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Journal
2013 | 21 | 4(84) | 5-29
Article title

Aiming at Truth. Part II

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
In scientific practice theories are allowed to posit objects believed to be fictious. Some philosophers undermine the legitimacy of scientific practice in this respect, which leads to a philosophical problem. Various solutions have been advanced. The paper argues for a certain version of fictionalism. Since the objections against positing fiction are objections against the practical wisdom of science and are neither compelling nor easily answerable, it is suggested in the paper that if there is a way out, it is mainly a way of revealing hidden motivations by looking anew at the scientific practice from the historical perspective, one of the hopes being that it will enable us to reveal some hidden burdens of history. This suggestion determines the main line of argumentation.
Journal
Year
Volume
21
Issue
Pages
5-29
Physical description
Contributors
  • University of Warsaw, Institut of Philosophy, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland, p.brykczynski@uw.edu.pl
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-f9fe0f10-b8c5-49bf-8c44-36038e41c27c
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