What Determines State Capture in Poland?

• Authors: Stanisław Alwasiak , Monika Lewandowska-Kalina , Kalina Lech , Michał Możdżeń , Oskar Kowalewski , Krzysztof Rybiński
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Purpose: This study examines the determinants of ex-ante state capture in Poland. Methodology: In order to establish the determinants of ex-ante state capture a logistic regression is estimated. Findings: The study shows that in Poland the majority of legal acts were passed with the aim to satisfy the interest of particular groups. Furthermore, the regression analysis shows that the likelihood of state capture increases during the period of higher economic growth and local elections. The likelihood of state capture, however, declines during presidential elections. The results we attribute to different interests of political parties in the period of local and presidential elections. Finally, we fi nd that the state capture increased over the years in Poland. Additionally, we show that the EU accession did not prevent state capture in Poland. In contrast, the fi nancial crisis of 2007 resulted in a wake-up effect and the likelihood of state capture declined in Poland. Research limitations: In the study we employ proxies for state capture, yet we assume that corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Poland. However, due to its nature corruption is very diffi cult to assess and measure. Originality: The study uses a unique dataset on ex-ante state capture that was identifi ed in the legal acts that have been passed in the period 1990–2011 in Poland.

Keywords

EN

law; corruption; state capture; public interest; transition country; Poland

• Publisher: Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego
• Journal: Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 4(123)
• Pages: 86-109

Contributors

author

Stanisław Alwasiak

• Cracow University of Economics

author

Monika Lewandowska-Kalina

• Warsaw School of Economics

author

Kalina Lech

• Warsaw School of Economics

author

Michał Możdżeń

• Cracow University of Economics

author

Oskar Kowalewski

• Kozminski University

author

Krzysztof Rybiński

• Vistula University

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