PL EN


2013 | 2 | 137-153
Article title

Poznanie niewyraźne Boga ("cognitio confusa") – Tomasz z Akwinu i Kartezjusz

Content
Title variants
EN
Confused cognition of God ("cognitio confusa") – St. Thomas Aquinas and Descartes
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
A man has a natural need for cognition of causes, particularly when he perceives reality, which is an effect of someone’s action. Aristotle, when describing a philosopher (the wise man), emphasizes that he’s a person, who has knowledge about all things (as far as possible) and cognitions of things, which are difficult to cognire and also knows causes, which are cognizable at most. But whether it’s possible recognition of causes and the paradigm of realistic philosophy nowadays, when we inherit principles of Cartesian Philosophy in our mindset and culture? When is everything unclear, inaccurate or mysterious regard as false? And when only mathematical clearness preserves state of knowledge and certainty? Therefore the problem of unclear cognition is so significant. This issue was prepared by St. Thomas Aquinas, who on that basis considered question of cognition of God. Descartes, however, completely negated this kind of cognition and built ‘boundary sign’ for the truth of the cognition. It seems that reinstatement of the right place of confused cognition and its protection in philosophy is possible inasmuch as it is still possible cognition of reality, i.e. cognition of thing-in-itself. A wonderment (admiration), which was the beginning of philosophy (because it express confused cognition of world) in post-Cartesian paradigm of reflection is unconvincing – the essence of the philosophy is purely and simply clear thinking. But emphasize the role of confused cognition is not a recognition it as sufficient and only way to perfect knowledge. Emphasizing confused knowledge is an objection to the thesis of the possession of only excellent knowledge and in the act, and objection to the claims that deny the potentiality and potency of knowing reality. If so, there would be no compromise statement that for the beliver the existence of God is obvious and for non-beliver non-existence of God is equally obvious.
Year
Volume
2
Pages
137-153
Physical description
Contributors
  • Wydział Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, mizem@tlen.pl
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
2300-1976
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-e3525a90-c7c9-433c-afe0-cb2da2a78a26
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