Paulina Kłos-Czerwińska
Akademia im. Jakuba z Paradyża w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim

# „Society of control. Discursive practices in 'Discipline and Punish' by Michel Foucault"

## Abstract

According to Michel Foucault cultural patterns in discursive practices differ and reflect the discursive apriori, or episteme, of a given epoch. Episteme is a notion introduced by Foucault in order to explain changing systems of thought, it indicates "the underlying orders, or 'conditions of possibility' which regulate the emergence of various scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge during specific periods of history. These 'epistemological fields' give rise to 'diverse forms of empirical science'" (Foucault 2009: 168). The work titled "Discipline and Punish" is the example of such an empirical approach to history, where all the rules, scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge are revealed. The book written by Foucault is a systematic and specific analysis of discursive practices that work in societies of control. Foucault analyzes many such practices starting from severe punishment of the convicted Damiens in 1757, through the hierarchic supervision and normative sanction at the turn of XVIII and XIX century, and ending with the explanations of the workings of contemporary discipline societies with its oppressive rigor in schools, hospitals and prisons.

In my presentation I would like to describe these different discursive formations and practices that have been in use in the past or present societies and to present them as certain cultural patterns characteristic to various cultures and societies on different levels of development.

*Keywords:* subject, discipline, punishment, control, docile bodies

## Introduction

The first scene from Foucault's book *Discipline and Punish* presents the execution of Damiens on the 2 March of 1757 (Foucault [1975] 1991: 3). This horrendous scene is a metaphor for the treatment of all convicted in these times and for punishment in general. The purpose of such treatment is not only to give the condemned a lesson to teach them how to be better people. Nor is it directed at the humiliation of their souls or degradation before their comrades. The main objective of this kind of approach is not even to kill. So Foucault ([1975] 1991: 3–31) asks what the objective is. A few lines later we receive an elaborate answer to this question, an answer that amazed not only philosophers of these times but also specialists

from other branches of knowledge, biologists, sociologists, or specialists on the subject of confinement, prison and rehabilitation. Foucault claims ([1975] 1991: 3–10) that the aim of such treatment as that experienced by Damiens was to produce a kind of spectacle. It was instituted to repeatedly remind the audience of the power of the sovereign.

In the elaboration concerning the problematic of discursive practices and the subject Foucault reveals ([1975] 1991) the whole history of systems of punishment, starting from the most repressive ones, through disciplining systems, ones that we are accustomed to, and ending with the so-called most enlightened form of punishment, namely prison, though, Foucault does not explicitly state whether this is the best option out of all the forms of punishment. The following pages present what different forms of punishing practices have revealed since the most representative form of the spectacle disappeared. Foucault starts by stating ([1975] 1991: 8–9) that "by the end of the eighteenth century (…) the gloomy festival of punishment was dying out. (…) The first was the disappearance of punishment as a spectacle. (…) Theatrical elements (…) were now downgraded as if the functions of the penal ceremony were gradually ceasing to be understood." One of the arguments for the disappearance of the spectacle of punishment was that it repeated the crime of the convicted but with the hands of the punishers. Foucault states ([1975] 1991: 9), that in this case "the murder that is depicted as a horrible crime is repeated in cold blood, remorselessly," by a person who is intended to punish not to harm. Thus, paradoxically, we are left with two crimes, not one. Since then, however, the situation of criminals has changed diametrically. The description of punishment as a form of spectacle reveals that the understanding of punishment has changed throughout the ages. With its effectiveness increasingly "seen as resulting from its inevitability, not from its visible intensity, it is the certainty of being punished and not the horrifying spectacle (…) that must discourage crime" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 9). The abandonment of the outward presentation of punishment is represented as "slackening of the hold on the body" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 10), which means that punishment since then wants to reach not only what is visible—the body, but "something other than the body itself" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 11). In this way "[f]rom being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights" (*ibid.*). Thus in the following ages we can see "the emergence of a new strategy for the exercise of the power" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 81–82), a strategy based rather on the inevitability of the punishment and amounting to the preference for making the punishment "a regular function (…) [authorities since then do not want] to punish less, but to punish better (…), to punish with more universality and necessity" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 82). At this point Foucault starts his description of the changing forms of punishment, trying to grasp all the elements that take part in systems called dispositifs, which are the machines that organize the group of rules in such a way as to be able to launch the process of a given practice, in this case, the process of punishing. Foucault in his book tries to follow and investigate all those hidden mechanisms of power and punishment. He wants to "[l]ay down new principles for regularizing, refining, universalizing the art of punishing. (…) [He wants] to constitute a new economy and a new technology of the power to punish" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 89). Thus, he approaches them not only as forms of punishment, but also as forms of different discursive practices used to order the surrounding reality.

### Discursive practices: definition

According to Michel Foucault cultural patterns in discursive practices differ and reflect the discursive a priori, or episteme, of a given epoch. Discursive a priori is "what in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man's everyday perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized to be true" (Foucault [1966] 1970: 158 cited in: O'Farrel 2005: 63). Episteme, on the other hand, is a notion introduced by Michel Foucault in order to explain changing systems of thought, it indicates "the underlying orders, or 'conditions of possibility' which regulate the emergence of various scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge during specific periods of history" (O'Farrel 2005: 63). These "'epistemological fields' give rise to 'diverse forms of empirical science'" (Foucault [1966] 1970: XXII cited in: O'Farrel 2005: 63). The work titled "Discipline and Punish" is an example of such an empirical approach to history, where all the rules and scientific or pre-scientific forms of knowledge are revealed. The term "discursive practice" depends mainly on these understandings of the notions of episteme and a priori, because "the underlying orders, or 'conditions of possibility'" (O'Farrel 2005: 63) constitute the background for the appearance of a given practice. The meaning of the term "discursive practice" can best be described by resorting to the statement that "to speak is to do something" (Foucault [1969] 1972: 209 cited in: O'Farrel 2005: 79), because discursive practice relates more to practice than to discourse. These are rather the rules of pre-given a priori that have discursive character, while a practice is the practical realization of this epistemic condition. Discursive practices "operate according to rules which are quite specific to a particular time, space, and cultural setting. It is not a matter of external determinations being imposed on people's thought, rather it is a matter of rules which, a bit like the grammar of a language, allow certain statements to be made" (O'Farrel 2005: 79). These statements are the practical configurations that are made possible on the condition of their previous, a priori given regularities. It is worth observing that discursive practices, as well as the earlier mentioned machines called dispositifs or apparatuses, are the result of the working of this historical a priori. Dispositif is the mechanism which organizes diverse elements like "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" (O'Farrel 2005: 66) in one, determined regime of truth. Its working guarantees that a certain discursive practice will appear. In an article titled "On the Archeology of the Sciences: Response to the Epistemology Circle" Foucault states that unities of discourse from which discursive practices come

> are not the laws of intelligibility but the laws of the formation of a whole set of objects, types of formulation, concepts, and theoretical options which are invested in institutions, techniques, collective and individual behavior, political operations, scientific activities, literary fictions and theoretical speculations. The set thus formulated from the system of positivity, and manifested in the unity of a discursive formation, is what might be called a knowledge [savoir]. (Foucault [1994] 2000d: 324)

Foucault tries here to grasp the workings in which the individual may take part, and this individual is taken as an object of knowledge—he can be explained "through practices such as those of psychiatry,

clinical medicine, and penality" (Foucault [1994] 2000e: 461). Following this line of thought we can understand that all the elements that are enumerated in the descriptions of the punishment practices are organized on the basis of a certain system of rules, which is given in advance. This very helpful system of rules, called dispositif, is taken as a mechanism responsible for the organization of these practices. They thus resemble the order that is imposed by this mechanism. Finally, we can state that the ways of realizing different forms of punishment may be regarded as the consequence of the working of a given dispositif, and further also of a given historical a priori. These ways are certain discursive practices about which the book on disciplining and punishing by Foucault ([1975] 1991) speaks extensively and in a detailed way. The book describes punishment in different epochs, different forms of disciplining, different rules on the basis of which the individual perceived its punishment and according to which he worked. Here, dispositif governed the ways individuals talk, learn, are cured. All these activities were formed by drills, coercion, discipline. So, when Foucault talks about punishment, he doesn't talk only about the criminals, he talks about each individual who constitutes a part of the different institutional activities. All this power exerted on the individual may be seen like a form of punishment, because we live—as Foucault proves in his elaboration—in a society of control. It doesn't matter whether we are in a school, hospital or church—we are kept in a submission to the greater sovereign power, which is constantly revealed in the forms of discursive practices of everyday routines.

## Discursive practices: examples

Different parts and chapters of the book "Discipline and Punish" report on various forms of discursive practices used in the practice of punishing. Foucault dedicates several chapters to the description of such rules and categories connected with this penalty discourse: the rule of "perfect certainty," the category of "docile bodies," the rule of "great confinement" or "enclosure," the rule of distribution of bodies, the rule of coercion or regulation of the working bodies, the timetable rule. All these rules constitute elements of the discursive machine, the machine called after Foucault dispositif, that has governed the workings of the individual and the social body throughout the centuries. It introduces a discipline in which the body should be controlled so that each individual will conduct himself properly. Foucault's chapters on different forms of punishment are in this way various descriptions of the mechanisms responsible for the practices, specific for each epoch, of maintaining an individual within a productive regime. The mechanisms mentioned function according to historical a priori or episteme given in advance and consisting of a certain paradigm for particular practices of behavior.

I would like to recapitulate some arguments for sustaining different behavioral patterns that are revealed in the following chapters by Foucault. I will start with a description of the discursive practice governed by the rule of "perfect certainty," which is presented in the chapter "Generalized Punishment" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 73–103). Foucault assumes (*ibid.*) here that certain rules have to be obeyed where the treatment of criminals is concerned. When the discourse on punishment was initiated, the rule of "perfect certainty" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 95) was the first to be introduced and obeyed. This rule states that "[t]he laws that define the crime (…) must be perfectly clear, so that each member of society may distinguish criminal actions from virtuous actions" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 95). Foucault adds also that "like a mathematical truth, the truth of the crime will be accepted when completely proven" (Foucault

[1975] 1991: 97). Following from this is the rule of optimal specification. It states that all illegal actions "must be clearly classified and collected into species from which none of them can escape" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 98). These changes in the laws for punishment were remarkable because they changed completely the rigour of the spectacle that was present in the culture in the previous centuries. The new rules initiated the formation of the book of law that was to be obeyed by everybody and assumed that everybody would be treated according to them equally, no matter what his rank, birth or status. The same punishment for the same crime—this was the main assumption of this jurisprudence and it represented a great step toward the modern treatment of convicts.

However, the way to the modern understanding of the law was still long and fraught with difficulty, because its main element was not just punishment that was visible and discernible, but also discipline instigated invisibly, but with more punishing results.

The chapters on discipline start with the definition of docile bodies. This category rules over the vast spaces of society and its important institutions. To explain what this means when Foucault refers to a docile body, he recalls the posture of a soldier. First, he describes (Foucault [1975] 1991: 135) the bodily rhetoric, the signs by which an observer can recognize this profession: these are, according to him: "an alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, (…) he has to march in step in order to have as much grace and gravity as possible" (*ibid.*). It appeared in these times that these features could be gained simply by training. Foucault explains: "by the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made, (…) the classical age discovered the body as object and target of power" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 135–136). The example of the soldier is very apt, because the attributes of the soldier may be gained by strict obedience to prescribed rules. In order to become a soldier, the body is trained. It is submitted to a regime, because military skill can be achieved by drill, thus the body can be "manipulated, shaped, trained, (…) [it] obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 136). The body here becomes part of the technico-political register, which was "constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 136). To be a docile body means here: "a manipulable body. A body (…) that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved" (*ibid.*). This body is sometimes called "the celebrated automata" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 136), which refers not only to the body of the soldier, for such correcting and controlling operations that produce what is intended to be achieved are not only characteristic of the production of the submissive body of the soldier. It is the kind of discipline that will be used in all other processes of production of the eligible subject. It is a body "in the grip of very strict powers, which imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or obligations" (*ibid.*) that can be transformed into whatever is desired by these powers. Thus we can observe the regularities according to which the systemic power produces planned and scheduled society members, all in accordance with the rules of the society of control in which authorities exert power over their subjects, using coercion, and exercise, to obtain the posture and attitude that should be achieved. Authorities catch hold of their subjects, they want to have their subjects to be part of a certain mechanism that will behave and function according to the rules prescribed to it, authorities want to produce certain "movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 137). It is the overall power of discipline over the active body which is visible not only in the military troops, but also in other institutions not necessarily connected with simple physical training. The body may become the "object of control" (*ibid.*) when it is analyzed from the point of view of economy

or for example, from the point of view of educational institutions where "efficiency of movements, their internal organization" (*ibid.*) may help in producing a docile body. The new rules that have to be obeyed by the body imply "an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 137). These rules thus refer not only to the army but to all institutions that started their career in XVIII century in the form submitted to the coercive sovereign. Foucault focuses on the "meticulousness of the regulations, the fussiness of the inspections, the supervision of the smallest fragment of life and of the body [that] will soon provide, in the context of schools, the barracks, the hospital or the workshop, a laicized content, an economic or technical rationality" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 140). We can say finally, that the body of the soldier was only an example of the training that was later to be imposed on other subjects making them completely docile as if they were troops of soldiers. Children in schools, the sick in hospitals, the faithful in churches—they all are the docile bodies ready to be exploited and managed for the sake of the benefits that can be gained.

An important aspect of the creation of docile bodies is achieved through the distribution of their work, distribution and segmenting into rooms, factories, particular benches, particular barracks. It is also usual that discipline requires "enclosure" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 141). Foucault talks here about the "great confinement" (*ibid.*) of the vagabonds, paupers or beggars: "There were the colleges, or secondary schools [that contributed to this confinement]: the monastic model was gradually imposed" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 141), the "educational regime" (*ibid.*) was introduced, military treatment was launched. Apart from schools and the army "great manufacturing spaces [developed, they were] homogeneous and well defined," (Foucault [1975] 1991: 142) and "the work of the factories" (*ibid.*) started to play an overwhelming role in the working of a society submitted to control: "[I]t was also a new type of control (…) compared with the monastery, the fortress, (…) [t]he aim [here was] to derive the maximum advantages and to neutralize the inconveniencies, (…) to protect materials and tools and to master the labor force" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 142).

Different workshops also underwent these rules of the distribution of space and of the work of their participants. In a workshop "it was possible to carry out a supervision that was both general and individual: to observe the worker's presence and application, and the quality of his work; to compare workers with one another, to classify them according to skill and speed" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 145)— the worker was observed and therefore "computed and related to the individual" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 145).

Foucault writes also extensively about the regimes that were encountered or introduced in schools. The method of hierarchization involves the pupil occupying a certain position in the hierarchy according to his age, his "performance, his behavior, (…) he moves constantly over a series of compartments" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 147). This hierarchization marks his position on a scale that values his knowledge and abilities, his merits are assessed on the basis of their distribution within ranks. The organization of space was a great technical achievement:

> By assigning individual places it made possible the supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all. It organized a new economy of the time of apprenticeship. It made the educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding. (…) The spatial distribution might provide a whole series of distinctions at once: according to the pupils' progress, worth, character, application, cleanliness and parents fortune. (Foucault [1975] 1991: 147)

Distinction, on the other hand, made the bodies still more docile and subjected them to further manipulation and exploitation. Control becomes not only a part of the working system of prisons or military institutions, but also part of everyday life in schools, hospitals, offices. Thus, Foucault mentions a variety of other operations of discipline imposed in these areas of social activity. One of them is the well-known process of including and creating the labour force into timetables. Thanks to timetables the work may be much more effectively organized, and the authorities may "observe, supervise, regularize the circulation of commodities" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 148). The timetable was "both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge. It was a question of organizing the multiple, of providing oneself with an instrument to cover it and to master it" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 148). The timetable "establish[es] rhythms, impose[s] particular occupations, regulate[s] the cycles of repetition" (149). It is used in schools, factories and hospitals. A good example is the introduction of the timetable into "mutual improvement schools" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 150), where the general discipline achieved by using a timetable cuts a day into small parts in which the activities, one after another, are realized. The regime decides when to sit, when to start the task, when to have a break. No individual, independent decision can be undertaken. Individuality is not a desirable form of behavior; it is not desirable where obedience and submission are required. The timetable organizes activities in such a way as not to allow the slightest movement of independence and decision to appear. The school day looks like this: "8.45—entrance of the monitor, 8.52—the monitors summons, 8.56—entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00—children go to their benches, 9.04—first slate, 9.08—end of dictation, 9.12—second slate, etc." (Foucault [1975] 1991: 150).

Foucault in his books mentions three forms of correct training of subjected individuals, they are: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and the examination. The punishment was treated differently here from that established in the XVII and at the beginning of the XVIII. Now it was no longer desirable to punish the body, but to punish in such a way that it would make the subject better without using external strength. Thus, punishment was intended to be simply invisible. Punishment referred to all those things that were capable "of making children feel the offence they have committed, everything that is capable of humiliating them, of confusing them: a certain coldness, a certain indifference, a question, a humiliation, a removal from office" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 178). However, the aim was not to totally humiliate the children. They had to have the power to correct their behavior. The measures used must be "essentially corrective" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 179)—as Foucault says. So, the task of punishment was to correct the children by showing them the truth of their behavior. This truth had to make them ashamed in order to achieve its corrective power. In order to come to know this truth they were forced to repeat several times the same occupations, the same activity in order to be familiarized with their fault. The teachers "favour punishments that are exercise—intensified, multiplied forms of training, several times repeated" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 179). Repetition and drill were the main forms used to instill certain habits, and habits were more desirable than independent decisions. In this way individuals become controlled, submissive automata. This could be used to support the working of the system. In fact, it was a part of this system, a part of this dispositif. Another form of assessing pupils and showing them the truth of their behavior and progress is examination. Foucault explains that it "combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to quantify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 184). In order to realize these assumptions the examination is ritualized: it combines "the ceremony of power, (…) the deployment of

force and the establishment of truth" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 184). Examination introduces competition among pupils, which makes them compete among themselves, and in this way punishment did not need to be based on external law. The power of external law was no longer necessary to induce the desirable response in the subjects. Examination made the power of the system increasingly internal and intensified because from the introduction of examinations it was up to the pupils to punish themselves when they did not live up to the rules. Punishment thus became a sort of feeling, a feeling of shame, of humiliation. It was no longer external power that disciplined the working of the individual. It was the rule of hierarchization itself that made pupils discipline themselves. They became their own disciplining power. No other, external, disciplining power was necessary. In this way, the society becomes its own oppressor, it can be controlled from inside with the help of its own mechanisms of oppression.

In the case of examinations we are dealing with a change in the character of punishment. Originally it was "what was seen, what was shown and what was manifested" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 187). "Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through its invisibility: at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 187). We can conclude here that this kind of punishment changes the subjected individual into the object—this objectification assumes depersonalization—as can be seen in the character of the hospital machine where the patients are called by numbers—it also assumes domination that is invisible. The child is offended and punished by humiliation not by physical punishment, and what is more, in this way it is punished more severely, it not only feels pain in the body, but also pain in his soul. He feels guilty, not only before his sovereign, but before the judgment of the whole society: he is punished by, and on behalf of, this society. So, we can say that in the moment of being punished he discovers the truth about himself, and this truth is that he behaved wrongly, and that is why, he has to face the truth—and he feels ashamed. Humiliation is here the most oppressive and coercive force of punishment.

The final machine that can be put in motion to punish subjects without being seen by them is panopticon, introduced into the penitentiary system by Jeremy Bentham. It assumed the principle on which it was based:

> at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring, the peripheric building is divided into cells. (…) All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, (…) a worker, a schoolboy. (…) [this mechanism makes] it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon: or rather of its three functions—to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide, it preserves only the first. (…) Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. (Foucault [1975] 1991: 200)

The final statement of the chapter on panopticon, where Foucault says that "visibility is a trap" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 200), is well-known and often cited. The main rule at work in this form of punishment and prison is that the supervisor or the authority must "avoid those compact, swarming, howling masses that were to be found in places of confinement" (*ibid.*). Here each individual is in one cell, he can be seen "from the front by the supervisor; (…) He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object

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of information, never a subject in communication" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 200)—e.g. with his mates from the surrounding cells. He has no access to them, he is alone, observed and supervised. Foucault points out that "this invisibility is a guarantee of order" (*ibid.*). Like the controlling oppression instilled in pupils, here the place of the controlling power is changed from its position on the outside of the system to the inside of the prisoner. He alone is the subject of his own oppression. He thinks that he might be observed and this is enough to make him behave in the way that is desired by the oppressor. There is no need to exert a power over the body, no need for drill, examination or physical punishment. The feeling of being subjected to an invisible eye is enough to make the prisoner obedient. He himself becomes a part of the machine that controls his behavior. He becomes an element of dispositif. In this way we can see that internalization of oppressive powers is the most oppressive kind of punishment. This process of internalization is also very well explained on the example of the internalization of the powers that govern human sexuality—Foucault described this in his works on sexuality (Foucault [1976] 2010, [1994] 2000a, [1994] 2000b, [1994] 2000c) where he showed that the individual is increasingly deprived of its own privacy even in the case of sexuality, which should be the most private and intimate area of the subject. The intervention of external powers in this subject area means that the subject's last space of privacy and independence is lost. Foucault showed the mechanisms that deprive the individual of this internal space, where he could be himself and not pretend to be anybody else. As a result, the subject of sexuality, the child submitted to the internalized power of examination or the prisoner of invisible coersion, they are all the examples of the workings of the most dangerous power of control because it is instilled in their minds and does not concern only their bodies.

## Summary

Imprisonment developed over time as a 'more civilized' form of punishment than spectacular executions. This is connected with new rules concerning punishment and the new assumptions about discipline. Foucault states that "at the turn of the century, a new legislation defined the power to punish as a general function of society that was exercised in the same manner over all its members. (…) It introduced procedures of domination characteristic of a particular type of power. A justice that is supposed to be 'equal'" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 231–232) and refers to every individual in the same way. Nobody can escape it. Thanks to this assumption potential criminals are aware that for each crime there is a severe punishment. Prison in this way is treated as the deprivation of a value that is guaranteed to all members of society, namely freedom. Freedom is a kind of feeling accessible to all, so if you are deprived of it, you feel thrown onto the margins of society. Understanding freedom in this way initiates the most egalitarian form of punishment. The penalty is quantified here "exactly according to the variable of time" (Foucault [1975] 1991: 232). The more serious your crime the longer you have to spend in prison. Here appears the idea that "the offence has injured, beyond the victim, society as a whole" (*ibid.*). The idea underlying this form of the punishment was the idea of the transformation of the subject. Prison was intended to play a role in the transforming machine, because it was dedicated to the transformation of the individuals from being rejected to accepted. Since then, punishment has been predicated on the idea of regenerating the convicts and its role is not only to punish their bodies or their souls but also to reappropriate them back into society. So, it is intended to be a lesson for them, not the end of their lives. Thus, here, apart

from the internalizing power of examination or oppression, the power of correction was introduced on the scene of punishments and control. The reappropriation of the individual back into the society was now the main goal of the punishing system, not the elimination of its degenerated body. With the change in the historical a priori based on the emphasis on the power of the sovereign, the situation of a member of the society has changed. More and more the accent has been put on the creation of the desirable attitude of the subjects, before they degenerate into prisoners, because of the lack of corrective mechanisms. There is more emphasis on education or rehabilitation; however this is also achieved with the help of coercing mechanisms. Apart from the changing situation of individuals with regard to the disciplining and controlling systems, the main problem has not changed at all. Individuals are still under full control and every abuse is severely punished as a lapse from normality. Individuals are still produced and formed by subjection to manipulation and exploitation. Their talents and abilities are transformed in such a way as to serve the main developmental tendencies present in societies. Individuals' own creativity is stifled and only their exploitative potential is used and strengthened. Hence, our society can still be called a society of control. Apart from the change from a society of punishment as a spectacle to a society of examination and prisons, we continue to create societies that control many different areas of individual enterprise and functioning. We are still very far from a society that provides opportunities for each individual to follow what is best for them, or a society that helps to create new ways of life, new modes of living—as is especially visible in the works of Gilles Deleuze ([1972] 2014, [1987] 2014, [1995] 2012), a friend and epigone of Foucault, to whom he dedicated one of his works. They both share the conviction that a society should not control its members by looking for ways of exploiting, but should help in their independent creativity. Freedom to be creative and the encouragement to individual independence could be an alternative to the coercive mechanisms of the society of control. To be able to provide opportunities for freedom of development should be the priority of such a society. Thus, this line of development that follows from the physical oppression of the bodies to an enterprise not based on prescribed rules, but on free creation, should be extended in the direction shown by Foucault. A society that equips its members with such opportunities to create themselves freely would certainly be a place of development and progress, not a place of control and submission. Foucault's presentation of the changes in the formation of docile bodies, and its mechanisms of coercion, may be helpful in revealing the dangers hidden behind what seems on the surface to be potential progress. The process of society's transformation as presented by Foucault may increase the knowledge and consciousness necessary for its further development.

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