2019 | 67 | 1 | 199-229
Article title

Zakład Pascala

Title variants
Pascal’s Wager
Languages of publication
Autor analizuje klasyczne rozumowanie, zwane „zakładem Pascala”, w kontekście teorii decyzji, wyróżniając w nim trzy argumenty: (i) argument z silnej dominacji, (ii) argument z wartości oczekiwanej oraz (iii) argument z uogólnionej wartości oczekiwanej; dyskutuje zarzuty względem poprawności materialnej i formalnej rozumowania Pascala w jego trzeciej wersji, rozważa kontrowersje natury moralnej względem argumentu, a także docieka znaczenia jego konkluzji.
The Author examines the classical reasoning called “Pascal’s wager” in the framework of decision theory. He distinguishes in Pascal’s original text three separate arguments: (i) the argument from superdominance, (ii) the argument from expectation, and (iii) the argument from generalized expectations. The paper addresses the third argument, discusses objections raised against it and finally investigates the true meaning of its conclusion.
Physical description
  • Australian National University
  • Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
  • Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
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