European Harmonization Versus National Constitutional Sovereignity – On the Example of the Measures to Contain the Crisis of the Common European Currency

• Authors: Ra Jochen Becker
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The Eurozone Crisis is not just a monetary and economic challenge. It is as well the first tremendous challenge of the European Community and as well the national institutions and constitutions of the member states not only within the Eurozone. On one side the European Commission, the European Parliament and the ECB with its endeavours to safeguard and stabilize the single currency EURO within the Eurozone, to support the suffering countries in the south (PIIGS) with its struggle against speculative hedge funds, to render financial relief measures to those countries and its financial industry. Irrespective the fact governments and citizens within that countries, less appear to appreciate or honor that measures (Troika, Financial checks and budgetary control) as efficient help to stabilize but condemn as form of European paternalism and patronage. On the other hand the countries and its citizenship especially in the north of the Eurozone to set a stop sign to the EU and the ECB. Therefore they stress the Maastricht criteria and cite the Art 125 of the TEU, which prohibits one nation to stand for or to be liable for the Government debts of another nation (no bail out). Especially in the German perspective the demarcation line appears to run along between the European Commission, European Central Bank and European Court on the European side and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Bundesbank on the national German side. Each of the institutions feels to be bound to its origin functions and principles and save the respective constitution and the task rendered by that constitution. For a better understanding it is essential to get aware of and to reinforce the constitutional role which the Grundgesetz awarded to the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesbank and the German citizenship placing their confidence in these institutions. Es soll konkret das Verhältnis zur Nichtbeistandsklausel No-Bail-out Klausel Art 125 AEUVertrag, den Europäischen Fiskalpakt / dem ESFS, ESM / dem OMT-Programm der EZB, möglichen Entwicklung des EU zur Haftungs- und Transferunion mit einem zukünftigen Haftungsautomatismus der Mitglieder, der Unterscheidung von gemeinsamer Währungspolitik und nationaler Wirtschaftspolitik, der drohenden Vergemeinschaftung von Staatsschulden einzelner EU-Länder, die Budgethoheit des nationalen Parlaments als freie Entscheidung über die Verwendung des nationalen Haushaltes untersucht werden. Mit allen diesen Fragen mussten sich das höchste Deutsche und Europäische Gericht in jüngster Vergangenheit intensiv beschäftigen.

Keywords

EN

European Commission; European Court of Justice; Bundesverfassungsgericht; Grundgesetz; Treaty on the European Union; No Bail Out Clause; Budgetary Sovereignty of the National Parliament; Essential Core of Constitution; European Central Bank; Bundesbank; Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT); European Stability Mechanism (ESM); Eurozone Crisis; (Government Debts Crisis; Banking Crisis; Growth and Competitiveness Crisis)

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Creative and Knowledge Society
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 5
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 66-82

Dates

published

2015-07-01

online

2016-02-16

Contributors

author

Ra Jochen Becker

• Pfarrgasse 17/1, D-74538 Rosengarten, Tel. [phone]

References

• Hopfauf, in: Schmidt-Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf, Kommentar zum GG, 12. Aufl., 2011, Heymanns Verlag Köln , ISBN: 987-3-452-28045-9
• Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, Hrsg. Winter, Eggert, 18 Akt. Aufl. 2014, Springer Fachmedien Verlag, Wiesbaden, ISBN: 978-3-8349-3464-2

Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/cks-2015-0006