Effect of National Decisions on Actions for Competition Damages in the CEE Countries

• Authors: Pärn-Lee Evelin
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

One of the main objectives of the so-called Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) was to make antitrust enforcement more effective. Although in most EU countries private antitrust enforcement has been possible subject to general rules of civil law; the number of private antitrust litigations has remained relatively low. It is presumed that the complementary roles of public and private enforcement, as well as the synergy between them, will take effect if formal decisions taken during public enforcement will have binding effect with regard to follow-on private litigations. According to the Damages Directive, final national decisions on competition infringements shall have binding effect in follow-on litigations. What is to be understood under ‘binding effect’, and the potential effects thereof, has been subject to a lively debate among academics and practitioners. It has been questioned if decisions of an executive body can bind the judiciary, and if so, to what extent. What is the evidentiary value of a formal decision of a NCA regarding national courts, but also on the court of another Member State. The article deals with the main issues and arguments presented in the general debate on the binding effect of national competition law decisions, and provides a closer look on this topic with regard to specific CEE countries.

Keywords

EN

private antitrust enforcement; damages directive; effect of national decisions on actions for competition damages; litigations; binding effect of national decisions; irrefutability; prima facie evidence; presumptions; implementation; legal certainty; effectiveness

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 10(15)
• Pages: 177-198

Dates

published

2017-06-30

Contributors

author

Pärn-Lee Evelin

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Identifiers

ISSN

1689-9024

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2017.10.15.9