The Case of Dialetheism

• Authors: Tkaczyk Marcin
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The concept of dialetheia and the claim of dialetheism has been examined and compared to such related concept as contradiction, antinomy, consistency and paraconsistency. Dialetheia is a true contradiction and dialetheism is the claim that there exists at least one dialetheia. It has been observed that dialetheism is equivalent to the negation of the traditional principle of contradiction. Hence, dialetheism itself is no new idea in whatsoever. The novelty of dialetheism consists in the arguments delivered for its case. Key justification the partisans deliver for dialetheism has been examined and evaluated: antinomies, an alleged Gödel’s paradox, and existence of limits of thought. The structure of those arguments has been analyzed. It has been claimed that they share one and the same simple structure which may be called reverse paradox. The vital content dialetheists add to the traditional paradoxes is only the thesis of reliability of the vernacular prima facie knowledge. Three objections have been raised against the justification of dialetheism: firstly, it has been claimed that exactly the same argument supports principle of contradiction, secondly, it has been questioned whether the arguments preserve their value when logic is subject to revision, and thirdly, it has been claimed that the underlying logic of dialetheism is classical.

Keywords

EN

antinomy; dialetheia dialetheism; consistency; contradiction; paraconsistency; paradox

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 203-224

Dates

online

2016-06-07

Contributors

author

Tkaczyk Marcin

• Faculty of Philosophy, Departament of Logic, The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, al. Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2016.012