A Synthetic Approach to the Grounds of Global Justice

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Abstract

This paper argues that neither the relational approach nor the non-relational approach to global justice is at once necessary and sufficient to deal with complex cases of global (in)justice. In this intervention in the dispute between relational and non-relational approaches, the aim of the paper is not to support one side and oppose the other, but to combine both approaches in order to arrive at a more robust approach. Using the strengths of the relational approach to compensate for the weaknesses of the non-relational approach and vice versa, the aim of the paper is to set out a mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach that will be used to address complex cases of global (in)justice. Rather thandiscussing how the synthetic approach applies to a particular complex case of global (in)justice, the paper shows how a synthetic approach that intends to address complex cases of global (in)justice will look like. Perhaps, colloquially in Hegelian dialectics, the relational approach can be seen as a thesis, the non-relational approach as an antithesis and the combination of both approaches as a synthesis.

Key words: Cosmopolitanism, Distributive Justice, Global Justice, Non-relational Approach, Relational Approach, Statism

INTRODUCTION

In the vast majority of political philosophy literature on the subject of global justice, global justice is mainly discussed as global *distributive* justice. Global distributive justice is only one facet, although the prominent facet, of global justice. We can also talk about global justice in terms of armed conflicts, humanitarian intervention, human rights, etc. Some of these other areas are mostly approached *legally* within the remit of international justice (particularly) and international law (generally) and *politically* within the remit of international politics. However, such issues are actually sometimes looked at *morally* within the purview of global ethics (in general) and global justice (in particular). My concern is not only with global distributive justice in particular, but with global justice in general. Nevertheless, given the prominent status of global distributive justice as explained above, the discussion in this paper will revolve around global distributive justice. Hereafter, the short term 'global justice' will be used rather than the long term 'global distributive justice.'

In this paper, I am aiming at arriving at a possible and plausible synthesis of the relational and non-relational approaches to global justice that will enable us to have a robust solution to complex cases of global (in)justice. The relational approach is an approach to global justice which stresses the common relationships that bind subjects and agents of justice together. It is a member-based approach, that is, it is associative. Any person that is not part of a particular relationship is deemed to have neither obligation to, nor right claim against, persons who are bounded together by the relationship. In contrast, the non-relational approach is an approach to global justice which does not see justice to be dependent on such relationship or any relationship other than common humanity and its variants. The non-relational approach claims that justice is not based on any special relationship and its variants such as citizenship, compatriotism, etc., but on common humanity and its variants such as basic human needs, natural prerogatives and sufferance, etc. (Maffettone, 2013, p. 127).

I contend that in view of the relational and non-relational approaches to global justice, there is no one approach that is at once necessary and sufficient to deal with complex cases of global (in)justice. My contention is based on the premise that while each approach is necessary,

none is sufficient.In the fifth and sixth parts of this paper, the necessity and insufficiency of the relational and non-relational approaches will be analyzed. But at this juncture, I shall explain what I mean by complex cases of global (in)justice. Some of these cases could be famine, AIDS pandemic, racial discrimination, genocide, resource wars, etc. But I am not interested in discussing any particular case; I am rather interested in the *generality* of these cases as complex cases of global (in)justice.

When I say a case is a complex case of global (in)justice, what I mean is that:

1. There are rights and duties involved in the case.
2. The rights and duties in (1) are not only relational, but are also non-relational.
3. Hence, there are relational and non-relational grounds on which the case is based.
4. There are advantages and disadvantages resulting from such grounds in (3).
5. The advantages and disadvantages in (3) are not only relationally divided, but are also non-relationally divided.
6. The divisions in (5) are not only relationally determined, but are also non-relationally determined.

In view of the stipulations from (1) to (6), to resolve such case, we must employ not only the relational approach or only the non-relational approach, but both approaches.My contention, as stated above, is not new in the global justice discuss. For instance, Mathias Risse has already contended in a similar fashion, and has gone on to propose an intermediary approach between the relational and the non-relational approaches (2017, p. 1). Usually, attempts to create an intermediary approach between the relational and the non-relational approaches tend to tilt toward either one side or the other. However, Risse's pluralist internationalism stands out in the sense that itis almost perfectly middle-of-the-road between either sides. Therefore, I will focus onRisse's approach. A detailed discussion of theapproach will be done in the third part of this paper.At the end of the discussion, I will explain the similarities and differences between the approach and mine. For now, I shall turn to an explanation of the structure of the paper.

Following the tradition in the global justice literature and discourse, my methodological approach is theoretical and normative. The paper is divided into seven parts. The first part is this introductory part while the seventh part is the conclusion. The second part discusses the grounds of justice by differentiating the relational approach from the non-relational approach. The third part presents a prelude to my synthesis of the two approaches by discussing Risse's pluralist internationalism which is itself a synthesis of the relational and non-relational approaches(Ibid.). The fourth part discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the relational and non-relational approaches while the fifth and sixth parts discuss my synthesis of the relational and non-

relational approaches. The fifth part begins the synthesis by exploring the possibility of using the strengths of each approach to compensate for the weaknesses of the other approach, while the sixth part ends the synthesis by formalizing those strengths and weaknesses in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

1. THE GROUNDS OF JUSTICE: RELATIONAL AND NON-RELATIONAL APPROACHES

Distributive justice presupposes three things: (i) that there are goods; (ii) that there is a population; (iii) and that the goods need to be distributed among the population(Risse, 2012, p. 4). Then the role of principles of distributive justice is to stipulate how these goods can be justly and fairly distributed among the population. For this reason, distributive justice theories tell us why any particular persons in a population should be, relative to other persons or in absolute terms, entitled to a certain amount of the goods (Ibid.). Here, goods do not only mean material goods and services and other concrete phenomena, they also mean rights and other related abstracts. While population may consist of individuals in some space and time, or states, or generations, or even the entire humanity (Ibid.).

In view of the function of distributive justice as explained above, there are different distinction lines in the global justice discourse. One distinction line, which is almost latent, separates positive duties from negative duties; this distinction is based on the *category* of duty. Another distinction line, which is controversial rather than latent, separates duties of justice from humanitarian duties or duties of charity; this distinction is based on the *nature* of duty. More controversial than the above distinction line is the distinction line which separates egalitarianism from minimalism; this distinction is based on the *degree* or *intensity* of justice.

One of the major and most important distinction lines is that which separates cosmopolitanism from statism.This distinction is based on the *scope* or *extensity* of justice.Cosmopolitanism is an approach to global justice which says that "all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another; we are required to respect one another's status as ultimate units of moral concern" (Pogge, 1992, p. 49). In contrast, statism is an approach to:

> global justice which on the one hand says that in the nation state, justice is at once intellectually plausible, practically realisable and in fact a necessary element. But on the other hand and more crucially, conversely holds that: either justice is at once intellectually implausible, practically unrealisable and in fact not an element in the global system; or justice is only partially intellectually

plausible, partially realisable and in fact only partially an element in the global system. While some statists hold the first, strong or radical view, others hold the second, weak or moderate view (Abumere, 2015, p. 11).

The other major or most important distinction line is that which separates the relational approach from the non-relational approach.This distinction is about the desideratum or desiderata on which justice is based. The distinction is based on the *grounds* of justice.In the global justice discourse, the fundamental questions relationists and non-relationists seek to answer are: Is global justice justifiable? If yes, on what grounds is it justifiable? If no, on what grounds is it unjustifiable?

Arguing on the grounds of the 'realities of our world,' one variant of relationists (statists) argue that global justice is unjustifiable while another variant of relationists (cosmopolitans or globalists) argue that global justice is justifiable. In disagreement with statists but in agreement with relational cosmopolitans or globalists, non-relationists argue that global justice is justifiable. And in disagreement with both statists and relational cosmopolitans or globalists, non-relationists argue for the justifiability of global justice on the grounds of the 'realities of human nature.' Based on the 'realities of our world': on the one hand, global justice is unjustifiable because globally we do not share certain institutions in common; on the other hand, global justice is justifiable because globally we share certain institutions in common. But based on the 'realities of human nature,' global justice is justifiable because of our common humanity (Armstrong, 2012, p. 25; Sangiovanni, 2007).

From the above explanation, it is evident that the non-relational approach is cosmopolitan. But the relational approach can be divided based on the scope of relationship or on the character of relationship. When divided on the scope of relationship, the relational approach can be statist or cosmopolitan - globalist. But when divided on the character of relationship, the approach can be institutional or cultural. On these distinctions and divisions of the two approaches, what we have in terms of variants are: (1) **non-relationists** - **non-relational** cosmopolitans; (2.0) **relationists**; (2.a.i) **relational** cosmopolitans – globalists; (2.a.ii) statists; (2.b.i) institutionalists; and (2.b.ii) culturalists.

In view of the above distinctions,in spite of the importance attached to John Rawls' *The Law of Peoples* (1999) and Charles Beitz's *Political Theory and International Relations* (1979; 1999) in the global justice discourse, Rawls and Beitz will be elided in my discussion. Rawls' Law of Peoples is an argument for statism in opposition to cosmopolitanism. Conversely, Beitz argues for cosmopolitanism in opposition to statism. Since statism and cosmopolitanism are subsets of the relational and non-relational approaches, Rawls' and Beitz's focus is narrow while my focus onthe

relational and non-relational approaches is broad.For the above reason, although Rawls is seen as the greatest political philosopher of our time, and although Beitz is seen as the herald of the current global justice discourse since the past four decades, I will leave them aside.

2. RISSE'S PLURALIST INTERNATIONALISM

I started by contending that while the relational and non-relational approaches to global justice are individually necessary, they are also individually insufficient for dealing with complex cases of global (in)justice. This implies that although the two approaches have their respective strengths, they also have their respective weaknesses.Therefore, my aim is to work out a possible and plausible synthesis of the two approaches which will serve as an alternative to the exclusive reliance on the relational approach on the one hand and on the non-relational approach on the other hand. There is a similar attempt by Risse to provide an alternative approach to the relational and non-relational approaches by combining the strengths of the two approaches and using the combination to compensate for the weaknesses of the two approaches. I do not totally agree with Risse's attempt, but I think his attempt is insightful. Hence, I will discuss his attempt as a prelude to mine.

For Risse, since non-relationists argue that principles of global justice should be based on the grounds of relation, then the onus is on them to explain what, other than relation, members of the global community share in common that makes principles of global justice applicable to the global community (2012, p. 9). Non-relationists usually argue that principles of justice are applicable to the global community because of the common humanity which the members of the global community share (Ibid.). The non-relationists who argue for the applicability of justice to the global community solely on the grounds of common humanity see justice as a component of the distribution of advantage (Ibid.).

On their part, by arguing that absent special relationships the applicability of the principles of justice cannot be justified, the onus is on relationists to explain what is so important about relations that makes them the *sine qua non* for the applicability of the principles of justice (Ibid.). In this regard, on the one hand, the onus is on statists to explain what is so special about common citizenship in a state that it is the *sine qua non*for the requirements of justice.On the other hand, the onus is on relational cosmopolitans or globalists to explain what is so important about participating in the global order that makes it the *sine qua non* for the requirements of global justice (Risse, 2012, p. 8).

Contra statists, Risse opines that other than shared membership in a state, there are other possible grounds on which we can argue for the principles of justice. Contra relational cosmopolitans or globalists, he opines that other than participation in the global order, there are other possible grounds on which we can argue for the applicability of the principles of justice. Then contra non-relationists, he opines that other than common humanity, there are other possible grounds on which we can argue for the applicability of principles of justice (Risse, 2012, pp. 8 – 9). In essence, Risse's argument, as contained in pluralist internationalism is that all principles of justice are not necessarily based on one ground or the same grounds and they do not necessarily have one scope or the same scope. They can be based on several and different grounds and they can have several and different scopes (Risse, 2012, p. 10).

Risse calls his intermediary approach internationalism or pluralist internationalism. To create the approach, he largely relies on John Rawls on the relationist side and even more on Hugo Grotius on the non-relationist side. According to Risse,internationalism or pluralist internationalism:

> shares with statism a commitment to the normative peculiarity of the state…. At the same time, internationalism accommodates multiple grounds, some of which are relational and some not. Therefore, I also talk about 'pluralist internationalism.' Internationalism agrees with globalism that the global order generates its own principles of justice and with nonrelationism that not all grounds are relational and that common humanity is a ground. But the principles thus generated are weaker than those that apply within states. Using the term 'internationalism' for my view is apt because it recognizes the applicability of principles of distributive justice *outside* and *among* ('inter') states. Internationalism's inherent pluralism transcends the distinction between relationism and nonrelationism, formulating a view 'between' the two common views that principles of justice either apply only within states (as statists think) or else apply to all human beings (as globalists and nonrelationists think) (2012, p. 10) (emphasis is original).

In other words, what distinguishes Risse's internationalism or pluralist internationalism from relational statism is that unlike the latter, the former argues that apart from the relationship that exists within the state, there are other grounds on which the applicability of the principles of justice can be based. And what distinguishes Risse's internationalism or pluralist internationalism from relational cosmopolitanism or globalism is that unlike the latter, the former argues that: the relationship within the state is indeed a special ground on which the applicability of the principles of justice can be based; and apart from participation in the global order, there are other grounds on which the applicability of the principles of justice can be based. While what distinguishes

Risse's internationalism or pluralist internationalism from the non-relational approach is that unlike the latter, the former argues that the relationship within the state is indeed a special ground on which the applicability of the principles of justice can be based (Risse, 2012, p. x).

My mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach does notreplicate Risse's pluralist internationalism.Nevertheless,my approach has some similarities,as well as some differences, with Risse's. Principally, what my approach shares in common with Risse's is their common aim. For Risse, pluralist internationalism is aimed at dealing with "a two-fold challenge: first, to show why statism, globalism and nonrelationism are insufficient and why a view combining relational and nonrelational grounds is promising; and second, to illustrate the fruitfulness of my view by assessing constructively what principles are associated with different grounds" (Risse, 2012, pp. 10 – 11).

However, my approach differs from Risse's in the following way. Risse's reliance on Rawls on the relationist side and Grotius on the non-relationist side constrains pluralist internationalism, at least to some extent. Consequently, pluralist internationalism is, at least to some extent, narrowed to fit into a mixed, combined or synthesized Rawlsian and Grotian worldview. The problem here is that Risse does not allow pluralist internationalism to benefit from the salient ideas of other notable thinkers on both the relationist side and the non-relationist side.

Although Rawls and Grotius are excellent thinkers, there is no overriding reason to exclusivelyfocus on them and neglect others. While it might be far-fetched to say Risse's choice of Rawls and Grotius is arbitrary, the methodological decision to exclude other notable thinkers seems unhelpful. My approach does not rely on any particular thinker on the relationist side or the non-relationist side. Therefore, it is neither constrained by the views of any thinker nor are its stipulations narrowed to fit into the worldview of any particular thinker. The fifth and sixth parts of the paper contain a detailed discussion of my approach. Given that the approach is based on the strengths and weaknesses of the relational and the non-relational approaches, as a prelude to discussing my approach the next part of the paper contains a discussion of these strengths and weaknesses.

3. RELATIONAL AND NON-RELATIONAL APPROACHES: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

A mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach is valuable because of both the strengths and weaknesses of the relational and non-relational approaches. Therefore, before explaining my

approach, I will briefly recapitulate the cores of the relational and non-relational approaches and explain where their strengths and weaknesses emanate from in order to identify how a mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach is possible and plausible.

The relational approach is practice-dependent (Sangiovanni, 2008, p. 140). According to Rawls, "the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing" (1971, p. 29). The practice-dependence nature of the relational approach is a derivative of the above Rawlsian argument. Similarly, the practice-dependence nature of the relational approach entails that "the content, scope and justification of a conception of justice depends on the structure and form of the practices that the conception is intended to govern" (Sangiovanni, 2008, p. 138). For the relational approach, justice is practice-dependent, and principles of justice are only applicable when a stringent condition is met. It is not enough for persons to merely share common humanity, or merely co-habit the earth or merely co-exist within a certain geographical space or at a certain time; they must be bound together by a relationship which is mediated by practice.

Critics argue that the relational approach works with existing relations, practices or institutions as they *are* rather than specifying for us which relations, practices or institutions we *ought to have*.Consequently, it does not have any critical force to morally evaluate existing relations, practices or institutions and condemn the ones that morally ought not to exist (Armstrong 2009, pp. 158 – 159). In view of its weakness of lacking critical force, the relational approach does not critically assess the practices and relationships which we happen to have as the status quo. It accepts the status quo, no matter how arbitrary the status quo may be, not merely as a point of departure but as legitimate grounds of justice, and as such assumes that every relationship and practice or any kind of relationship and practice is morally valuable and acceptable (Kime, 2009, p. 40).

For instance, the case of racialor minority discrimination poses a tough challenge to the relational approach because most times racial identity is arbitrary. Most times persons do not choose their racial identity; persons do not choose their biological parents from whom they acquire the colour of their skin. Similarly, most times persons do not choose their ethnicity, and persons are often born into a nationality, or raised in a religion, etc. In spite of the fact that persons are arbitrarily born into or arbitrarily raised in the aforementioned identities, and in spite of the fact that they arbitrarily share those identities or arbitrarily belong to groups with those identities, the relational approach will accept such arbitrary status quo and its consequences as 'morally relevant practices.'

According to Kok-Chor Tan, restricting the applicability of justice to any kind of social arrangements which we have at any point in time is tantamount to showing an arbitrary

preference for the status quo, and this is in clear opposition to the ends of justice (2004, p. 59). To start "theorizing about justice from currently accepted institutional arrangements and practices as if these are given or inevitable, and that our conception of justice has to accommodate this existing reality, is to misconstrue the role and point of justice" (Tan, 2004, p. 156). This is because the aim of justice is:

> to guide and regulate our existing institutions, and can call on us to create new ones if necessary. That is, justice constrains and informs our institutional arrangements, not the other way around. To tie justice to existing institutional schemes would be to misconstrue and pervert the purpose of justice; it would be to treat justice as a mirror of society, when in fact we should want justice to be society's critic (Tan, 2004, p. 34).

However, some relationists (statists) may argue that absent practices or order, we cannot achieve the aims of justice. Without the framework of an order, no form of justice is realisable (Bull, 2002, p. 83). This argument is based on the premises that: the requirements of global justice are justice obligations; absent any order, justice obligations cannot be met; there is no global order; therefore global justice obligations cannot be met (Abumere, 2015,p. 209). Arguendo, it can be conceded to statists that absent any global framework of order the obligations of global justice such as positive duties cannot be met, yet argue that this does not negate any form of negative duties. For instance, we do not need any framework of order before we can perform our negative duties such as abiding by the principle that we ought not to violate the rights of other persons (Nagel, 2005, p. 131).

The relationist position will be weakened if the assertions made by Steven Shavell,Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H McAdams are deemed plausible. Although the assertions were made independent of each otherand were not originally aimed at criticizing the relational approach, they can be considered as a joint argument against the approach. Taking the three assertions to form a syllogism, we can see Shavell's assertion as the major premise, Sunstein's assertion as the minor premise and McAdams' assertion as the conclusion. According to Shavell:

> both law and morality serve to channel our behaviour. Law accomplishes this primarily through the threat of sanctions if we disobey legal rules ….So too does morality involve incentives (…). When we do the wrong thing, we may suffer guilt and disapprobation, and when we do the right thing, we may experience virtue and enjoy praise; the push and pull of the moral forces constitute an important influence on our conduct (2002, pp. 227- 228).

For Sunstein, "behavior is pervasively a function of norms" (1996, p. 4). Then McAdams argues that:

> For some behaviour X in some population of individuals, norm may arise if (1) there is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in X (...); (2) there is some risk that others will detect whether one engages in X; and (3) the existence of this consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the relevant population. When these conditions exist, the desire for esteem necessarily creates cost of or benefits from engaging in X. If the consensus is that X deserves esteem, a norm will arise if the esteem benefits exceed, for most people, the costs of engaging in X. Conversely, if the consensus condemns X, a norm will arise if, for most people, the esteem costs exceed the benefits of engaging in X" (1997, p. 358).

While McAdams based his theory of norm on the grounds of esteem, norms can be derived from other grounds such as egoistic fear of punishment, altruistic love of others, deontological sense of duty, etc. But discussing the origin of norms is not within the remit of this paper. Furthermore, as shown by Shavell in the 'major premise,' there is a relationship and correlation between law and morality. Nevertheless, the two are distinct entities.But McAdams seems to conflict the two by failing to specify whether his esteem theory of norm is about law, morality or both. In spite of this limitation, if it is true as McAdams asserts that "norms arise because people seek the esteem of others" (1997, p. 355), then even without the framework of a global order there can still be justice, at least to some extent.

However, David Miller argues that except we have a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between persons, we will not know what duties of justice we owe one another (2013, p. 5). I partially agree and disagree with Miller. Firstly, we do not have to stand in an 'absolute' or 'strict' relationship in order to have duties of justice and to understand them. For instance, we do not need a comprehensive understanding of our relationship with others in order to know that justice requires that we should not murder them. But if we stand in such relationship, then our duties are more stringent and more understandable. Secondly, there are layers of relationship; citizenship, humanity, etc. While citizenship-relationship is comprehensive in comparison to humanity-relationship, it is still possible to know that there are basic and negative requirements of justice we may morally owe other fellow humans even though they are not fellow citizens.

Unlike the relational approach, the non-relational approach is not practice-dependent. Unlike practice-dependent views, practice-independent views assert that when stipulating and justifying first principles of justice, we should strive to arrive at a normative stance which is unencumbered by the form or structure of institutions and practices which we happen to have as

the status quo (Sangiovanni 2008, p. 138). While the non-relational approach avoids the pitfalls of the relational approach, the former, just like the latter, has its own weaknesses. Because the non-relational approach is practice-independent and therefore lacks practical force, it is seen to be infeasible and its requirements are seen to be practically impossible to implement.

The point of the 'infeasibility' argument is that it is not enough for an approach to justice to be theoretically plausible and morally reasonable; it also has to be feasible and practically possible. Theories of justice are not mere theoretical exercises; they have practical ends which are the realization of the stipulations or requirements which are contained in their principles. These realizations are not possible in vacuum. They are possible when there are practices which mediate the relationships of persons socially, politically, and institutionally (Kime, 2009, p. 42).

It is possible, and even plausible, to accept the charge that the non-relational approach, due to its practice-independence, lacks practical force and therefore is infeasible, but yet argue that considerations of justice, and principles of justice, should not necessarily depend on practical possibility and feasibility. When an approach to justice is theoretically plausible and morally reasonable, the onus is on agents of justice to strive to ensure it is also practically possible. They should ensure that the practically possible and feasible practices of the status quo reflect and approximate the stipulations of the theoretically plausible and morally reasonable approach to the nearest maximum rather than to the barest minimum or remaining with the status quo.

Although the non-relational approach says that principles of justice are applicable "independently of persons' membership of a common association, the substantive implications of those principles will be affected by the extent to which persons belong to a common association and the extent to which that association is coercive and characterized by high levels of interdependence" (Caney,2011, p. 526). Moreover, the practical meaning of justice varies depending on the increase in the interdependence of persons (Caney, 2011, p. 527).

4. RELATIONAL AND NON-RELATIONAL APPROACHES: A MIXED, COMBINATORIAL OR SYNTHETIC APPROACH

Distributive justice in general, or global justice in particular, can be seen as the genus, the relational and non-relational approaches can be seen as its species, and the two approaches disagree on what grounds justice should be based (Risse, 2012, p. 8). Relationists, on the one hand:

may hold a range of views about the nature of the relevant relations, and they may think there is only one relational ground or several. Relationists are motivated by concerns about 'relevance,' the moral relevance of practices in which certain individuals stand. Such practices may include not only those that individuals chose to adopt but also some in which they have never chosen to participate (Ibid.).

Non-relationists, on the other hand, "deny that the truth about justice depends on relations. They think principles of justice depend on features that are shared by all members of the global population, independent of whatever relations they happen to be in. Rather than focusing on relevance, nonrelationists seek to avoid the 'arbitrariness' of restricting justice to regulating practices" (Risse, 2012, p. 9).

Consequently, on the one hand, a weighty argument against the relational approach is that because of the relational approach's arbitrary preference for the status quo, that is, because it is practice-dependent, it is devoid of any critical force (Kime, 2009, pp. 39 – 40). On the other hand, a weighty argument against the non-relational approach is that because the non-relational approach has no consideration for the status quo, that is, because it is practice-independent, it is devoid of any practical force (Risse, 2012, p. 42).

The main strength of the relational approach is that it possesses practical force, but its main weakness is that it lacks critical force. While the main strength of the non-relational approach is that it possesses critical force, but its main weakness is that it lacks practical force. Nevertheless, the two approaches, although are opposites, are not mutually exclusive; they can be used complementarily. Combining the two approaches, the practical-force-strength of the relational approach will be used to compensate for the lack-of-practical-force-weakness of the non-relational approach and the critical-force-strength of the non-relational approach will be used to compensate for the lack-of-critical-force-weakness of the relational approach.

Creating a mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach, we can have two levels: one level will be the non-relational level which will be broader and lower; the other level will be the relational level which will be narrower and higher. In other words, creating a mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach, we can use the non-relational approach on a broader and lower level and then use the relational approach on a narrower and higher level. For this purpose, a mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach can "use the non-relational side of the account in the first instance as a foundation" (Dietzel, n.d., p. 14) for non-relational global grounds of justice and then stipulate "a minimal moral threshold of immutable demands, and then, in the second instance, use the relational side of the account to explicate a more detailed content, or further specific demands of justice, based on (…) relationships" (Ibid.).

Consequently, firstly, a mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach will be based on non-relational grounds, and this will: "entail certain basic immutable demands, such as not violating minimum human rights (...). This could be considered the non-relational baseline which can never be crossed under any circumstances" (Ibid.). Then, secondly, the mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach will go further to "employ a relational account in order to explore existing relationships and provide guidance for demands of justice based on these relationships" (Ibid).

Unlike the relational approach alone and the non-relational approach alone, the mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach possesses critical force and practical force. I think an appropriate approach to complex cases of global (in)justice must possess these two forces. On the one hand, an approach to complex cases of global (in)justice might possess practical force, but if it does not possess critical force it is unlikely to convincingly and successfully challenge some of the morally arbitrary grounds on which, for instance, racial discrimination is based. In this case, then it is likely not going to be accepted. Therefore, an approach to complex cases of global (in)justice, first and foremost, must possess critical force.

On the other hand, an approach to complex cases of global (in)justice may possess critical force, but if it does not possess practical force it will make no difference in the lives of those, and in societies, that suffer global injustice. Consequently, such an approach will be a project in futility. Hence, crucially, any approach to complex cases of global (in)justice must possess practical force. For instance, when an approach to complex cases of global (in)justice possesses both critical and practical forces, then it makes the problem of racial discrimination more tractable. Any approach that does not make the problem of racial discrimination more tractable might even aggravate the injustice and unjust inequality it is meant to remedy, alleviate or eradicate.

A possible criticism against the mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach may be that the relational approach and the non-relational approach are mutually exclusive. This criticism is based on the premise that as "opposites" both approaches cannot be combined to work together because that will inevitably entail contradictions. A possible response to this criticism is to argue that although both approaches are opposites, combining them does not necessarily entail any contradictions for the following reason. Although both approaches have differences, they also share some similarities For instance, on the one hand, relational cosmopolitanism or globalism is different from statism on the scope of justice just as relational cosmopolitanism or globalism is different from non-relationism on the grounds of justice. On the other hand, non-relational cosmopolitanism or globalism is similar to statism on the grounds of justice just as non-relational cosmopolitanism or globalism is similar to non-relationism on the scope of justice.

In view of the above differences and similarities, although the relational and the non-relational approaches are opposites, their opposition is not like that of A and non-A. Therefore, to say that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive is not a logical contradiction (Abumere, 2015, pp. 229 – 230). Arguendo, let us concede for a moment that the opposition between the two approaches is equivalent to the logical opposition between A and non-A. Even in this case, to say that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive does not necessarily entail any logical contradiction. "The first rule of logic says a thing must be identical to itself; a thing cannot be A and non-A at the same time – it is either A or non-A. The faulty reasoning is that since […the relational approach] is the 'opposite' of […the non-relational approach], to say they are not mutually exclusive is to break the first rule of logic" (Ibid.).

However, arguing that both approaches are not mutually exclusive does not break the first rule of logic or entail any logical contradiction of identity because to say the relational approach and the non-relational approach are not mutually exclusive is not to say that relational approach is non-relational approach and non-relational approach is relational approach. "Rather, it is to say that although both are opposites, they can still be moderately employed to work together. Moreover, opposites are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, man is the opposite of woman, yet both of them cooperate in many ways including bringing into existence other men and women" (Ibid.). So also a mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach is intended to make the relational and the non-relational approaches 'cooperate' in order to make complex cases of global (in)justice more tractable.

5. RELATIONAL AND NON-RELATIONAL APPROACHES: NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS

In the previous part of this paper, in order to have a robust approach to global justice that will make complex cases of global (in)justice more tractable, I opted for the mixed, combinatorial or synthetic approach. This synthetic approach is based on the premises that:

(i) Neither the relational approach nor the non-relational approach is at once necessary and sufficient.

(ii) Neither the relational approach nor the non-relational approach is at once unnecessary and insufficient.

(iii) Neither the relational approach nor the non-relational approach is unnecessary but sufficient.

(iv) The relational approach and the non-relational approach are each necessary but each insufficient.

(v) The relational approach and the non-relational approach are jointly necessary and jointly sufficient (Abumere, 2015, p. 217).

The sum of the above premises is that while the relational approach alone and the non-relational approach alone are necessary but insufficient, a mixture, combination or synthesis of the two approaches is at once necessary and sufficient to resolvecomplex cases of global (in)justice (Ibid.).

When resolving complex cases of global justice, if the relational approach alone is at once *necessary and sufficient*, then we will not need the non-relational approach. This is because if the Relational approach (R) is at once necessary and sufficient, whenever we apply R to Complex cases of global (in)justice (Cc) we will have a *necessary and sufficient* resolution (NS) of Cc. In short, this Necessary and Sufficient resolution (NS) of Complex cases of global (in)justice (Cc) we shall hereafter call NSCc. Ceteris paribus, when R is applied to Cc we will have NSCc; failure to have NSCc will only occur if R is not well applied to Cc (Ibid.)[1]. Caveat; this is at the level of theorization about global justice!

Assuming R is at once *necessary and sufficient* (NS) to resolve Cc, in short NSCc, therefore;

(i) If R then NSCc.

(ii) If not R then not NSCc.

(iii) That we have NSCc necessarily implies that we have applied R.

(iv) That there is not NSCc necessarily implies that we have not applied R.

So also when resolvingComplex cases of global (in)justice (Cc), if the non-relational approach alone is at once *necessary and sufficient*, we will not need the relational approach. This is because if the Non-relational approach (Nr) is at once necessary and sufficient, whenever we apply Nr to Cc we will have a *necessary and sufficient* resolution (NS) of Cc, in short NSCc. Ceteris paribus, when Nr is applied to Cc we will have NSCc; failure to have NSCc will only occur if Nr is not well applied to Cc (Ibid.). Caveat; this is at the level of theorization about global justice!

Assuming Nr is at once *necessary and sufficient* (NS) to resolve Cc, in short NSCc, therefore;

(i) If Nr then NSCc.

(ii) If not Nr then not NSCc.

(iii) That we have NSCc necessarily implies that we have applied Nr.

(iv) That there is not NSCc necessarily implies that we have not applied Nr.

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[1]This formalization and the subsequent steps of the formalization were first used in the fusion of horizons between statism and cosmopolitanism in order to deal with the complex problem of resource curse. See Abumere, 2015, pp. 217 - 219.

When resolvingComplex cases of global (in)justice, if R is at once *unnecessary and insufficient*, therefore;

(i) That we have applied R does not necessarily imply that we have NSCc.

(ii) That we have NSCc does not necessarily imply that we have applied R.

(iii) That we have not applied R does not necessarily imply that we do not have NSCc.

(iv) That we do not have NSCc does not necessarily imply that we have not applied R.

So also in when resolvingComplex cases of global (in)justice, if Nr is at once *unnecessary and insufficient*, therefore;

(i) That we have applied Nr does not necessarily imply that we have NSCc.

(ii) That we have NSCc does not necessarily imply that we have applied Nr.

(iii) That we have not applied Nr does not necessarily imply that we do not have NSCc.

(iv) That we do not have NSCc does not necessarily imply that we have not applied Nr.

When resolvingComplex cases of global (in)justice, if R is *unnecessary but sufficient*, therefore;

(i) If R then NSCc.

(ii) That we have NSCc does not necessarily imply that we have applied R. For we can also have NSCc by applying Nr (assuming that R and Nr are the only applicable approaches).

So also when resolvingComplex cases of global (in)justice, if Nr is *unnecessary but sufficient*, therefore;

(i) If Nr then NSCc.

(ii) That we have NSCc does not necessarily imply that we have applied Nr. For we can also have NSCc by applying R (assuming that Nr and R are the only applicable approaches).

Since when resolvingComplex cases of global (in)justice, R is *necessary but insufficient*, therefore:

(i) That we have NSCc necessarily implies that we have applied R.

(ii) That we have applied R does not necessarily imply that we have NSCc. Apart from the application of R, we also need the application of Nr in order to have NSCc (assuming that R and Nr are the only applicable approaches).

So also when resolvingComplex cases of global (in)justice, if Nr is *necessary but insufficient*, therefore:

(i) That we have NSCc necessarily implies that we have applied Nr.

(ii) That we have applied Nr does not necessarily imply that we have NSCc. Apart from the application of Nr, we also need the application of R in order to have NSCc (assuming that Nr and R are the only applicable approaches).

I employed the above formalization in order to ascertain the truth-value of the assertions made in the preceding parts of the paper, especially the fifth part. Having already presented my assertions in 'natural language', re-presenting them in 'formal language' eliminates, or at least reduces, concerns of invalidity and unsoundness that one may have about the assertions. Moreover, classical logic tells us that:

> a *logic* consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a model-theoretic semantics. The language has components that correspond to a part of a natural language like English or Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply record arguments that are *valid* for the given language, and the semantics is to capture, codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions for at least part of the language (Shapiro, 2013).

CONCLUSION

I do not pretend to have created a new approach to global justice. Creating a new approach was not my aim. My aim was to improve the existing approaches. It is for this reason that I relied on the existing approaches and use the strengths of each approach to compensate for the weaknesses of the other. Since Risse has already attempted this sort of 'compensation' in his pluralist internationalism, I simultaneously showed how my attempt is different from Risse's and then attempted to improve Risse's. The key contribution I made to the discourse on global justice is the identification of complex cases of global (in)justice and showing the insufficiency of the existing approaches when used separately to resolve the complex cases.

The non-relational approach is necessary for the 'lower' and 'broader' level of the demands of global justice -the justice demands in complex cases of global (in)justice. While the relational approach is necessary for the 'higher' and 'narrower' level of the demands of global justice -the justice demands in complex cases of global (in)justice.Mixed, combined or synthesized, both approaches suffice for the 'lower and broader' and the 'higher and narrower' levels.

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