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2009 | LXXX (80) | 9-29

Article title

Kontekst odkrycia i kontekst uzasadnienia w świetle topicznej koncepcji prawa

Content

Title variants

EN
Context of discovery and context of justification in the light of the lopical concept of law

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
The subject of this text is the distinction between the context of discovery and context of justification in legal reasoning, exemplified by the discursive concept of law which is represented by legal topics, however, the deliberations contained herein are of the philosophical and legal nature instead of dogmatic and legal one, thus, they do not directly refer to any field of law. The starting point and also justification for the deliberations is to assume a hypothesis for the possible adaptation of the appointed distinction in the theory of law Its meaning has been limited to two separate questions referred to various aspects of legal interpretation and argumentation, the former being: “How do we arrive at formulating an interpretative hypothesis?”, and the latter: “How can it be justified?”. The main thesis of the text comes down to a statement that it is the nature of legal reasoning as presented by legal topics which defines both the way of arriving at an interpretative hypothesis understood as a proposal to settle a dispute as well as the way of justification for such hypothesis. As a result of that, a topical point of view is associated with both views being in favour of the genetic and validative value of heuristics in the process of legal cognition and the kind of preferred justification criteria, which, in case of topics, constitutes a consensus of opinions on what, in a specific here and now case, is or might be regarded as just. That means that the final decision on the value of legal reasoning and adjudicationis coming down to connect a specific legal effect with the actual state of affairs will be made on the basis of both the context of legal discovery and the context of justification.

Year

Volume

Pages

9-29

Physical description

Dates

published
2009

Contributors

  • asystent sędziego Sądu Rejonowego dla Krakowa Śródmieścia w Krakowie

References

  • Achterberg A., Argumentationsmängel als Fehlerquellen bei der Rechtsfindung, w: Krawietz W., Argumentation und Hermeneutik in der Jurisprudenz, Duncker Humblot, „Rechtstheorie“, Zeszyt 1, Berlin 1979.
  • Cyrul W., Topiki i prawo. Krytyczna analiza topicznej wizji dyskursu prawnego, „Państwo i Prawo”, z. 6, 2004.
  • Maryniarczyk A. (red.), Powszechna Encyklopedia filozofii, t. V, Lublin 2002.
  • Neumann U., Juristische Argumentationslehre, Darmstadt 1986.
  • Perelman Ch., Logika prawnicza. Nowa retoryka, Warszawa 1984.
  • Pietruszka - Madej E., Odkrycie naukowe. Kontrowersje filozoficzne, Warszawa 1990.
  • Pietruszka - Madej E., Szkice o filozofii K. Poppera, Warszawa 1997.
  • Popper K., Logika odkrycia naukowego, Warszawa 2002.
  • Spyra T., Granice wykładni prawa. Znaczenie języka tekstu prawnego jako granica wykładni, Zakamycze 2006.
  • Stelmach J., Kodeks argumentacyjny dla prawników, Zakamycze 2003.
  • Stelmach J., Brożek B., Metody prawnicze, Zakamycze 2004.
  • Ustawa z dnia 17 listopada 1964 r. Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Dz. U. Nr 43, poz. 296 ze zm.).
  • Viehweg T., Topik und Jurisprudenz, Muenchen 1974.
  • Woleński J., W sprawie odróżnienia pomiędzy kontekstem odkrycia i kontekstem uzasadnienia, w: Woleński J., W stronę logiki, Kraków 1996.
  • Woleński J., Logika, kontekst odkrycia, kontekst uzasadnienia, w: Krajewski W., Strawiński W. (red.), Odkrycie naukowe i inne zagadnienia współczesnej nauki, Warszawa 2003.
  • Wróblewski J., Logika prawnicza a teoria argumentacji Ch. Perelmana, w: Perelman Ch., Logika prawnicza. Nowa retoryka, Warszawa 1984.

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

ISSN
0081-6841

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-e9d6606b-9f8e-417c-8f6f-804a626a6eb9
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