Spór o depresję. Czy fenomenologicznie zorientowana filozofia psychiatrii rozwiąże problemy psychiatrii redukcjonistycznej?

• Authors: Białek Maja

Title variants

EN

The Debate on Depression. Can Phenomenologically-Oriented Philosophy of Psychiatry Combat the Problems of Reductionist Psychiatry?

• Languages of publication: PL EN

Abstracts

PL

Celem artykułu jest zarysowanie sporu dotyczącego trudności w diagnozowaniu, definiowaniu i leczeniu depresji toczącego się w ramach redukcjonistycznej psychiatrii biologicznej, a także odpowiedź na pytanie, czy nowe podejście do zaburzeń psychicznych oferowane przez fi lozofów psychiatrii wywodzących się z nurtu fenomenologicznego i paradygmatu ucieleśnionego poznania rozwiązuje owe trudności. Problematyczne zagadnienia związane ściśle z depresją przedstawiam w kontekście głównych wskazywanych obecnie problemów psychiatrii redukcjonistycznej. Po tym wprowadzeniu prezentuję enaktywistyczne, fenomenologiczne i ucieleśnione koncepcje dotyczące depresji, w tym terapii depresji. Na koniec rozważam, na ile owe koncepcje istotnie wykraczają poza nurty już obecne w psychiatrii. Wskazuję również, pod jakimi względami omawiane koncepcje w fi lozofi i psychiatrii mogą okazać się pożyteczne, nawet jeśli z różnych względów nie rozwiązują wielu ze wskazanych problemów psychiatrii redukcjonistycznej

EN

The aim of my paper is to review the discussion concerning various difficulties which surround the definition of depression and the methods of diagnosing and treating the disease against the background of the now dominant reductionist paradigm in psychiatry, as well as to answer the question whether a new approach to psychiatric disorders proposed by philosophers of psychiatry working within the phenomenologically inspired embodied and enactive paradigm indeed offers a solution to these difficulties. I present the issues specific to the subject of depression in light of the more general problems related to biological psychiatry that have recently caused much debate. In the second part of the paper, I consider enactive, phenomenological and embodied theories of depression and the possibilities of new methods of treatment. My goal is to assess whether these theories indeed add anything important to the conceptions that are already present in psychiatry. I conclude that even if the embodied philosophy of psychiatry does not solve many of the problems faced by modern psychiatry, it can, nevertheless, provide a useful theoretical basis for future changes.

Keywords

PL

filozofia psychiatrii; depresja; fenomenologia; ucieleśnione poznanie redukcjonizm; antypsychiatria; T. Fuchs; M. Ratcliffe; S.N. Ghaemi; L. Sass

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 59
• Pages: 1-22

Dates

published

2019-03-31

Contributors

author

Białek Maja

• University of Bialystok ul. Świerkowa 20 B 15-328 Białystok

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Identifiers

DOI

doi: 10.33392/diam.1074