of the Polish intelligentsia. During his career, he focused on writing historical novels and children's books.

This book told the story of North Korean orphans who were based in Gołotczyzna, a village close to the city Ciechanów. These North Korean orphans were living in a dedicated facility. After World War II, the building had been managed by the Polish Ministry of Education, which created an orphanage for orphans of soldiers who had died during World War II there.

This book underlined the number of interactions between Poles and North Korean citizens. These North Koreans were from a group of children born in the northern part of their country. Jolanta Krysowata, the author of *Skrzydło aniola. Historia tajnego ośrodka dla koreańskich sierot*, a book related to North Korean orphans in Poland, believes that some of these children were living in the Soviet Union between 1951 and 1953 and came sick to Poland. Before hypothetically leaving Soviet Union, half of them left to Hungary, and the second half to Poland. While in Poland, these children were taught by teachers from Poland and North Korea, such as Ten Bi Czir.¹⁶

The youngest orphans: Kim Ba Hwa (spelled as Kim Ba Chła) and Li Un Son were nine years old.¹⁷ The most active student was Pak Un Gu.¹⁸

16 Brandys 1953: 42.

17 Brandys 1953: 44.

18 Brandys 1953: 45.

Brandys evocated several North Koreans in his book, such as Kim Che Su, Li Dzon Sun,¹⁹ I Chun Chin,²⁰ Lim Sa Son, Pan Te Ion,²¹ Dzan Czan Sin,²² Kim Sun Bon,²³ Kim Ion Suk,²⁴ Kil Chon Gi.²⁵ He also mentioned Li Wan, the translator of the group.²⁶ The book described in detail the life of these young orphans in Poland including their daily gymnastic, the lectures they were taught, such as Polish, mathematics, geography and the history of Korea.²⁷ Of course, these young North Koreans coped with difficulties regarding the Polish language.²⁸ Each day started with some gymnastics.²⁹ We cannot know for sure whether these young North Korean orphans actually existed, however their detailed life related to lectures, meals etc. is based on real facts. Based on facts, we know that Brandys visited several times these North Koreans. He met them in 1957, when they moved from Golotczyzna to Świder and provided material for some pieces of his book.

This book was a success in Poland, being reprinted five times, in 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, and 1957. Each version has the same textual content, but in some of them there are additional drawings, which were prepared by Helena Cygańska-Walicka. This book was also translated into Czechoslovakian in a version entitled *Dom na vǎzvǎrnatoto detstvo* published in 1954 with the support of the author, R. Pečikova). This book was also translated into Chinese under the romanized title of *Chaoxian haizi zai Bolan* (which can be translated as Korean Children in Poland) and published in 1955 in the city of Shanghai by the Shaonian Publishing House.

Some extracts of this book were also published in the Polish Press, for example in *Życie Warszawy* on its Christmas Edition (24–26 December 1952) on page 3. It worth noting that the first edition of this book was only published in 1953.

19 Brandys 1953: 32.

20 Brandys 1953: 36.

21 Brandys 1953: 46–47.

22 Brandys 1953: 48.

23 Brandys 1953: 54.

24 Brandys 1953: 63.

25 Brandys 1953: 64.

26 Brandys 1953: 29.

27 Brandys 1953: 53.

28 Brandys 1953: 56.

29 Brandys 1953: 42.

Koreańczycy z Golotczyzny

The author of this book is Brandys. It is a shorter version of the book entitled *Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa* as it included 142 pages in comparison to 232 pages of the previously mentioned masterpiece. One difference is that it includes a foreword written by the Polish writer Marian Bielicki (1920–1972), where he described the beautiful life in North Korea, and the attack on this country by the South Korean Army.³⁰ He also admits that in several North Korean places such as Misan or Czonsan, people acknowledged the support made by the Polish nation toward these North Korean orphans. Also different from *Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa*, the majority of illustrations are related to the Korean War and not to the life of North Koreans in Poland, for instance depicted with younger children. The probable aim was to show the pitiful life of these North Koreans during the Korean War.

Karolinka z Diamentowych Gór

This 274-pages book was written by Monika Warneńska (1922–2010), illustrated by Henryk Bzdok (Henryk Bzdok was a graduate of the Faculty of Graphics in Katowice, Academy of Fine Arts in Kraków and the author of over 50 individual exhibitions in Poland and abroad, where he represented the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and edited by Krystyna Migdalska. Monika Warneńska was a poet and a writer who among other things served as a war journalist in Vietnam between 1965 and 1974.

This publication is dedicated to Jerzy Siedlecki and his wife Irena. Jerzy Siedlecki was the ambassador of Poland to North Korea between 1954 and 1959. He cooperated also with the previously mentioned Halina Ogarek-Czój, making pictures for her book entitled *Pradzieje i legendy Korei* (1981). Monika Warneńska wrote in her book entitled *Karolinka z Diamentowych Gór* of a protagonist who is sent to join a group of small Korean children who settled in Plakowice, near Wrocław. Then the book depicts these North Korean orphans, providing also some names such as Kim Bo San or Han, a teacher from North Korea, who accompanied orphans all over Poland.³¹

Karolina Józefiok (her name is shortened to Karolinka in the book) is a young girl of eleven, who was living close to the mining city of Katowice, the most important in the region of Silesia in Poland. Karolinka's parents had been living in North Korea for one year (her father) and two months (her mother) and she was living with her grandparents. Her mother wanted to write a book about Poles living in North Korea. Waiting for a letter from her parents, she finally

30 Brandys 1954: 5–11.

31 Warneńska 1966: 32.

received a package with products from North Korea. This was probably the reason for her visit to the North Korean orphans based in the city of Płakowice, close to Lwówek Śląski. She met these children and recalled that they sang *Arirang*. Later she traveled to North Korea via Moscow. At Pyongyang airport she was welcomed by representative of the Polish embassy in North Korea. Later she met her parents and left to Kaesong and to Panmunjom with them. We learn that she read the books of Brandys, which described North Korean orphans in Poland. Finally Karolinka came back to Pyongyang, where with a Polish translator named Adam, she visited a primary school and West Pyongyang, where Poles were employed. One of the last points of her journey to North Korea is the visit to an orphanage managed by Poles in the city of Wonsan. When they all came back to the Polish embassy in Pyongyang, they watched a movie about North Korean orphans in Poland. Kim Li Hyon, one North Korean teacher of the previously mentioned primary school who was with them, recognised one of his sons in the movie.³² Later it was confirmed, that this child was the son of Kim Li Hyon. The book ends with the departure of Karolinka to Poland.

Other books

There are also several more books related to North Korean orphans, however not based in Poland.

Mały łącznik Kim E-Cho is the title of a book authored by two women: Weronika Tropaczyńska-Ogarkowa (1908–1957) and Maria Krüger (1904–1999). The book was illustrated by J. Karolak and edited by W. Raclawicki. Weronika Tropaczyńska and Maria Krüger are famous Polish authors who devoted their writings to children's literature and journalism. Weronika Tropaczyńska-Ogarkowa was also the mother of Halina Ogarek-Czój (1931–2004), the most famous Koreanist in Poland who even studied and obtained an unrecognized in Poland PhD on Korean literature. Weronika Tropaczyńska-Ogarkowa was a part of the Warsaw Uprising during the Second World War and later focused on literature. In this book, there is an 18-page story related to the life of a young North Korean child during the Korean War.³³

A second publication worth of a mention is *Grupa Słowika*, which is a 138-page book written by Marian Bielicki (1920–1972), illustrated by the previously mentioned Helena Cygańska-Walicka, and edited by Hanna Lebecka. This publication was dedicated to the daughters of the author: Stenia and Bożena. The book tells the history of young children who are in living in

32 Warneńska 1974: 265.

33 Tropaczyńska-Ogarkowa & Krüger 1951: 121–139.

North Korea during the Korean War. These children are trying to make some military operations against the South Korean and US Army.

It is also worth noting that the first books introduced to Korean literature appeared during the same period of time, such as *Na południe od 38 równoleżnika. Sztuka w trzech obrazach* (1951), by Bronisław Troński; *Korea walczy. Wiersze poetów koreańskich 1950–52* (1954), by Jerzy Ficowski; *Korea walczy. Zbiór opowiadań* (1952), by Marek Lechowicz; *Bajki koreańskie* (1954), by Czesław Jastrzębiec-Kozłowski and *Ziemia* (1955). The image of the Second World War was still very present in the mind of Poles. A comparison between North Korea and Poland was also easy to draw as both countries had been heavily damaged during these conflicts, in the Polish case more than any other country in Central Europe.

Comparative analysis

Publications related to the Korean War were skewed in favour of the PRL's own historiography, claiming that the Korean War was provoked by South Korea and American imperialists. The North Korean orphans inspired many books, poems, and articles. This topic was widely covered, for instance, the second edition (1954) of *Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa* was published with a 90,000 print run, the fifth (1956) in 10,000 copies, and the sixth (1957) with 20,000 copies. A short version, entitled *Koreańczycy z Gołotczyzny* (1954), was printed in 10,000 copies in 1954. *Ptaki powracają do snów* (Saliński 1964) was made available in 20,350 copies. Concerning *Grupa Słowika* (Bielicki 1954), its first edition was printed in 10,000 copies.

These books are inter-connected. Two of them were published in the same collection of books: *Biblioteka Płomyka*, which may be translated as the Flame Library. Also in *Karolinka z Diamentowych Gór*, the author is directly referring to the publication entitled *Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa*.³⁴ It must be noted that the children who were depicted in Brandys's texts had left Poland before those who arrived to Plakowice. This information is also provided on the Warneńska book.³⁵ Some of these books are also comparing North Korea to Poland, saying that the destruction of Pyongyang is similar to that of Warsaw or that the Taedong River in Pyongyang is the Korean Vistula.³⁶ Monika Warneńska made also a reference to the book entitled *Błask ciemności* written by a Polish doctor who was employed in North Korea, Andrzej Braun, describing the Korean War.³⁷

34 Warneńska 1974: 25.

35 Warneńska 1974: 29.

36 Warneńska 1974: 30; 121.

37 Warneńska 1974: 202.

The objectivity of the authors may be also put in doubt, as they were members of the Polish Communist Party (Marian Brandys until 1966 and Marian Bieliński). These two authors were under the pressure of governmental organizations to show an image of young children who are the most fundamental casualties of the Korean War. Some North Korean orphans were even allowed to publish some texts in the Polish press. An interesting example is the text prepared by Cze Czan Ir, a North Korean orphan educated at the Mining and Plastics Technical High School in Częstochowa, who praises the Polish authorities for supporting North Korean orphans. He underlined that he and his colleagues were not used to Polish food and its climate.³⁸

The fate of the North Korean orphans in Poland

As mentioned earlier, once back in North Korea, some of them continued to live in orphanages but were sent to ones with other orphans from abroad. Later some of them were purged as they had in the past been in contact with “non-Asian” values.³⁹

However, starting from the mid-1960s, some of the older orphans of higher Songbun (reliable citizens) were able to study and get jobs working with Eastern European engineers sent to North Korea.

In the case of those who lived in Poland, they worked in places where Polish citizens were based, such as the Polish hospital in Hamhung, the Polish mission at the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (the border between the two Koreas), and the Polish embassy in Pyongyang.⁴⁰ Others worked in fields where Polish specialists were based, and where knowledge of Korean was requested. For their jobs, no university degree was required, only knowledge of the Polish language. As proof, we can quote the case of Ri Hang Sik, who worked for Fabex-ZREMB as a translator despite having only primary education.⁴¹ In the book by Brandys, there is a reference to a Ri Han Sik, who may be the previously mentioned sportsman.⁴² There may be a potential orthographic mistake between Ri Hang Sik and Ri Han Sik, due to the limited knowledge of Korean of Brandys.

Some zoologists such as Kazimierz Kowalski, who visited North Korea, were working during field trips with several North Korean citizens who spoke Polish, at various level, such as Ku Wan Son. He was a North Korean orphan

38 Cze 1957: 4.

39 Kim & Kim 2009: 24.

40 Konecka 1989: 42.

41 Konecka 1989: 42.

42 Brandys 1954: 80.

who arrived to Poland on 23 November 1950 and was educated at the Mining and Plastics Technical High School in Częstochowa.⁴³

Another example of a translator is Kim Je Ming (born in 1941), who was initially a translator for Polish companies in North Korea in the 1970s. He returned to Poland in the 1980s and was used as a translator for five North Korean artists who worked as cartoonists in the Cartoon Studio in the city of Bielsko-Biała (*Studio Filmów Rysunkowych Bielsko-Biała*). Another orphan was a translator for a group of overseas North Korean workers delegated to Kleczanów in 2004. Furthermore, the Department of Polish Studies at Kim Il Sung University has been headed since its creation in 2007 by one of the orphans from Płakowice, Jo Song Mu. Jo Song Mu also received a Polish award as an expert in the Polish language in 2010.

It is also known that a wife of a North Korean ambassador was also an orphan based in Otwock. A military *attaché* at the North Korean embassy in Warsaw was also an orphan based in Poland. Waldemar Jan Dziak (1952–2019), the most prominent researcher on North Korean issues mentioned that Dzo Gum Dzen a First Secretary at the North Korean embassy in Warsaw in 1972, was an orphan, who had lived in Poland since the 1950s.⁴⁴ Yun So Hyon, the current officer of the Committee for Cultural Relations of North Korea, and the secretary of the association of Friendship between France and North Korea, and between Poland and North Korea, is the daughter of Yun Myong Jin, a former Secretary of the National Commission of North Korea to UNESCO and a former orphan based in Poland. Her father taught her Polish, a language she speaks perfectly.⁴⁵ As of August 2020, Yun So Hyon had travelled at least six times to Poland.

Another story to be mentioned is the case of several North Korean orphans who made sporting careers during and after their time in Poland. Two of them, born in the mid-1930s, Im Kwan Sik and Ro Jong Nam, came to Poland in 1952. A third one, Pak Ton Ho, arrived at an unknown later date. All of them were educated at the Sport High School in the Oliwa district of Gdańsk along with other North Korean citizens, including one woman who trained in athletics and three males who focused on acrobatics. Ro Jong Nam and Im

43 Ku Wan Son was educated with several other North Korean young people, Jae Jang Il (Cze Czan Ir as spelled in the newspaper), Ha Jon Sik (Ha Czon Sik), Ri Jan Hui (Li Chian Hi), Kang Jaen Kwon (Kang Jen Kwen), Ri Han Su (Li Han Su), Ho Jong Rak (Ho Zon Rak), Kim Ho Gon (Kim Ho Kon), So Jon Sik (So Ją Sik), Pak Riom Dok (Bak Rią Dok), Jo Ju Gon (Czo Ji Gon), Jae In Gon (Cze In Gon), Kim Pong Muk (Kim Bą Muk), Kye Kyong Ho (Ke Ken Ho), Kim Jae Gon (Kim Ze Gon), and Kim Sun Won (Kim Syn Won). Cze 1957: 4.

44 Dziak 2018: 37.

45 Myjak 2017: 11.

Kwan Sik were able to participate in the Polish Judo Championships due to their strong physical and technical abilities. Ro Jong Nam competed in the under-60 kg category, topping the charts in the mid-1950s. Ro Jong Nam left Poland in 1956. Im Kwan Sik was allowed to remain a few more years. Im Kwan Sik obtained some medals and with Pak Ton Ho regularly trained young Poles in the city of Elbląg. Pak Ton Ho was also awarded the Order of Merit with a Knight's Cross by the Republic of Poland in 1994 for his involvement in the North Korean cooperation with the Mining Academy of Kraków.⁴⁶

Conclusion

In this conclusion I would like to enlarge this research paper with two ways. First overall, I want to mention some non literature issues related to North Korean orphans in Poland. Secondly, I would like to assess the discussion about North Korean orphans in Poland and their impact on North Korean society.

After the Korean War, some documentaries related to these North Korean orphans were released in Poland, such as a 15-minute movie entitled *Dzieci koreańskie* prepared by Władysław Marko in 1953, describing the life of Koreans in Poland. Also, according to chronicles from Polish Television, Radio Pyongyang broadcast the message, *War orphans, go to Sinuju! From there you will be evacuated to places where there is no War.*⁴⁷

In recent years, some events and books focused on North Korean orphans have been published. The journalist Jolanta Kryszewata's programme entitled *Osieroceni* (2003), in which two orphans were found, was awarded the *Europa Award* in Berlin. She also co-directed a similar documentary called *Kim Ki Dok* (2006). This production was focused on the life of the North Korean orphan Kim Ki-dok (김기덕), who lived in Poland and was buried in Osobowicki Cemetery in Wrocław, Poland. Kim Ki Dok was also described in a poem written by her doctor Tadeusz Partyka, who had a deeply respectful feeling toward this 13-years girl. Below is a translation of this poem. No title is available. The translation was made by the author of this research paper.

Recently the South Korean producer Chu Sang Mi authored a film concerning North Korean orphans in Poland entitled *폴란드로 간 아이들* (*Pollandeuro gan aideul* [Children Gone to Poland]) and was released in 2019. On 15 March 2019, there was a conference focusing on North Korean orphans in Lwówek Śląski.

46 *Monitor Polski* 1994.

47 Levi 2009: 351.

Polish version	English version
<p style="text-align: center;">Już późno jest Jesienna mgła i tramwaj obok muru płynie Osobowicka cisza trwa Nieprędko minie Dałaś mi życia trzy miesiące które i ja Ci dałem może I zgasło słońce Jeżeli żywych kochać nie potrafię Wystarczy to, że byłeś Mam tabliczkę przy murze Osobowic I twoją dziecinną fotografię miłą</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">It's already late Autumn fog and a tram is running by the wall The silence in Osobowice continues It won't pass soon You gave me three months to live which I also gave you maybe And the sun went out If I cannot love the living It suffices that you were I have a plate close to the wall of Osobowice And your childhood photo, my dear</p>

The memories of North Korean orphans can be transmitted through the previously mentioned events, however on the other hand, the memory of people who came from North Korea during the communist era is especially present in the mind of people who were in contact with them. A perfect example illustrating this situation are the memories of the citizens of cities where North Korean orphans used to live. To a lesser extent, a similar situation can be described for those who lived closely to the Polish hospital in Hamhung.

The importance of cooperation between Poland and North Korea on the issue of orphans was a driver for the deepening of relations between both countries for the next 50 years. The past and European values were absorbed, to a certain extent, in the consciousness of the North Korean orphans who lived in Central Europe. The North Korean orphans who went back to North Korea had an impact on the perception of Poland, which was transmitted to further generations and which proves that North Korea is not as hermetic a society as it may often pretend to be. It is more than probable that these children were forbidden to talk about their life in Poland, however they learnt some habits which are incrustated in their mind as children, a way of thinking that could not be forbidden by the North Korean authorities. Those who were educated at the Mining and Plastics Technical High School in Częstochowa were also living with other foreigners, mainly from Algeria and Cuba, which may have also impacted their psychology.

These North Korean orphans possessed a large cultural background related to Poland. Even if they were not able to transmit it. Therefore, there is a constant imperative to learn and debate, and to have a better chance of finding the right balance when discussing the isolation of North Korean society.

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Center and Periphery in the Hymns of the Atharvaveda. Analysis of Image Schemas in Ancient Magic-religious Text

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to apply the cognitive theory of image schemas in the field of Vedic studies. The study is based on analysis of selected magical formulas of the Atharvaveda. In the paper the possible presence of the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema in the Atharvavedic formulas is considered. The conclusion is that the application of cognitive linguistics in Vedic studies can enrich our interpretations and understanding of Vedic worldview.

Keywords: Atharvaveda, magic, cognitive linguistics, image schemas, Vedic Studies.

Introduction

The paper presents the results of previous research² and is an example of the application of the methodology of cognitive linguistics in the study of ancient magical-religious texts represented here by the Atharvaveda – canonical Vedic text composed in Vedic Sanskrit on the Indian Subcontinent. Due to the need to focus on the possibility of using new research tools in the analysis of the above-mentioned text, the presentation of classical studies on magic in the Atharvaveda and the current state of philological research were reduced to a minimum. The text contains basic information about the Atharvaveda and Vedic tradition. The image schemas theory is also briefly introduced. The third part is an analysis of selected fragments of the Atharvaveda in terms of the reconstruction of the mental schemas expressed in the text. The issue of redefining ritual phenomena and magical formulas in the context of cognitive and evolutionary sciences remains a topic for future research and this article should be seen as a presentation of preliminary research and the formulation of the topic for further research.

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2 Author's unpublished M.A. thesis: "Cognitive Analysis of the Selected Hymns of the Atharvaveda. The Methodological Issues" – Gutowski 2016.

The Atharvaveda

The Atharvaveda (hereinafter AV) is one of the four collections (*saṃhitā*) of Sanskrit hymns, which constitutes the oldest layer of Vedic literature in India.³ The composers of the Saṃhitās called themselves “Aryas” (*ārya*) and belonged to the groups of the speakers of the Indo-European language (later called Sanskrit) during the second millennium BC. One of the oldest names of the text analyzed in this paper is the Atharvāṅgīrasa. J. Gonda stated that the term is derived from the names of two priestly clans: Atharvan and ṅgīras.⁴ This is to some extent, an explanation of the dual nature of the AV itself. The Atharvans were associated with blessings, while the ṅgīras’ activities were linked to aggressive practices. It is extremely important that at first this text was not included in the Vedic canon and did not have a status comparable to the other Vedas that formed the Triple Knowledge (*trayī vidyā*). Non-acceptance of this text as a canonical text by religious authorities was probably a result of the private and intimate nature of many of the practices described in it. A. Parpola suggests that Atharvavedic tradition is as old – or even older – than the Ṛgvedic one.⁵ The Atharvavedic world-view would be then included in the younger parts of the Ṛgveda (books I and X) independent of its relatively late canonization. Its contents and structure do not indicate that the process of addition to the Vedic corpus was continuous. But – if Parpola is right – it was rather the result of cultural fusion of two Aryan traditions.

Dating and place of origin

Despite many attempts, the absolute dating of Vedic literature is unclear. This paper does not aim to analyze the extensive and often controversial theories of the time and location of the composition of the Vedic Saṃhitās, but for the purposes of this work the period of 1200–1000 BC can be assumed as a probable time of the compilation of the analyzed text.⁶ Relative chronology, although it also causes many problems for researchers, allows for further hypotheses. The Atharvaveda as a constituted and edited whole text seems to be the youngest of the Vedas. The basis for such a statement are the geographical locations described in the text. The Ganges and central areas of the Hindustan Plain are known. The structure and form of the text also speak for the relatively

3 The Vedic literature is – apart of Mitanni texts – the oldest attestation of Indo-Aryan language: Vedic language. The evolution of this language in the context of migration of its users and external influences is described inter alia in: Erdosy 1995, Southworth 2005 and Staal 2008.

4 Gonda 1975: 267.

5 Parpola 2015, chapter 12.

6 Witzel 1997: 280; Parpola proposes the dates 1000–800 BCE as a time of the AV composition, see Parpola 2015, chapter 2.

late origin of the AV as it is known in its present shape. In the text it is easy to find many fragments of prose that resemble those known from the Brāhmaṇa texts.⁷

According to M. Witzel, in the case of the AV we are dealing with a text whose creation (or at least the oldest part of it) may reach the time of widespread use of iron in South Asia, i.e. around 1200 BC.⁸ Despite the fact that the AV was added to the canon relatively late its relation to the other parts of the canon is complicated. What is visible are not merely chronological, but also dialectal differences.

Witzel locates the origins of the AV in the area of the Kuru tribe (Kuruḥṣetra) and the area to the east of this place (the headquarters of Pāñcāla tribe).⁹

Recensions and the history of transmission

Despite the traditional nine “schools” associated with the AV in the texts, only two recensions of this Saṃhitā survived to this day. Gonda claimed that the text was differentiated very early and was transmitted only in two versions known until today.¹⁰ The preserved versions are Śaunakīya (abbreviated to AVŚ) and Paippalāda (abbreviated to AVP). They differ to some extent in the content and arrangement of the material. The AVP is a more extensive text, although it is the AVŚ that has been better preserved and has a richer analytical tradition (texts in various recitative versions and supplementary literature).¹¹ For many years, the AVŚ was mistakenly considered as a kind of Vulgate or the UR-Atharvaveda.¹² The AVŚ review enjoyed, until a very recent time, a greater interest of researchers, even after discovering the existence of a second AV transmission tradition. The history of research on the AVP dates back to 1873, when an extraordinary discovery of the Kashmiri AV manuscript was made.¹³ For decades, the manuscript from Kashmir written in the *śāradā* script was the only remnant of the Paippalādin tradition. The situation changed dramatically when in the 1950s the living tradition of the Paippalāda Atharvaveda in Orissa was discovered.¹⁴ Its discoverer Durgamohan Bhattacharyya prepared and

7 More information in: Renou 1955. Cf. Kubisch 2007.

8 Witzel 1997: 281.

9 Witzel 1997: 280.

10 Gonda 1975: 272.

11 Gonda 1975: 272.

12 It has been described in this way for example by W. Whitney (Whitney 1905) and M. Bloomfield (Bloomfield 1899).

13 History of the research on the AV in: Selva 2019.

14 Lubotsky 2002: 5.

published the edition of the first four books of the Atharvaveda of Orissa¹⁵. Currently, when it comes to the AVP, we have access to most AVP texts. This is so thanks to the work of the Durgamohan Bhattacharya, his son Dipak Bhattacharya and the work of other researchers. Witzel, however, emphasized the need for further research and re-editing of these texts (partly already done since then – cf. the Online Edition of the Paippalāda Recension of the Atharvaveda at the University of Zurich).¹⁶

To the list of research goals should be added the postulate formulated at the beginning of this paper to enrich the classical philological perspective in the interpretation and understanding of the texts of the Vedic canon with the application of the entire repertoire of theoretical approaches and research tools proposed by modern humanities.

Structure and content

The Atharvaveda belongs to the Vedic Saṃhitās and, similarly to the R̥gveda, it contains primarily metric hymns (*sūkta*). The text is divided into 21 books or parts (*kānda*). The arrangement of the hymns in the AVP seems less coherent and not so strict, which in Gonda's opinion proves the autonomous origin and archaic nature of this version.¹⁷ In the AV it is easy to notice many elements typical for the Vedic poetics. We also find in the text many examples of magical formulas that seem to show many similarities and parallels in many other cultures. Therefore, in the AV we are dealing, among others, with archaization, alliterations, numerous parallels and the presence of refrains, as well as the presence of direct invocations to deities, demons, personified diseases, objects and phenomena. Extremely frequent are references to mythical events and comparisons that are meant to intensify the impact and adequacy of magical procedures.

The presence of archaisms can be explained both by the history of the text and conscious stylization, which in turn may result from a certain tendency common in magical texts to use old and to some extent incomprehensible words. It is possible, however, that the priest editors are responsible for the language characteristics of the AV. They, according to Witzel,¹⁸ sought to

15 It is quite remarkable that nowadays the AV has survived mostly on the peripheries of the Vedic world. In other parts of India this tradition is extinct or extremely endangered. This peripheral location of the AV may be related with its additional status in Vedic corpus. About the efforts of Atharvavedins to establish its symbolical importance see: Parpola 2015: chapter 12 or Witzel 1997: 275–283.

16 Witzel 1997: 283–84, Online Edition of the Paippalāda Recension of the Atharvaveda (www.atharvavedapaippalada.uzh.ch – 26.06.2020).

17 Gonda 1975: 274.

18 Witzel 1997: 278.

demonstrate its antiquity, wishing to find a place for this Saṃhitā in the Vedic canon, and for themselves in the political and social structures of the time.

J. Gonda divided AV hymns by their nature and main topic. Based on such criteria, magical, speculative (“mystical”) and ritual hymns can be distinguished.¹⁹ Comparing the nature of individual hymns and their location within both reviews, Witzel suggests the following scheme:

Table 1. Hymns sections of the AV20

<i>Hymns</i>	<i>AVŚ</i>	<i>AVP</i>
sorcery hymns (black and white magic)	I–VII	I–XV
speculative hymns (“mystical”)	VIII–XII	XVI–XVII
special topics of <i>gr̥hya</i> and royal ritual	XII–XVIII	XVIII
various appendixes	XIX–XX	XIX–XX

This division is very general and could certainly be criticized. Many hymns have a heterogeneous character. Moreover, from the point of view of the Vedic thought itself, the division into magical and ritual hymns seems extremely risky, because practices described in them both have 1) the nature of a ritual and 2) use exactly the same source of power (“sacred word” – *brahman*). These hymns do not differ in quality. They all relate to rituals intended to produce specific effects in reality. Indeed, they differ in what effects are to be produced and whether they are personal, “home-related” or public. However, according to the division into magical and ritual hymns, the first group includes, among others: spell formulas, exorcisms, healing hymns and formulas causing various other effects based on the action of the sacred word and additional elements (plants, amulets, etc.). They often deal with universal human problems such as: illness, issue of love and jealousy, hatred, protection against evil, etc. The second group will contain speculative hymns, sometimes referred to, quite vaguely and ambiguously, as “mystical”. In most cases, these are cosmogonic and cosmological hymns, presenting concepts of the creation and of the world, as well as reflections of the Vedic composers on the mechanisms and laws of reality. The third group consists of separate hymns that directly relate to home rituals. Very often they are the earliest references to the rites de passage in Indian tradition (later developed into the *saṃskāra* rituals). Many other hymns

19 Gonda 1975: 270.

20 Witzel 1997: 277.

found in the AV cannot be classified into any of these three groups – so they were included in the category of “other hymns” by Witzel. These include ritual riddles (*brahmodya*), Kuntāpa hymns, or narrative sequences. The Atharvaveda tradition – both of the Saṃhitā text itself and the later ancillary literature as well – can be of great importance in studying the mentality of people who are culturally different and distant in time. The study of such a text gives the opportunity to learn about the architecture of the mind – both its universal cognitive foundations and specific cultural realization. Cognitive linguistics is the approach that enables the aforementioned reconstruction of the expressed in the language of sacred formulas Vedic worldview of the composers of the Atharvaveda.

Cognitive linguistics and image schemas

Cognitivism as a research trend in linguistics grew in opposition to the tradition of transformational and generative grammar and was a kind of continuation of earlier linguistic ideas, such as the American school of anthropology of F. Boas, E. Sapir and B. Whorf. Researchers whose works have become the basis of the new paradigm include: G. Lakoff, R. W. Langacker, M. Johnson and Ch. Fillmore. “Metaphors We Live By” by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson published in 1980 is considered the first linguistic work written in the cognitive approach.²¹

It is impossible to summarize even in brief the whole range of theoretical ideas and proposition presented within this linguistic paradigm. But it should be noted that cognitive linguistics originated mainly in opposition to N. Chomsky’s generative grammar. Rejecting the thesis about the possibility of precise and sufficient description of the language using mathematical and logical symbols and other tools of formal science is then linked to the fact that cognitive linguists assume that human cognitive processes (expressed in language) are closely related to the human experiences that form their basis. Along with regular experience, there appear structures that represent the cognitive representation of experience in the mind. These are image schemas.²²

Image schemas

Image schemas are “a recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programmes that gives coherence and structure to our experience”.²³ Image schemas result from human interaction with the

21 Lakoff & Johnson 2008.

22 Classic version of the image schemas theory was formulated by M. Johnson in: Johnson 1987.

23 Johnson 1987: 14.

environment and provide a way to classify and capture experiences in the system of mental representations. The schema consists of a small number of elements and simple relationships between them, often having the character of simple oppositions (for example: CENTER-PERIPHERIES). Some researchers, such as T. Krzeszowski, believe that imaginary schemas can be much more complex. He considers it necessary to include an additional SCALE schema, which is an internal element in some other image schemas, conditioning the axiological evaluation of such cognitive representations.²⁴

The author of the basic concept of imaginary schemas, M. Johnson, specified about 30 schemes that he considered basic.²⁵ This list, along with new research and theoretical proposals, is constantly changing. Some of the schemas may be particularly useful in analyzing magic formulas. A scheme that can be considered as the basic one for this kind of studies is the FORCE image schema.

The impact of force is one of the most basic and culturally universal experiences. The image schema that is formed as a result of this experience plays a fundamental role in organizing our entire experience. The FORCE image schema evokes a physical or metaphorical causal relationship.

It can be considered as consisting of the following components:

1. A source and target of the force
2. A direction and intensity of the force
3. A path of motion of the source and/or target
4. A sequence of causation.²⁶

CONTAINMENT schema is another fundamental for research into the magic of imaginary schemes. It evokes the idea of physical or metaphorical:

- boundary
- enclosed area or volume, or
- excluded area or volume.²⁷

Z. Kövecses gives two experimental foundations for this schema. Firstly, people experience their body as a container. Secondly, in terms of the container,

24 Libura 2000: 32 see also: Krzeszowski 1994.

25 Johnson 1987: 126.

26 <http://www-01.sil.org/linguistics/glossaryoflinguisticterms/WhatIsAForceSchema.htm> [Accessed: 28.06.2020].

27 <http://www-01.sil.org/linguistics/glossaryoflinguisticterms/WhatIsAContainmentSchema.htm> [Accessed: 28.06.2020].

we perceive larger objects, space and places where we are (e.g. room, house, forest, etc.).²⁸ Childhood experiences also seem important – games based on manipulation of objects, i.e. placing them in containers, matching, etc. Perhaps it is the experience of contact with simple real containers that influences the constitution of this schema more strongly than the much more abstract perception of your body as a container.

The research on magical thinking should also include the study on the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema. This schema refers to the physical or metaphorical core and edges of the object.²⁹ Thus, “object”, “center” and “periphery” are elements of the structure of this schema. Examples where the structure of the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema is revealed are, among others:

- Apple structure (at the level of physical matter – the inside of the apple is the center, the surface is the periphery);
- Individual sphere of perception (with the perceiver in the center and the perception limit in the periphery);
- Idea of the *axis mundi* in mythologies (located in the center of the universe);
- The sphere of individual social relations (family and friends in the center).

In opinion of A. Libura, there are two separate forms of the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schemas:³⁰

1. **The CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema 1.** (hereinafter: C-P1) – is based on the perception of space available to the senses from a specific point where the perceiving subject is located and makes an observation. It often combines with the image schemas of BALANCE, PART-WHOLE, NEAR-FAR and similar.
2. **The CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema 2.** (hereinafter: C-P2) – is related to the space perceived through a single view, i.e. the perception of an area that is available within the conceptualizer’s sight. Therefore, it is associated with the organization of space and its evaluation. An important experiential basis for this scheme may also be the perception of one’s own body (related to the CONTAINMENT image schema) and perceiving it as a being having a central (corpus) and peripheral (limbs) part.

28 Kövecses 2011: 307.

29 <http://www-01.sil.org/linguistics/glossaryoflinguisticterms/> [Accessed: 28.06.2020].

30 Libura 2000: 158.

As a model, it should be assumed that in the case of C-P1 the peripheral space is evaluated positively and in C-P2 negatively. However, such valuation may be the opposite, and it depends only on the specific scene being described or on specific ontologies and axiologies represented in a particular culture. The cognitive division into the center and periphery may function on many levels, both linguistic and cultural.³¹

There are many other schemes that may be relevant to the subject of the study, just to mention one here: PART-WHOLE schema, CONTACT schema, CONTROL and BALANCE schemas.³² Complete analysis of the AV from the cognitive linguistic perspective (especially with the application of image schemas theory) would require taking into consideration the whole range of the image schemas.

CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema in Atharvaveda

Another important imaginary schema strictly related to the first one is the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema. As already mentioned, these are de facto two schemas emphasizing different aspects of the relation described by it: schema C-P1 (extensive experience of space) and schema C-P2 (relative experience of space narrowed to object). Both versions of this schema can be certified in a wide spectrum of AV hymns.

In most cases of healing, defensive or offensive hymns, the periphery is evaluated negatively, which is usually associated with placing the speaker *and / or* conceptualizer in the center of the scene. Dangerous supernatural beings, diseases or enemies are eliminated from the center on the peripheries – a remote place characterized as dangerous. An example where the C-P schema is subtly revealed is the anthem AVŚ 1.14. Here, the basic assumption about placing the conceptualizer in the center is required. A woman making these words wants to get rid of her rival in love.

AVŚ 1.14.1

*bhāgam asyā vārca ādiṣy ādhi vṛkṣād iva srājam /
mahābudhna iva pārvato jyōk pitṛṣv āstām //*

Her portion (*bhāga*), splendor have I taken to myself, as from off a tree a garland; like a mountain with great base, let her sit long with the Fathers.³³

31 It seems potentially interesting to describe and analyse the Vedic canon and its parts in the categories of C-P schema and historical and cultural sources of such conceptualisation.

32 About the application of cognitive image schemas in religious and folklore studies see: Masłowska 2012: 20–21 and Masłowska 2020.

33 All the translations of AVŚ are from Whitney 1905, those of AVP from Lubotsky 2002.

AVŚ 1.14.2

*eṣā te rājan kanyā vadhūr ni dhūyatām yama /
sā mātūr badhyatām grhé 'tho bhrātūr átho pitūh //*

Let this girl, O king, be shaken down to thee [as] bride, O Yama; be she bound in her mother's house, also in her brother's, also in her father's.

AVŚ 1.14.4

*ásitasya te bráhmaṇā kaśyápasya gáyasya ca /
antaḥkośám iva jāmáyó 'pi nahyāmi te bhágam //*

With the incantation (*bráhmaṇ*) of Asita, of Kaçyapa, and of Gaya, I shut up (*api-nah*) thy portion (*vulva?*), as sisters do what is within a box (*-kóça*).

This is one of the typical hymns against a rival in love. A woman wants to make her rival not to threaten her love for a man. Therefore, in AVŚ 1.14.1. the opponent's features are mentioned, i.e. fertility and splendour. The word *bhaga* translated by Whitney as "portion" can also have the meaning of fertility. These features are seen metaphorically as something that clings to a woman like a garland. In AVŚ 1.14.2. Yama – the ruler of the realm of death is summoned. The purpose of the ritual is to make the wife Yama's wife. It is unclear whether the aim is only to avoid her from entering to a relationship with a man during her life and become a partner of Yama after her natural death, or whether the effect of the ritual is to be the death of the opponent. VERTICALITY image schema is also activated in this stanza. The object located at the bottom is negatively valued. So, not only center-periphery oppositions appear in AV hymns, but also those based on verticality and up and down opposition.

In AVŚ 1.14.1 CONTAINMENT image schema³⁴ is a part of the conceptualization of taking over significant features of the rival. Features are understood in terms of material objects that can be taken from the other person – it can be understood as a manipulation of the object between two containers. At the same time, the rival is to be immobilized in the home of her parents. It is important to determine where the center is located in the conceptualized scene. This center can be either the current localization of the conceptualist (where the magic activity takes place?) or the destination (future family home; husband's home?). In this case, the rivals' family home should be located on the periphery. We do not have full conceptualization of the perfect circle here (as the C-P schema often presents), but it seems that it is not required to recreate this scene in C-P categories. The term: *quasi-C-P* image schema can be introduced to keep the formula of this schema for the situation just

34 More about the CONTAINMENT image schema in the AV in: Gutowski 2017.

discussed. It means that the general principle of presenting C-P image schema is absent here, but within this scene the opposition between the close (center) and distant (peripheral) space is maintained, even if the particular “center” is not defined.

AVŚ 1.14.2. and 3. contain phrases addressed to Yama – the ruler of the Vedic realm of the Dead. The purpose of the spell is to place the rival in Yama’s abode, which undoubtedly from the point of view of everyday life and the temporal world (understood as the center), is located on the periphery of the universe. In addition, there is an expectation that the rival should not get married, but stay with the family, away from the person reciting the spell-hymn (that she would keep her virginal status until old age and death, and achieve the socially expected wife status only in the land of Ancestors, i.e. after death). In the last stanza, there is probably described some kind of manual magical procedure performed during the ritual along with the recitation of the formulas. Here, the CONTAINMENT image schema is evoked. The rival’s luck (or fertility) is to be hidden, covered, just like women hide objects in a box. The CONTAINMENT schema is almost directly referenced here. In this case most likely there is an imitation of the real actions performed during the ritual in the verbal sphere. This would require analysis based on a broad perception of magic action as a conceptual blend or multimodal metaphor.³⁵

Some AV hymns express the displacement of a rival on the periphery in a more direct way. An example can be found in AVŚ 3.18.2–4. This spell was performed with a magic plant.

AVŚ 3.18.2

*úttānaparṇe súbhage dévajūte sāhasvati /
sapātnīṃ me pārāṇuda pātiṃ me kévalaṃ kṛdhi //*

O thou of outstretched leaves, fortunate, god-quicken, powerful, do thou thrust away my rival, make my husband wholly mine.

AVŚ 3.18.3

*nahī te nāma jagrāha nō asmin ramase pátau /
pārām evā parāvátam sapātnīṃ gamayāmasi //*

Since he has not named (*grah*) thy name, thou also stayest (*ram*) not with him as husband; unto distant distance make we my rival go.

35 The theory on the magic ritual as a conceptual blend is presented in: Sørensen 2007. There is also an important approach based on understanding the Vedic ritual as a kind of multimodal metaphor presented by J. Jurewicz in: Jurewicz 2014.

AVŚ 3.18.4

*úttarāhām úttara úttaréd úttarābhyah /
adhāḥ sapátñī yā māmādharā sādharābhyah //*

Superior [am] I, O superior one; superior, indeed, to them (f.) that are superior; below [is] she that is my rival; lower [is] she than they (f.) that are lower.

In this hymn, the rival is to be banished far (*pára-kr*), over a great distance. Based on the action of the plant and the spoken word formula, the removing or displacement of the wife should happen by ritual manipulations with a plant and a verbal formula. The family home, although not explicitly mentioned here, is an easily identifiable center, while the periphery is a distant space – a destination for the hated rival.

In the hymns of the AV, far distance is repeatedly mentioned, expressing peripheral areas where stay such creatures, which, being too close, may be dangerous or may pose a threat to the life of the individual or social order. Below there are selected stanzas in which the C-P image schema is recalled by the image of the postulated distance, the space “over there”.

AVP 5.20.1

*paro 'pehi paraś cara paras tarda parastaram /
agner vātasya dhrājyā apa bādhe ahaṃ t_uvām//*

Go far away, move far away, away, O borer, still farther away. I repel you with the force of fire, of wind.

AVP 5.20 is a spell against the destroyers of barley. Probably some kind of field pest – unseen, but personified. The threat is chased “further away” to a “distant” place (*paras*). Getting rid of the pest is conceptualized in terms of moving it by force. The place where the conceptualizer is located is the center. It is positively evaluated as a space for living. The barley destroyer as an enemy creature must be moved far from the conceptualizer – to the periphery.

The idea of getting rid of something undesirable can also be evoked by verbs expressing relocation directly or indirectly. This is the case with the verb “to lead” (*√nī*) in the stanza AVP 5.17.3, in which madness is removed from a silent person (*muni*).

AVP 5.17.3

*yathāgne devā rbhavo manīṣiṇo
munim unmattam asṛjan nir enasaḥ /
evā te śakro abhayaṃ kṛṇotu
mucyasvainaso vi nayāmi rakṣaḥ //*

O Agni, just like the divine, wise bhus [in old times] let loose the mad muni from the mischief, so let the powerful one (Indra) make peace for you (the patient). Get released from the mischief. I lead the demon away.

A similar scene based on the C-P image schema with motion verbs is certified in AVP 5.1.1:

AVP 5.1.1

*namaḥ piśaṅgabāḥ_u vai sindhau jātāyā ugrāyai /
yo asyai nama it karad aped asya grhād ayat //*

Homage to her, with tawny arms, born in the Sindhu, mighty. She will certainly go away from the house of this [man], who will pay her homage.

The idea of the periphery can also be evoked not only through purely spatial terms, but also by means of recalling different, “foreign” social or ethnic groups associated with distance (possibly supernatural beings – see Yama in AVŚ 1.14.2–3). The undesirable phenomenon is banished to the place where other, by definition, hostile tribes reside. This is evidenced by the hymn against the fever (AVP 5.21). The first stanza generally defines the long distance to which the disease is to be banished (horizontally – far and vertically – down). In verses 3 and 8, there are additionally tribes of the Maraṭas and the Mahāvṛṣas, the tribes which are foreign to the composers of the AV.

AVP 5.21.1

*dyaus ca naḥ pitā pṛthivī ca mātā-
-agniś ca nṛcakṣā jātavedāḥ /
te takmānam adharāñcaṃ nṛyañcaṃ
daśāhnam asyant_v adhi dūram asmat //*

Heaven, our father, and Earth, [our] mother, and Agni Jātavedas, the men-watcher – let them send the ten-days-fever, going low, going downwards, far away from us.

AVP 5.21.3

*takman parvatā ime himavantaḥ somapṛṣṭhāḥ /
vātaṃ dūtaṃ bhiṣajaṃ no akraṇ naśyeto maraṭaṃ abhi //*

O fever, these snowy [mountains] with Soma on their back have made the wind, the messenger, the healer for us. Disappear from here to the Maratas.

AVP 5.21.8

*takman na ta ih_a āśvā na gāvo neha te grhāḥ /
śakambharasya muṣṭihā punar gacha mahāvṛṣān //*

O fever, here are not your horses, not [your] cows, here not your homestead. The fist-slayer of śakambhara, go again to the Mahāvṛṣas.

The hymn contains references to deities (Heaven and Earth, Agni-Fire) and probable mythical analogies. These are the elements provided to strengthen the power of the verbal formula. References to individual entities and mythical events are hierarchical. The cosmologically basic Heaven and Earth and Agni-Fire, fundamental for Vedic thought, are mentioned in the first stanza, while the following stanzas refer to the minor deities and mythically relevant reinforcement elements. Cited stanzas AVŚ 5.21.3. and 8. recollect the Maratas and the Mahāvṛṣas. These groups can be interpreted as tribes. They are to become the target of harmful fever. It can be assumed that their headquarters are located at a certain distance, somewhere on the periphery of the conceptualist's world, whose center, according to a common tendency, can be located in the place where he resides (depending on the interpretation, one can propose: a village, a household, a mythologically significant sacred place – *axis mundi*, or simply a place where sacrificial fire burns). The presence of the adverb “again” (*punar*) in stanza 8. is intriguing. The spell is to send the fever back to the Mahāvṛṣas, which may mean that their sinister activity was the source of this misfortune. This interpretative suggestion, however, requires a compilation of different and more extensive material, which would go beyond the scope of this study.

It is also worth noting that the analyzed C-P image schema is also implied in almost all these cases when the CONTAINMENT image schema is present in the AV. These two patterns seem conceptually very close. The CONTAINMENT image schema assumes the interior-exterior relationship based on the C-P schema. The opposition of the Center – Periphery appears in many contexts. Often, this pattern is difficult to grasp and expressed explicitly. A complete study of this scheme would require a much more detailed reconstruction of scenes conceptualized in the text (both ritual and mythical).

Conclusions

It has been shown that magic formulas in the Atharvaveda contain numerous realizations of image schemas. Taking these patterns into account enables an in-depth analysis of the hymns and obtaining important interpretative conclusions. The magical thinking that is attested in the AV is based on universal cognitive processes that can be described with the use of theoretical models developed on the basis of cognitive linguistics. In the analyzed fragments, it was often possible to show more than one image schema, that could be used to characterize the presented scene. The cognitive theories presented in the paper may require some adaptation to the specificity of the research material. For it seems that the mere consideration of the theory of mental schemas is insufficient for a complete analysis of the Atharvaveda hymns. A better perspective is obtained when we additionally take into account the theory of conceptual blends, which is the starting point for Sørensen's theory of magic.³⁶ Image schemas should then be treated primarily as elements that can become the basis for creating a common generic space in the reconstructed conceptual blends. It is an important research postulate for further studies.

It seems too early to develop a coherent cognitive theory of AV magic. This paper presents to some extent an experiment. The presentation of selected theoretical approach and an attempt to apply it in the analysis of the AV is only an introduction to possible detailed studies using the methodology of cognitive linguistics in future. Further research perspectives relate primarily to testing a wider spectrum of cognitive theories and analyzing larger parts of the text. These studies should be conducted with application of classical and cognitive linguistics, but also psychological theories, achievements of neuroscience and altered states of consciousness studies. It would certainly be valuable to compare an image known from Vedic literature with archaeological data. This work is only an introduction to further interdisciplinary research of the worldview of the Vedic period in ancient India.

36 Sørensen 2007.

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Building a Cultural Superpower: The Impact of South Korean Popular Culture in Romania

Abstract

In this article we aim to present the ways in which listening to K-pop music influences consumer behaviour. We examine how South Korean cultural exports have been adopted in Romania, but we also weigh the gender-wise benefits for the consumer. The theoretical framework is centered on the effect of K-pop music and deals with key-concepts such as gender, globalisation, hybridity, and influence. The methodology is mainly qualitative, as data were collected through telephone interviews. Our findings show that K-pop music has a major impact on the purchasing decisions and lifestyle of Romanian fans of South Korean popular culture.

Keywords: consumer behaviour, cultural export, gender, globalisation, influence, K-pop.

Introduction

The story of K-pop as cultural movement began in 1967, when local female trio “The Korean Kittens” started performing concerts for the American troops based in Korea. Characterized by upbeat music, modern choreography, and Korean lyrics sporadically altered with English words, K-pop gradually attracted a significant worldwide following. However, it was “Seo Taiji and the Boys” who really laid the foundation of K-pop as a musical genre, by combining elements of traditional and modern music, thus drawing attention to the creative potential of Korean music. This has led to a profitable entertainment industry through the appearance of several well-established acts, agencies that provide long-term training programmes, innovative choreographies, visual and vocal impact, eye-catching music videos, as well as consistent aesthetics, cinematography, and storytelling. The opening of borders, the advent of new media, and the progressive emergence of globalisation led to the widespread appreciation of this musical genre, becoming increasingly attractive to youngsters outside Asia. This became part of the “Hallyu” phenomenon, translated as “Korean Wave”, a term used to describe the increasing popularity

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of not just K-pop music, but also K-Drama, which includes South Korean televised dramas and films.⁴ The impact of the Korean Wave was steadily felt, leading to increases in the consumption of artist-endorsed exported cosmetics of up to \$1.1 billion and the relative suppression of related imports. Also, in terms of tourism, this influence resulted in an increase of up to \$68 billion.⁵

K-pop bands are known for their intricate choreography, as well as for the hard work invested in their training and the sophisticated stage design and direction that is prominent throughout their live appearances. Furthermore, it is customary for K-pop idols to be involved in promoting social causes in order to be a positive influence among their followers, but also to be appreciated by other age groups, notably when advocating the preservation of cultural values.⁶ As these cultural exports became increasingly abundant, groups of fans known as fandoms were created. These fans dedicate a good portion of their time to supporting their favourite band and often change their identity within the community referencing the band and their body of work. Furthermore, fans commonly associate themselves with band logos printed on clothing items, posters, and other objects which are proudly displayed at home or in public.⁷ This type of devotion has managed to break lasting social and cultural barriers, thus helping K-pop access mainstream media.

The Korean wave has not been overlooked in Romania either, where this musical genre has taken shape since 2009, when rights to broadcast Korean series began to be bought by Romanian television stations, namely TVR1, Euforia TV, and Național TV.⁸ As the ratings soared, further broadcasting rights were purchased. Both online and traditional press made room for K-pop and K-drama articles featuring star biographies and posters. A few Romanian radio stations also dedicated timeslots for airing the latest K-pop hits. The K-pop frenzy gave rise to the opening of brick-and-mortar shops intended strictly for the distribution of Korean products, food, clothing, cosmetics and body care products, media (albums, postcards, posters, light sticks for concerts, CDs and DVDs, stationery and accessories), but also Korean restaurants. Even during the 2020 pandemic, K-pop fans have been being kept active through online dance classes on video communication apps like Zoom.

The first objective of this study was to understand K-pop music as a cultural export in Romania. Another purpose was to establish the consequences of

4 Shim 2011.

5 Truong 2014.

6 Truong 2014.

7 Shim 2011.

8 Marinescu 2017.

K-pop on Romanian consumer behaviour, videlicet the way in which this lifestyle affects purchasing decisions.

Consequently, we asked the following research questions:

RQ1: In what way is the cultural export adopted by Romanian K-pop listeners?

RQ2: How is the consumer behaviour of Romanian fans influenced by K-pop music in terms of purchasing decisions?

RQ3: What are the social and psychological effects on Romanian fans exposed to K-pop music?

RQ4: What are the gender-wise benefits and shortcomings of K-pop as a cultural export in Romania?

Theoretical framework

In 2009–2011 we conducted research on a sample of 250 Romanian K-pop fans,⁹ the results showing that fans of this musical genre tend to be friendlier, have at least one good friend and can adapt to new situations much easier. When we asked our respondents what they think of first when they hear the word Korea, most of them answered with song titles or names of bands or artists, thus we could clearly observe the cultural impact that Korea has in terms of media consumption. Embracing the K-pop phenomenon progressively induces the concretisation of the globalisation factor. According to Waters,¹⁰ globalisation is the “social process in which geographical constraints on social and cultural arrangements fade and people are increasingly aware of this blurring”, thus Romanian fans’ perception and assimilation of Korean music and products is done in a conscious and deliberate manner. Globalisation can also be acknowledged as a comprehensive process of cause and effect, as well as a course of cross-cultural and transnational integration of human and non-human activities.¹¹ However, this concept of globalisation refers to the wide range of processes concerned with the way in which societies become homogeneous, although hybridity is becoming the most appropriate feature of this process.¹² Despite being initially attributed to “colonial racism” after it was readapted by social critics, the concept received a favourable definition of cultural change and it has since been used to challenge “immobile and existentialist approaches to identity and culture¹³”. Thus, the influence becomes a homogeniser of this

9 Marinescu & Balica 2013: 113–135.

10 Waters 1995.

11 Khondker 2011.

12 Choi, Meza & Park 2014: 36–42.

13 Marshall 2014.

hybridity as an action that is exerted on a thing or person, ultimately changing its character, belief or form. These two concepts define what the research aims to analyse, namely the influence that K-pop music exerts on consumers and the processes by which it manages to determine the consumption of music and associated products on a regular basis. Similarly, this kind of social impact can also cause changes on a physical and mental level.

The research analysis also gives heed to the concept of gender, which refers to the “cultural component of our sexual identity (femininity – masculinity¹⁴)”, in order to assess whether gender plays a role in the production and consumption of Korean cultural exports. Regarding the attitudes or perceptions that K-pop manages to transform, the gender characteristic holds an essential function, particularly in the relationship between music fans, who are mainly young females, and the predominant boy-band scene.

Various studies on K-pop have been carried out since the 2010s, most of them referring to the music genre, as Korean fans are labeled as adopting a much more possessive attitude toward their beloved band, which in turn makes them increasingly aggressive and harmful over time, both towards fans of other bands, but also toward the band itself. This demeanour evolved into a phenomenon called “Hyeonsaengbulga”, referring to people who are unable to live their own lives, a meaningful definition derived from the fact that some fans get overzealous and forget about their own lives and priorities, tirelessly following their idols day and night. The relevance of the concept of gender inequality is shown through fan jokes that have ironically come true: “we raised idols” and “my bank card belongs to K-pop stars”; such ideas are self-characterised by aligning with traditional gender roles.¹⁵

The predominance of male groups, their impact and fanbase preferences impose a glass ceiling which makes it more difficult for female K-pop groups to reach the stage and even less likely to achieve superstardom. As a further consequence, this determines the emergence of beauty standards that are difficult to maintain through strict workout programmes, diets and beauty routines. Beauty standards thus become more and more exaggerated: flawless porcelain skin, hourglass body shape and a flat stomach are viewed as the norm, not just as a goal. This translates into more female bands pursuing beauty and attractiveness ideals in order to gain fans, top the charts, win awards, and ultimately fulfill their artistic dreams. Generally, female bands and idols gain fame through posing as cute, innocent, and submissive. The preoccupation with beauty, for both male and female bands, incrementally determines the

14 Grünberg 2011.

15 Hentschel, Heilman & Peus 2019.

rise and concretisation of the concepts of sexualisation and feminisation of artists. In the case of sexualisation, the female gender is most affected by this process, as female pop stars are more often than not sexually objectified and promoted by the media exclusively for their sex appeal. Furthermore, female celebrities often receive beauty titles from gossip columnists that are based on certain parts of their bodies which are seen as attractive. Female celebrity objectification can be easily spotted in music videos, lyrics and choreography, as combinations of lascivious movements, self-touch, and sexual innuendo are seen as the norm. The beauty standards that these women are pressured to maintain and revealing or see-through clothing consolidate the idea of artistic value predicated on physical appearance.¹⁶

The double standard in the case of male sexualisation of South Korean boy-bands further accentuates the gender gap. If female performers wearing skimpy clothing are often chastised, the same does not apply for their male counterparts. In fact, male artists that show off their naked torsos, or wear skintight clothing, are praised by their fans who take every opportunity to bring up this subject. An explanation for this discrepancy can be the deeply rooted conservative criteria which are now manifested through codes of conduct that are rigorous for women, but somewhat malleable and permissive for men. All these factors diminish the popularity of female bands, while favouring the abundance of male acts.

The success of male pop bands can also be interpreted through the concept of feminisation. An increasing number of agencies are sexualising and, at the same time, feminising artists. From the use of excessive make-up to skin whitening and from assuming typical feminine gestures to wearing lace, mesh, or latex garments and flashy accessories, these idols effectively emulate the female allure. The image of male idols, however, has an aesthetic duality. Most of the time, they seem to be “bipolar”, as they can swiftly go from angelic pretty boy to devilish bad boy. While male careers are set on a clear path, women working in this industry are subject to criticism from agencies, jealous female fans and a society who expects them to be pure and innocent.

Undoubtedly, gender differences are also examined by marketers and agencies in order to generate more income, as young female fans are believed to be more predisposed to spending larger amounts of money than male fans, who are not generally credited with much attention to detail. At the same time, the female category tends to buy more personal care products. From a mercantile point of view, it is notable that trade between Romania and South Korea is not unilateral and according to statistics from 2016, the annual trade

16 Choe & Lee 2019: 1–10.

between the two countries was over \$1.1 billion.¹⁷ However, the differences are noticeable on almost any level. But it is this very fact makes K-pop fans find both the music and associated merchandise to be more appealing.

Although foreign fans are miles away from their idols, the physical distance is neglected, mainly due to the Internet, which gives the impression of closeness. Many fans use certain apps or websites solely because their favourite band is more active there.¹⁸ In this way, K-pop groups differentiate themselves from other fan communities and manage to boost both the band and the fan group's reputation.¹⁹ The social identity of the group borrows the values fostered by South Korean artists. As a consequence, they tend to imitate behaviours and general outlooks regarding men's makeup, cosmetic surgery, sexual minorities, or beauty standards. Fans recognise themselves by the name of the fandom they are members of. Over time, the name turns in to a brand in its own right. Similar to band logos, the fandom labels are printed on a wide range of fashion and household items and casually displayed in plain sight.²⁰ Cultural critic Kim Jak-Ga considers the power of a fandom structure to be similar to the authority the police have, due to the surveillance and power over the actions of their members.²¹

Examples of such endeavors repeatedly set hourly and daily viewing records on YouTube often overloading global servers. An example is the case of George Floyd and the Black Lives Matter movement, where joint efforts by K-pop fans and artists have raised donations in the millions of dollars. The expansion and development of telecommunications and social media systems has favoured the spread of the Korean Wave. The most frequent apps for updates on K-pop bands are YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, or Vlive, though it is not unusual for artists to engage with their fans on messaging apps such as SNS, Line, and KakaoTalk.

All the concepts and theories stated above are integrated in the interview guide in order to uncover the changes that K-pop fans went through as a result of the cultural export process. We are interested in investigating what these fans find fascinating about South Korean culture and why they feel so represented by it. Furthermore, we look at how the process of cultural export influences their purchasing decisions, how they are viewed by others and whether they feel judged. We also asked the Romanian K-pop fans who participated in this

17 Park 2020.

18 Choi, Meza & Park 2014: 36–42.

19 Scardaville 2005: 881–901.

20 Shim 2011.

21 Jung 2012.

study whether they suffered behavioural or physical changes as a result of their musical preference or lifestyle, and whether they faced bullying, discrimination, and racism. It was also interesting to learn some of their opinions about South Korean fans and how they are different from those in Romania. We also registered some spontaneous details revealed during interviews.

Elements of methodology

The present study is a qualitative one, using the interview as the method of obtaining primary data. The research tool employed was the interview guide. The research tool, the interview guide, is a semi-structured one, which includes open short length questions organised by topics, which are discussed informally and then based on the research topic. Sampling is non-probabilistic, based on an “intentional” sampling technique,²² which will identify individuals suitable for the research topic.

The minimum selection criteria for the people in the sample are: they must have been listening to K-pop for at least 2 years, they must have some knowledge about this industry and culture, and they must be at least 18 years old.

The interviews were conducted by phone call, as to comply with local state of emergency safety regulations and recommendations set in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The interviewees were chosen from the Romanian online K-pop group on Facebook. Ultimately, our sample comprised 16 people. The interviews lasted between 49 minutes and 1 hour and 15 minutes, with an average of about 50 minutes. The age of the interviewees is between 18 and 24 years old. Out of 16 participants, 11 were female and 5 were male.

Data analysis

In this section, the answers of the 16 interviewees will be analysed on the basis of the topics of the interview guide. The questions in the first topic of the interview guide, which refer to how and when they discovered this musical genre, show that most of the participants (12 out of 16) have been introduced to K-pop by other friends. From the remaining four participants, one learned about K-pop world through videogame soundtracks (VM, 18 years old, female), and the other three subjects found out about it by watching K-Dramas (GM, 18 years old, female / DD, 18 years old, female / VV, 19 years old, female).

The determination to listen to this musical genre comes predominantly from the fact that it is different, which is why in almost all interviews, the word “different” is most often pronounced. Other words frequently used by the participants are: “originality”, “aesthetics”, “quality”, “vivid colors”, “choreography” and “effort” (of the bands), “performance”, “vibe” and “rhythm”, the “literature” used in the “stories” of the videos and the “messages” transmitted, or the “curiosity” towards the culture.

With respect to the period for which they have been listening to K-pop, the shortest time is 2 years and 6 months (CD, 21 years old, male), and the longest time is about 11 years (DL, 24 years old, female), other listening periods being 2, 4, 6 years actively, the rest mentioning break periods. Regarding the characteristics that make a listener become a fan of the band (whether they are acknowledged by other fans or not), the most common arguments are: “streaming”, “tracking”, “distribution”, “involvement” (in online band community projects), “promotion”, “purchase of band products” or advertisement that results in recruiting new people to their groups.

As for their favourite bands, the participants mentioned BTS, Big Bang, EXO, Ateez, GOT7, Super Junior, 2PM and Shinee most frequently, which are bands with predominantly male members. Only 4 (all female) out of 16 participants also listed a few female names and bands, which were mostly placed at the end of the list. After insisting on the presence of female bands, a few participants mentioned: IU, Sunmi, Hwasa and Red Velvet. From our attempt to capture some aspects related to the favourite Romanian bands, it was a surprising discovery that none of the 16 participants had a favourite Romanian band nor did they listen to local music acts. Thus, a small creative experiment was used, which makes the subjects imagine the feeling they might have if they were to see their favourite band live in concert in Romania or in South Korea. The answers revolved predominantly around the idea of “a unique moment in life” and “a sea of energy”. Distance and opportunity (of interaction) were also invoked.

Going deeper into the topic of consumption, culture and influence, all interviewees stated that they bought products related to the bands: albums, postcards, plush mascots, light sticks, artist-endorsed products, or branded smartphone cases. But there were also mentions of indirect purchases in which one of the participants declared that they observed the idol using a certain care product, which they immediately bought, just because they wanted to have something that her idol uses. When asked if the decision would be the same if a Romanian star were to promote the same product, one of the participants was quick to respond: “Aaa! No, no! By no means!” (G.M., 23 years old, female).

There are two ways in which subjects purchase products: physically, from stores located in Bucharest or Cluj-Napoca, and online, from distributors or original sites, the latter being considered a higher quality choice. The purchased products are: stationery, objects inscribed with the name or logo of the band, food, cosmetics, clothing, accessories and books.

When asked what motivates them to buy these products, the first and foremost reason is that they come from South Korea and this makes them feel closer to their idols and their culture. The second most frequent response was the quality of the products, especially in the case of cosmetics, because such products cannot low quality, taking into account the high beauty standards most South Koreans would praise. Other answers include “uniqueness”, “difference” and “unavailability” on the Romanian market. Even though their active consumption is predominantly K-pop, their interest is not only strictly shown for South Korean culture, but also for Asian culture in general, often migrating from one to another, “through one, we discover another” (DO, 20 years old, male).

Only a few of the participants (6 people, 5 female and 1 male) can read and write at a basic conversational level in this language (with no transliteration). But some of them point out that K-pop music helped them improve the quality of their English, as they needed to understand the lyrics that international fans had previously translated from Korean.

In the field of media and social media, all subjects have at least one account made especially on a certain application just to follow their idols. Among the top social media platforms and websites on which K-pop stars are active, we can name Twitter, Instagram, Youtube, Facebook, Vlive, or WeVerse, as well as KakaoTalk, Line and SNS, which are used more for direct messaging.

The fans’ perception of other fans ranges from the regular fans who really support their idols and actively participate in their events, to the fans who are obsessed with their idols and violate their rights to privacy.

In the penultimate topic of the interview guide, the most used keywords with regard to Korean culture are “respect”, followed by “education”, “politeness”, “effort”, “civilisation”. As for the manner in which they adopt these traits as their own, the answers range from not adopting them, but not ignoring them, to how they began to influence them, wanting to become better, more polite and work harder to learn.

K-pop music, although seen differently by people outside this phenomenon, does not cause the participants to feel different from non-listeners. However,

seven interviewees discuss the fact that they do not feel different because they listen to this musical genre, but those who “point the finger” at them (P.C., 24 years old, male), and make them feel different. Concerning the changes that take place at the mental and behavioural level, as well as the physical level, the participants acknowledge that they have been influenced by certain norms and standards or trends, which they have adopted in their current lifestyle. Thus, at a psychic and behavioural level, they consider themselves more sociable and even friendlier, arguments that came as a consolidation of the research in the theoretical framework about K-pop in Romania. They assert that they became more creative and made close friends based on this affinity, believing that it has a close effect. Two respondents, (DB, 21 years old, female and DL, 24 years old, female), consider that they adopted the behavioural influences promoted by female bands or by Korean girls in general, by trying to be as nice as possible and to seem fragile, adding a somewhat “superficial fragility” to their behaviour (DL, 24 years old, female).

There is also another feature of influence on the standards of the life partner, many of the respondents seeming to be attracted to Korean men rather than Romanians, or preferring the masculine standards promoted by those in K-Drama. One of the respondents, who is in a relationship with a Romanian man, states that her own mother often says that her boyfriend “looks a bit Korean” (RG, 23 years old, female).

At the physical level, almost all respondents made a change in their appearance, be it the clothing style, the haircut (especially bangs, just because it was very common in Korean fashion at one point), as well as the makeup. In observing changes in attitudes, we can observe four main directions, namely: men’s makeup, cosmetic surgery, sexual minority communities and beauty standards. Thus, the participants were asked to say which character would act more normal in each of the four given directions, a Romanian or a Korean. In the case of make-up, a greater normality is highlighted in the Korean man than in the Romanian one, the arguments being focused on the idea of habit. In cosmetic surgery, another fact is emphasised, that Korean surgeries tend to give and “create a porcelain doll, while cosmetic surgeries in Romania create an inflatable doll” (R.G, 24 years old, female).

Being asked to provide reasons as to why they would prefer to keep their musical preference hidden from others, certain subjects declared that this is due to judgment they might receive from those around them who do not consume this type of music. With the exception of three cases, everyone else was criticised and judged for listening to K-pop, or for adopting changes to their physical appearance, from makeup to haircut and hair color change. The

most frequent arguments regarding the judgment of others were related to the change of hair colour, opting for nonconformist colours such as pink, blue, green, or purple. All these colours made them the target of allusions to their sexual orientation, while they had no inclinations in that direction.

Several respondents stated that they felt offended and discriminated against by the behaviour of various people towards them, including their own parents, relatives and even teachers. Those who consider themselves as the most criticised by others are the five male interviewees, who are humiliated because they would “listen to music by girls or guys who look like girls” (SA, 20 years old, male), and this makes others call them gay.

The last topic covered in the interview guide refers to gender and how certain factors represented in K-pop. Asked what category they think is predominant among fans from a gender perspective, the majority of participants clearly indicated the female category. Arguments in favour of their statement are based on the fact that girls are more receptive and adaptable. At the same time, the participants established that K-pop boy-bands have the greatest impact because their target audience (i.e., the female audience) is easier to reach and impress.

With regard to question of the behaviour of K-pop fans and whether it differs in any way from that of non-listeners, the answers are divided into two: a) it does not affect anyone, they are the same, and their possessiveness is rarely triggered; b) sometimes fans tend to adopt those behaviours of false fragility and innocence.

Regarding the feminisation and sexualisation of artists by their companies, there is a positive unanimity which criticises the way companies treat their idols and force them to dress, behave and pose. The predominant view is that this factor is only used as a marketing strategy to sell more, a sex doll meant to satisfy the fantasies of fans, who will spend more and more in order to sell their image and attract as much publicity and attention as possible, especially in the case of girls' bands, where the public considers themselves harder to get, thus a strong sexualisation is required to attract men to them.

The influence of gender on consumption is materialised based upon the question about the tendency to buy products promoted by South Korean celebrities. Also to be noted is the male gender influence on purchasing decisions. Even if placed alongside a female idol, most of the participants stated that they would buy from the male idol. There were also two participants who declared that they would be convinced by a female idol if the advertised

products would be cosmetics, as they trust women more when it comes to beauty tips.

The last question in the guide pointed to the category of fans with the highest gender vulnerability of becoming targets for discrimination, bullying, and racism. Apart from feeling embarrassed, intimidated, harassed and offended by the changes they have adopted, being called “gay” and making racist comments about their beloved bands, other situations were not mentioned. However, each of the participants knows, or had at least heard of, cases that have ended in serious acts, such as suicide, moving out of town/school, or marginalisation. Regarding the socio-demographic data, they can be concretised and represented: as a home environment: 11 (eight female, three male) are from urban areas and five (three female, two male) are from rural areas; as a civil status, nine people are in a relationship (five female, four male), the rest being single; the current level of education varies from high school (two participants) and higher education (14 participants) and to professional status, 12 interviewees are employed and attend college at the same time, while the other four people are unemployed.

Conclusions

Referring to the impact of South Korea’s popular products worldwide, Shin²³ stressed the fact that the paradox of globalisation in South Korea is the existence of two (seemingly) contradictory trends: the co-existence between “nationalist appropriation of globalisation” and “intensification of ethnic/national identity in reaction to globalisation”. Shin’s conceptualisation of globalisation and the South Korean response to it can be extended to the globalisation of culture, in which South Korea finds both the forces of homogenisation and heterogenisation in play.

Following the analysis of the 16 interviews, one can finally answer the research questions as follows.

RQ1: In what way is the cultural export adopted by Romanian K-pop listeners?

Answer to RQ1. South Korean cultural exports are adopted in a gradual manner in the consumer behaviour of Romanian K-pop fans. These fans are influenced by curiosity and the desire to be closer to their favourite bands/idols and Korean culture. The main exports, in order of consumption are: music, television series, cosmetics, food, clothing and literature, as well as the Korean language. In the field of media and social media, consumption is presented

23 Shin 2006.

through their activity, in groups or individually, on applications that allow direct interaction with other fans and their idols. They are integrated into the routine of Romanian fans and become a consumer habit.

RQ2: How is the consumer behaviour of Romanian fans influenced by K-pop music in terms of purchasing decisions?

Answer at RQ2: The fans' buying decisions are directly influenced by the music they listen to, as well as by the desire to be perceived as a real fan, avidly buying albums and products related to or endorsed by idols. These idols have a major decision-making power over their consumption, their fans being willing to buy everything they can, thus showing their loyalty. Romanian fans are especially predisposed to such strategies, as they cannot have a direct interaction with their idols, so products become a sort of surrogate.

RQ3: What are the social and psychological effects on Romanian fans exposed to K-pop music?

Answer at RQ3: Changes at the social, physical, and mental level do not massively impact Romanian fans, but some features that can be highlighted are: increased sociability, creativity, self-investments, and learning English and/or Korean. They are also influenced in choosing a life partner, who has to accept the music they listen to, or at least resemble Korean physical features. Furthermore, on a physical level, fans often adopt certain haircuts or hair colours, clothing style or makeup used by their idols. Lastly, from a social point of view, they run the risk of becoming a target of criticism or prejudice from others.

RQ4: What are the gender-wise benefits and shortcomings of K-pop as a cultural export in Romania?

Answer at RQ4: The benefits of cultural exports are cultural diversity and the new information that fans assimilate about Asian cultures. But at the same time, it can attract the hatred of those around it, judgment and criticism of those who do not agree with this type of culture. Thus, fans are in danger of becoming targets for racist behaviours, bullying and discrimination. Male fans, in particular, are at greater risk of being harassed, as their presence is very rare in the bands' fanbases, and the music and promoted aesthetics are opposed to Romanian ideals and standards.

In conclusion, the research questions received an affirmative answer for the way in which the cultural export is transmitted and adopted. This also applies to the influence that K-pop music has on the fans and their consumption

behaviour. In our opinion, if Hallyu should be understood as an alternative to the U.S. or West-dominated cultural globalisation²⁴ its new hybrid forms of popular culture enclosed elements of both the West and the East.²⁵ As shown by our data, this was the case of the K-pop export in Romania.

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Perception of space and the evolution of the Chinese psyche

Abstract

This paper is intended as an investigation of the conceptualisation of space in the Chinese context. It takes the Kantian “form of sensibility” as a basic framework for the analysis of the specific linguistic and spatial representation of space. Through this investigation, it tries to establish how this accumulated perception emerged and in what relationship it remains with physical and imagined space. In conclusion, it will argue that despite numerous changes and adaptations, core perception remains relatively intact and as such, determines the uniqueness of Chinese psyche and its relation with the spatiality.

Keywords: Chinese culture, intercultural communication, philosophy of culture, space.

Introduction

Since any human activity happens in a more-or-less defined physical space, it is then not hard to conceive that the conceptualisation of space in which the event occurs is one of the factors that signifies the event as such. Whether the notion is consciously perceived or not, some intuition of space is an indispensable factor allowing for an act to be performed. That is precisely why for Immanuel Kant, space, alongside time, is not just a category like some others that determine the way a human experience the world, but an a priori concept that is somehow apprehended before any knowledge of anything else happens. In his own words:

“Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead, it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally.”²

The concept of space, and time, is then a “form of sensibility”,³ an invisible frame of human cognitive activity that negotiates the internal-external interplay.

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2 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft)*, first published in 1781), as cited in Janiak 2016.

3 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, as cited in Janiak 2016.

Following from Kant's assertion, it becomes apparent that space is anything but an easy-to-comprehend concept. Despite the fact, as Kant rightly pointed out, that space is nothing less than an omnipresent experience, it largely escapes simple generalisations and is hardly reducible to ordinary perception. On the one hand, it "originates from the mind's nature", on the other, it precedes any experience without which the mind is a hardly conceivable reality. The question may then arise about the degree to which this concept is determined by the "mind's nature" and to what is "sensed externally"? Conversely, how the understanding and application of this concept determine the "nature of mind" and affect, or create what is "sensed externally"? Finally, what is the role of socio-culturally determined values in the conceptualisation of space and shaping other perceptions arising from it?

In the following verses, I will limit the investigation to a specific, Chinese, display of this internal-external interplay. I will try to understand what are the sources and consequences of this particular conceptualisation of space for an individual and the society one inhabits. Focusing on the Chinese understanding an application of the concept of space, I will examine the origins and structure of this "form of sensibility" and its significance for the larger structure that we habitually call "Chinese culture".

Method

In the case of cultural studies, analysis of a specific notion cannot proceed without some reference to the context of a larger structure. The notion of space is not an exception here, since, as Henri Lefebvre urges, space is not just a neutral "container" but an ongoing process of socially produced spatial structures that are in an inseparable inter-action with individuals, groups, or social institutions.⁴ Space is then "produced", but is also a "producer". It is an integral element of culture, a larger structure that Geert Hofstede called "programming of the mind".⁵ To conceptualise and access such inter-reactions, that from the Lefebvre's point of view are crucial for the understanding of space, some generalisation of that larger structure is inevitable.

Chinese culture is one of those that due to its longevity and significance for the development of the entire human civilisation deserves particular attention. However, as Arif Dirlik quite interestingly pointed out, despite a tendency to refer to Chinese culture as it were a single entity, even very superficial analysis shows that it is anything but one formation.⁶ Chinese culture, similarly to

4 Lefebvre 1991.

5 Hofstede 2001: 9.

6 Dirlik 2006.

any other “national culture”, is a conglomerate of historically accumulated experiences, perceptions, and memories that has many spatiotemporally different embodiments. In the context of this generalisation, and with the awareness of its vertical and horizontal diversity, the accuracy of Geertz’s assertion that every “cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete”⁷ is even more apparent.

Wishing to proceed with an analysis that, despite Geertz’s reservation, is still grounded in a specific cultural context, there is no option but to utilise as researched material cultural products that at least to some degree are shared by different subgroups’ perceptions and images. Amongst them, language (at least the written one), historical and modern dwellings (as shared images) are those that conceal and at the same time disseminate a specific version of Kant’s “form of sensibility”. As diverse they might be, they are negotiated through the same socio-symbolic reality.

The approach is inevitably reductionist, in Geertz’s sense, and the obtained results are rather generic. However, despite not being exhaustive, the proposed generalisations are meant to provide an applicable framework for further, more detailed analysis. An investigation of locally specific instances awaits research that goes beyond the scope of this paper.

Space hidden in the language

The very first display of specific perception of space, or as Kant would prefer, “an a priori form of sensibility”, and how it has embedded the Chinese mind can be learnt from the name of the country itself. States’ names often reflect their specific historical roots (Poland – the land of the Poles), geographical features (North Korea), or features of the political system (the United States of; the Democratic Republic of). The name that has been accompanying China for centuries is a display of particular involvement of intuition of space with the individual mind and universalised worldview. *Zhongguo*, or even more *Zhonghua*, as notions associated with the origin, culture and civilisation are one of the first and the most fundamental conceptualisations of space that signified the further external-internal interplay. As Zhou (1122 BC – 256 BC) overthrew Shang (1600 BC – 1046 BC), the notion of the “Centre” (*zhongyang*, *zhongyuan*), has gradually become synonymous of the right to rule widely employed by the ones who claimed rights to govern China.⁸ It is then a quite common, even though not a necessarily correct belief that the term *Zhongguo* denotes the “Middle Kingdom”, which is then associated with the perception of

7 Geertz 1973: 29.

8 Chang 1983.

its own special, physical and symbolic, location amongst others. The physical centrality then was a synonym of specific status, indispensable significance. Factual centrality is rarely sufficient, and often not even present. It had to be established with ideological and political measures, through which it occupies psycho-symbolic space. This emphasis on the centrality and its cultural and political significance was an ideological creation of the Zhou Dynasty. Zhou, trying to establish themselves as an authoritative ruling force, on the one hand, evoked the Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*), and the historicised myth of Yu on another.⁹ The significance of Zhou is determined by its imagined transmission of culturising power and order. Subsequent states that were soon to emerge, similarly established their status through claiming a part of this imagined centre, the “splendid central civilisation” (*Zhonghua*) in opposition to the “uncivilised outsiders”, barbarians. As a result, the centre, in symbolic and not necessarily geographical terms, is identified as the source of orderliness, as more authority was claimed by the state.

We can imagine that this identification of civilisation with the centre probably had its beginning in actual experience. However, as it was reproduced and constantly recreated it also shaped the application of this a priori “form of sensibility”. For most of the Zhou period, there were “Central Kingdoms” not just a “Middle Kingdom”, even the ambiguous nature of Chinese language, and later amendments of the term’s meaning do not always allow one to see it. For Zhou, the idea of the physical and political centrality of the imperial court had been associated with an image of divinely sanctioned socio-political order. Such arrangements not only legitimised the power of the court but also shaped the way state subjects perceived the relationship between the physical and socio-political spaces in their proximities. Such an approach eventually did pave the way for the notion of the “Central (Middle) Kingdom”, as it has been so vigorously applied for centuries to come.

Despite being challenged by numerous modernisation movements of 20th and 21st centuries, the relation between power and physical and imagined centre, seems to remain a vital factor determining the self-identification and socio-cultural positioning of the individual even in contemporary China. The appreciation of the physical or imagined centrality of the individual and communities that one belongs to is key, seeking justification of actions and behaviours by appeal to the “central sanction” (*zhongyang*).

There are quite a few other features of the Chinese language that demonstrate the nature of the Chinese conceptualisation of space and reveals its involvement with the entire cultural structure. Amongst them, periodisation

9 Dirlik 2006: 420.

of events and their sequences deserves particular attention. First of all, because by applying universal binary oppositions, for instance, a specific, morally loaded message is being delivered. Second, as the particular value system is trying to establish its validity through an appeal to this association, further conceptualisation and their valorisations follow suit negotiating the a priori sensibility of space.

To be more specific, in the Chinese language, an event or an item preceding another one is referred to as *shang*, which also means “something above”. Conversely, the one that comes after as *xia*, that in a similar manner also means “something below”. At the same time, something more valuable, more desired is also being referred to with *shang*, or other words pointing to the location above, *gao* for instance. Similarly, things that are disregarded or of lower quality, less importance are referred to as *xia*, or *di*, low. As the association of quality with the position occupied in space seems to be universal, the association of time with space is somewhat different that can be found in other, for instance, western conceptualisations. Through such examples, it becomes quite clear how an a priori concept of space is an indispensable framework for further cognitions and is being negotiated and amended by culturally specific ideologies and values. If what is above, *shang*, is valuable, and what is below, *xia*, is not, and what is previous is *shang* and what follows is *xia*, then the message about the value of time flow is quite explicit. This spatiotemporal entanglement sheds light on the Chinese perception of history and its moral dimension. Without a doubt, it results from the Confucian admiration of antiquity. However, it requires a spatial metaphor to establish it as an everyday, common perception. By making an appeal to very basic cognition of space, a vivid metaphor, the ideological message becomes “readable” and applicable. And vice versa. As the moral values are associated with the specific location in space, associated places as such are becoming synonymous of specific values. Evaluation of subsequent sets of items then applies a similar code, creating a unique, dynamically developing structure.

This is another case of display, and linguistic codification of values through spatial in nature metaphor is the opposition of *nei* and *wai* as closely associated with greater in scope arrangements of space and human dwellings. The entire plethora of expressions utilise the *nei* – *wai* (internal-external) dichotomy, sometimes in a slightly modified form of *ben* – *wai* (this itself – external foreign), that carries a specific axiology of Chinese culture. *Nei hang* vs *wai hang*, for instance, demonstrates, with a spatial metaphor the difference between legitimate authority in a specific discipline and a laity. *Nei ren* vs *wai ren*, in a similar manner, draws a line between those from the inner

circle, family, clan or a group of individuals bounded by close socio-moral ties, and strangers that are not to be shared with significant resources. An even more apparent embodiment of this perception of social relations in the light of spatial cognition is the *ben di/ben guo* vs *wai di/wai guo* (this vs external/foreign land/country). It is then probably one of the first lessons of the Chinese language that can cause some moral concerns – to learn that that which is *wai*, is also foreign, strange and suspicious. The attitude towards *waidi ren*, lit., “people of an external land”, even slightly improved in recent years is then the most vivid example of such a tendency. *Waiguo ren*, foreigners, are not an exception here. What is interesting, and what differentiates it from the *shang – xia* dichotomy mentioned above, is the fact that the value of the *nei* is not always positive, and in some cases slightly unclear. For instance, *nei ren*, used to be largely an obsolete self-derogatory term used in reference to one’s wife. What is important, it can be used only in reference to the speaker’s wife, never when talking about the addressee’s wife. *Wai*, especially in regards to foreigners and foreign products, has also been to a large degree revalorised. It is largely due to the experience regarding the quality of foreign, mostly American, German or British products in comparison to local Chinese, that *waiguo de* became something more desirable than *benguo de*. Regardless, the *nei/ben* is still largely valued higher than *wai*, and in areas where it is not, authorities work quite hard to reverse the trend.¹⁰

Application of spatial metaphors is a common feature of numerous languages, that proves the accuracy of Kant’s assertion mentioned at the beginning of this paper. However, specific metaphors depict a particular perception and valorisation of space and perceptions conceptualised through these valorisations are products of specific programming of the mind. This specific form of spatial sensibility not only determines the form and value of specific perceptions and metaphors but also contributes to the further replication of particular programming of the mind. Even though it is hardly an unchangeable structure, specific, often unconscious tendencies remain largely untouched. The deviations are then reincorporated or even redefined to fit the basic framework of the larger structure. Spatial metaphors are then an ongoing dialogue between the individual and the larger structure that contributes to the shaping of the former and the further replication of the latter.

10 Promotion of Chinese products as being not only of an equal quality, but also as a “patriotic choice”. “Chinese values” as not only more suitable in the Chinese context but even superior to the Western ones are the concrete cases of such efforts.

Walled city: power and control

Probably the most obvious demonstrations of Chinese conceptualisation of space is the unsurpassed Chinese taste for a clear-cut delineation of social spaces and centuries-present utilisation of walls in Chinese urban planning. The tendency to build walled cities with rectangularly organised inner-city space has been present since the very beginning of Chinese civilisation.¹¹ One of the most striking experiences that one may have visiting the Xi'an museum is the maquette of the former capital, Chang'an. As one looks at the miniature of the ancient city, the complexity and precision of spaces delineation recalls nothing less than a – designed and manufactured with mathematical precision – computer micro-chip. The design that took its beginning in Qin (221–206 BCE), applied a rectangular grid as a model for a new settlement that was fully implemented during Han (220 BCE – 202 CE). During Tang (618 CE – 907 CE), the whole city was then arranged according to the *Lifang* system, with strictly delineated streets, clearly demarking 108 quarters, *li*, that were further divided into smaller wards, *fang*, and courtyards that belong to patrilineal clans.¹² Any specific unit was accessible only through one particular set of closed in night gates (city-, quarter-, ward- and courtyard gate), as the limits of all these units were clearly marked with the walls, *qiang*.

The city as such was then also guarded by several-metre high city walls (*cheng*), the climbing of which was a serious offence. As such, not only the limits of space accessible and used by specific individuals were clearly marked, but the space as a significant determinant of individual psycho-social reality was created. The city – *chengshi* was soon to be identified with its walls that marked the borders between two worlds, the civilisation, and the wilderness.¹³ The city life was happening inside the walls, with subsequent groups occupying designed areas. The world outside the walls, on the other hand, was wild and dangerous, regarded as less, if at all, valuable. For instance, *shang*, merchants, as the lowest social class, were not allowed to live inside the city walls!¹⁴ Space was then created as the answer to humans' needs for safety and socio-cognitive clarity. Especially such a clear delineation of subsequent quarters made a particular contribution to the emergence of specifically Chinese perceptions of space and its significance. They inevitably made the social hierarchy “tangible” and almost omnipresent. The walled cities with clearly marked structures guarded by the controlled by the subsequent levels of authority gates were unbreakably binding the individual with the social

11 Lee-Wong 2018.

12 Duan, Huang & Zhang 2014.

13 Xu 2000.

14 Cotterell & Cotterell 1975: 99.

structure. There was not much room for individuality in such a structure, as everyone belonged, on the one hand, to a specific social group/class, on another, was firmly, and steadily located under the set of control measures that determine his/her movements.¹⁵ The scope of the cognisable, and open for creative activity, space was then quite clearly determined and controlled. By definition, there was way less room for social deviation, and the presence of power, social, political, symbolic is overwhelming and inevitable. Space was then created and re-created as the embodiment and the convenor of power and hierarchy, making it omnipresent and almost omnipotent (climbing the wards' walls was to a degree disallowed).¹⁶ Song Mei Lee-Wong has convincingly argued that the walls in Imperial China functioned mostly as a means of social control, and were proven not to be very effective as protection from external aggression. The case of the Great Wall of China (*Changcheng*) supports such a claim most evidently.¹⁷

Without a doubt, such an arrangement of space, originally being an embodiment of specific aspirations, also had a further impact on the Chinese “programming of the mind”. The fact that the Chinese tend to be referred to as “collective” and “authoritarian”¹⁸ is the idea of a specific association of space with power even in modern times resulting from the high-power distance that characterises Chinese society. It does not mean that there is no resistance and that everything is set up once and for good, quite to the contrary. However, even contestation happens in a specific space, and aims at its own retaking and redefining. No wonder then that an attempt towards redefining one's individual or social identity includes, or even begins with, manipulation of space, turning down or transgressing of the physical or symbolical walls.

In their very informative paper, Jian Xiao and Shuwen Qu¹⁹ analysed a case of such transgression that emphatically illustrates how the perception of space and social actions complement each other. The case of a local artistic initiative that aimed to stop the transformation of a Donghu urban scenic spot in Wuhan city into a commercial district is then presented as a form of protest, contestation of socio-political reality with the available, under specific condition. Xiao and Qu are interested in “the practices of resistance in public spaces, particularly in the context of an authoritarian regime such as China”.²⁰ What is of interest here is the very fact that “architect Li” and his associates

15 Bray 2005.

16 Lee-Wong 2018: 111.

17 Lee-Wong 2018: 109.

18 Pye 1992.

19 Xiao & Qu 2020: 1–15.

20 Xiao & Qu 2020: 1.

chose to contest the “new wall” that the development was about to become, demonstrating its significance as a display of power and dominance. The fact that they “create[d] a personal space by using their own bodies as a means to resist”²¹, and for instance “Mr Ge drank filtered water from Donghu and then drew a 1.1meters long personal coast line by urinating”²² is a display of the same perception. Space does matter, it is related to power, regardless if it is power of coercion or a protest against it.

Moreover, that space comes from the physical or imagined centre, government or an individual conviction of moral righteousness, and its margins must be marked. There does not have to be much deliberation regarding the nature of space. Still, there is a direct, cognitively significant action that is possible due to the a priori form of sensibility mentioned by Kant. One then acts in space, through space and, at least superficially, for space. Through those specific actions, the values are presented and goals claimed. The act is possible due to a priori knowledge of space, but through its specific nature and the creative power mentioned by Lefebvre, it also displays the inner, culturally determined cognition of the acting one.

Gated communities: space and social status

The specific involvement of the Chinese with the concept of space despite inevitable changes and adjustments, in terms of its core structure, remains somewhat intact. The gated communities that took over the landscape of Chinese cities with growing urbanisation are the most visible embodiment of this intertwining of space, power and social status. How then has – in modern gated communities and Imperial China’s – perception of space been embodied?

According to Hongping Yang, gated communities are:

“... residential communities enclosed by a wall, green belt, or construction that restrict the entrance of outside visitors by using security guards, keys, and entrance cards, in which a CCTV system and patrols are usually applied”.²³

The fear of crime and withdrawal of public services are the reasons driving development of gated communities, and the reinforcement of residential segregation and social exclusion that result from their development, are often emphasised in scholarship.²⁴ Without a doubt, they do provide some sense of

21 Xiao & Qu 2020: 3.

22 Xiao & Qu 2020: 10.

23 Yang 2016.

24 Duan, Huang & Zhang 2014; Deng 2017: 233.

additional protection, especially since the memory of turbulent times is still vivid. Yang Hongping can then claim that “To a certain extent, the gated community provides a kind of sanctuary for people.”²⁵ However, housing is not just a dwelling, but a sign of social status, identity and interaction with the “sensed externally”. In other words:

“As a basic space for family activities, the house is not only a physical structure for people to live in, but also reflects people’s social position, identity, taste, and style.”²⁶

Gated communities are visible and clearly marked signs of social status, providing some level of social recognition and a sense of community. They then fulfil, similar to ancient cities, functions by including people of a certain class and excluding those who do not fit the standard. A guarded gate is a visible sign of exclusion of outsiders that are permitted only under specific circumstances and for specific purposes. Even though the strictness of applying this rule varies considerably, the dichotomy of *nei* vs *wai* mentioned above still applies, at least in theory.²⁷ Such inclination towards social isolation can be viewed as a result of a close link between the designers’ own values and experience of space. It is then the designers’ values and socio-historical experience that determine their taste for the safety-guaranteeing and status-marking designs.²⁸ However, in the market economy determined by the interplay of the supply and the demand, the needs, the perceptions of consumers are an equally significant factor. It is rather pointless from the perspective of this paper to argue in favour of the designers or the consumers as the more significant factor in this respect, as their motivations seem to be grounded in similar perceptions. How much these two resonate is convincingly demonstrated by the fact that over 80% of newly built urban communities follow the pattern of the gated community! In the context of the market economy, this stands as sufficient proof in this regard. There is then an a priori sensibility that seems to be largely shared by all parties involved. Even the reasons for designing and desiring living in a gated community may vary, the fact is that this delineated with a fence or

25 Yang 2016: 22.

26 Yang 2016: 25.

27 Observing gated communities in Suzhou for over five years, I have encountered great variety in this respect. While some communities do not bother closing gates and inspecting ID cards, some are accessible only after swapping a card, but security guards still do not bother stopping those without cards following those who have swiped. Some others, usually high-end ones do require external visitors to register at the entrance. Delivery guys and garbage collectors must follow established pattern and can rarely enter as they pleased. The outbreak of Covid-19 certainly made all communities to apply way stricter measure, that were all abolished once the pandemic was under control.

28 Liao, Wehrhahn & Breitung 2019.

even a concrete wall space, providing specific amenities and forms of social interactions, are dominant forms of urban dwellings.

Certainly, the physical scale and the profoundness of, for instance, social isolation are not comparable. However, it still does not nullify the similarities between the modern gated community and the walled city of the ancients. Even though there are significant variations in the actual design, status and governance of specific communities,²⁹ the delineated spaces of a walled city and gated communities share features mentioned above – provide a sense of safety, belonging and social status. Not only the physical structure then but also socio-cultural functions are reminiscent of those of the ancient city. Gated communities are then not only a copy of American patterns brought to China with the advancing modernisation, that in China, to a large degree means “westernisation”. No doubt, gated communities are a product of urbanisation and modernisation. However, being a product of modernisation, at the same time they are a negation of western neoliberal ideologies, that, like urbanisation, are associated with modernisation.³⁰ They are then not a simple replantation of the western urban pattern. They are rather an expression of Chinese conceptualisation of space, Chinese perception of the relation between the physical and the social. The same process modernisation that has enabled constructing privatised housing in China also witnesses the denial of basic modern principles of openness and equality. The values that grew out of conceptualisation of space in Imperial China seem then to resurface despite the progressing modernisation. “The wall that surrounded the city in ancient time now crisscrosses all over the city.”³¹ is then the reality of basically every major Chinese city of the 21st century.

Conclusion

Space, as Immanuel Kant once argued, is an a priori form of sensibility that originating from the mind’s nature and precedes and determines sensual experience and empirical cognition. At the same time, this form of sensibility is affected by the internal-external interplay. As such, it is a unique record of a dialogue between the individual, society/culture and what is “sensed externally”. This record is then not only a product of this dialogue but also a significant tool allowing for further interaction. In other words, as the perception of space is determined by historically accumulated experiences and memories, it finds its expression in the relation with the “world outside the mind”.

29 Lu, Zhang & Wu 2020.

30 Duan, Huang & Zhang 2014.

31 Yang 2016: 22.

As mentioned above, space is not a simple and static concept. It denotes an active force that furtherly reproduces, revitalises and redefines perceptions directly or indirectly associated or evoked in the context of space or through related metaphors. Language, urban planning and declared and practised values through their entanglement with the concept, a sense of space not only finds its realisation but through reinvention and reappraisal further perpetuate it. Space is then “created”, and as such embodies the specific socio-historical experience of those who create and apply the concept. It is a product, but also one of the pillars, a frame of specific programming of the mind. In other words, as the conceptualising of space is a universal phenomenon, conceptualisation as such is an expression of a particular set of experiences, memories and values.

Through analysis of the Chinese conceptualisation of space and the ways it is being applied, I have tried here to, on the one hand, demonstrate how this particular dialogue, entanglement, has been created and recorded. On the other, I wanted to determine the socio-historical experience that determined the specificity of such record and the values that perpetuate through it. Finally, I wanted to grasp the uniqueness of the process in the Chinese context. Due to the rather limited scope of the paper, a full analysis was not possible. However, even such a generic overview allows for some, I believe practically applicable, conclusions.

First of all, from the embodiments of the space conceptualisation and their socio-historical background, the process of value creation and preservation can be encapsulated. The historical experience of the Chinese appreciation of order, as opposed to disorder, was then expressed and solidified by the way space was conceptualised and operationalised. This appreciation of orderliness was then expressed in the urban planning and language of Imperial China, contributing to the emergence of specific acceptance of authoritarian control.

Second, as culture is a dynamic reality, an analysis of specific cultural perception, in this case, the concept of space, the dynamics of socio-cultural change reveal. The dominant in the Imperial China values and their embodiments have gone through significant changes and appropriation. The modern forms of space apprehension are then result of the “space creation” process analysed by Lefebvre. In the Chinese context, gated communities, for instance, are then a record of that struggle between modernisation and the historically determined values, deeply embedded in the Chinese mind.

Third, the impact of modernisation and growing urbanisation on the larger structure, the programming of the mind can be assessed. As the new perceptions and values have been externalised, it is hard to deny the reality

of significant changes in Chinese culture. The resistance and independent re-definition of space became then an element of individual programming of the mind. Nevertheless, some core tendencies such as the *nei-wai* dichotomy or appreciation of status, have remained largely intact, making resistance to trying to establish itself mainly through means that are rooted in contested realities.

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