PL EN


2013 | 3 | 165-177
Article title

Organizacyjne zróżnicowanie gospodarki rynkowej a rola spółdzielni i przedsiębiorstw społecznych: apel o pluralizm ekonomiczny

Content
Title variants
EN
Organisational variety in market economies and the role of co-operative and social enterprises: a plea for economic pluralism
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
Dominujące dotychczas podejścia ekonomiczne w sposób lekceważący i marginalny traktowały rolę spółdzielni i przedsiębiorstw społecznych we współczesnej gospodarce rynkowej. Niewielka uwaga przywiązywana do tego zjawiska wynika z ograniczonej stosowalności analizy przypadku spółdzielni i przedsiębiorstw społecznych do dwóch podstawowych założeń ekonomii głównego nurtu: egoistycznych interesów jednostek i maksymalizacji zysku jako jedynego możliwego celu funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstwa. Niezgodność między założeniami teoretycznymi a dowodami empirycznymi prowadzi do niedoceniania potencjału wzrostu oraz wagi i roli odgrywanej przez spółdzielnie i przedsiębiorstwa społeczne. Wyjaśnienia trwałości i wzrostu tych typów organizacji nie dostarcza również teoria instytucjonalna. Uważamy zatem, że należy rozszerzyć założenia głównych modeli teoretycznych, aby postrzegać przedsiębiorstwa jako mechanizmy koordynacji działalności gospodarczej, i aby interesariusze takich fi rm kierowali się wielością motywacji i ujawniali zróżnicowane preferencje. W celu zarządzania kompleksowością motywacyjną i behawioralną, spółdzielnie i przedsiębiorstwa społeczne tworzą specyfi czne procedury organizacyjne. W konsekwencji ich cele nie są jednoznaczne: mogą odwoływać się do indywidualnego wzrostu zysku, korzyści wzajemnych, a także korzyści publicznych opartych na preferencjach altruistycznych.
EN
In the article the authors analyse, the dominant to date economic approaches have downplayed and marginalised the role of co-operative and social enterprises in contemporary market economies. This insuffi cient attention derives from the limited applicability to the case of co-operative and social enterprises of two of the main assumptions of orthodox microeconomic theory: the presence of self-interested individuals and profi t-maximisation as the only possible fi rm objective. The mismatch between theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence has led to the underestimation of the growth potential, weight and role of co-operative and social enterprises. An explanation for the persistence and growth of these organisational types has not been provided by institutionalism either. Thus, the authors maintain that the assumptions of the main theoretical models must be enlarged to consider fi rms as coordination mechanisms of economic activities, whose stakeholders are driven by a plurality of motivations and display complex preferences. In order to mange motivational and behavioural complexity, co-operative and social enterprises develop specifi c organisational routines. Consistently, their objectives are not univocal: they can contemplate private appropriation, mutual benefi t goals and public benefi t aims supported by altruistic preferences.
Contributors
author
  • Uniwersytet w Trento
author
  • Uniwersytet w Trento
author
  • Uniwersytet w Trento
References
  • Bacchiega A. , Borzaga C. [2001], Social enterprise as an incentive structures, [w:] C. Borzaga, J. Defourny (red.), The Emergence of Social Enterprise, London: Routledge, s. 273–95.
  • Bartling B., Fehr E., Schmidt K.M. [2011], Screening, Competition, Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs, “The American Economic Review(forthcoming).
  • Becchetti L., Castriota S., Tortia E. [2009], Productivity, wages and intrinsic motivation in social enterprises, Milan, Econometica Working Paper no 16 (http://www.econometica.it/wp/wp16.pdf ).
  • Ben-Ner A., Putterman L. (red.) [1998], Economics, Values,and Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Birchall J. [2010], People-centred Businesses: Co-operatives, Mutuals and the Idea of Membership, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Borzaga C., Defourny J. (red.) [2001], The Emergence of Social Enterprise, London: Routledge.
  • Borzaga C., Depedri S., Tortia E.C. [2010], Testing the Distributive Eff ects of Social Enterprises. The Case of Italy, [w:] G. Degli Antoni, L. Sacconi (red.), Social capital, Corporate social responsibility, Economic Behaviour and Performance, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, s. 280–301.
  • Borzaga C., Tortia E.C. [2010], The economics of social enterprises: an interpretive framework, [w:] L. Becchetti, C. Borzaga (red.), The Economics of Social Responsibility: the World of Social Enterprises, London Routledge, s. 15–33.
  • Borzaga C., Tortia E.C. [2009], Social enterprises and local economic development, [w:] A. Noya (ed) The Changing Boundaries of Social Enterprises, Paris: OECD Publishing, s. 195–228.
  • Bowles S. [2004], Microeconomics, behaviour, institutions and evolution. Princeton, NJ: Russel Sage Foundation/ Princeton University Press.
  • Bowles S. [1998], Endogenous preferences: the cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions,“Journal of Economic Literature”, 36(1): 75–111.
  • Coase R. [1937], The nature of the firm, “Economica”, 4(16):386–405.
  • Deci E.L. [1975], Intrinsic Motivation, New York: Plenum Press.
  • Draghi M. [2009], Solidarieta nelle crisi. Il Credito Cooperativonelle economie locali, Rome: Bank of Italy.
  • Fehr E., Fischbacher U. [2002], Why social preferences matter.The impact of non-selfi sh motives on competition, cooperation and incentives, “Economic Journal”, 112(478): C1–C33.
  • Fehr E., Gachter S. [2000], Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity, “Journal of Economic Perspectives”, 14(3): 159–81.
  • Fehr E., Schmidt K. [2001], Theories of fairness and reciprocity: evidence and economic ass lications, Working Paper no 75, Zurich: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.
  • Frey B.S. [1997], Not Just for the Money. An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publications.
  • Furubotn E.G., Pejovich S. [1970], Property rights and the behaviour of the fi rm in a socialist state: the example of Yugoslavia, “Zeitschrift furNationalokonomie”, 30(5): 431–454.
  • Gagne M., Deci E.L. [2005], Self-determination theory and work motivation, “Journal of Organizational behavior”, 26: 331–362.
  • Hansmann H. [1996], The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Hodgson G.M. [1993], Economics and Evolution: bringing life back into economics, Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Hodgson G.M. [2006], Economics in the Shadows of Darwin and Marx: essays on institutional and evolutionary themes, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
  • Nelson R.R., Winter S.G. [1982], An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Ostrom E. [1994], Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  • Rose-Ackerman S. [1996], Altruism, nonprofi ts, and economic theory, “Journal of Economic Literature”, 34(2): 701–28.
  • Sacchetti S., Sugden R. [2003], The governance of networks and economic power: the nature and impact of subcontracting relationships, “Journal of Economic Surveys”, 17(5): 669–91.
  • Stiglitz J.E. [2009], Moving beyond market fundamentalism to a more balanced economy, “Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics”, 80(3), 345–360.
  • Tyler T.R., Blader S.L. [2000], Cooperation in Groups. Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement, Philadelphia, Psychology Press.
  • Vanek J. [1970], The General Theory of Labor Managed Market Economies, Thaca, Cornell University Press.
  • Valentinov V. [2007a], The property rights ass roach to nonprofi t organisations: the role of intrinsic motivation, “Public Organisation Review”, 7 (1).
  • Valentinov V. [2007b], The Transaction Cost Theory of the Nonprofi t Firm: Beyond Oss ortunism, “Nonprofi t and Voluntary Sector Quarterly”, 37(5): 5–18.
  • Valentinov V. [2008], Toward an Incentive Alignment Theory of Nonprofi t Organization, Evolutionary and “Institutional Economics Review”, 5(1): 189–196.
  • Viale R. [2005], (Red.) Le nuove economie, Milan: Il Sole 24 Ore.
  • Ward B. [1958], The fi rm in Illyria: market syndicalism, “American Economic Review”, 44(4): 566–89.
  • Weisbrod B.A. [1988], The Non-Profi t Economy, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
  • Williamson O.E. [1975], The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press.
  • Williamson O.E. [2000], The new institutional economics. Taking stock, looking ahead, “Journal of Economic Literature”, 38(3): 595–613.
  • Zamagni S. [2005], Per una teoria civile dell’impresa cooperativa, [w:] E. Mazzoli, S. Zamagni (red.) Verso una Nuova Teoria della Cooperazione, Bologna: Il Mulino, s. 15–56.
  • Zamagni S., Sacco P. (red.) [2002], Complessita relazionale e comportamento economico, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-ef7adec2-b654-4713-a02f-b7d3983d30f2
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.