How Government Creates Value? / Kako Vlada Stvara Vrednost?

• Authors: Fred Thompson , Polly Rizova
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Private enterprises should be concerned with maximizing productivity. Government should be concerned with minimizing risk, perhaps subject to a cost or productivity constraint. Value creation in government ought to strive for consistency, coherency, and transparency. Achieving consistency and coherence in the face of systemic and idiosyncratic risk calls the elaboration of general risk assessment model, which takes account of the various kinds of risk confronted by the diversity of government institutions. Lacking such a model, the best we can hope for is the design and execution of policies and practices that assure reasonably satisfactory outcomes no matter what the future throws at us.

Keywords

EN

Process; Mechanism; Government spending and taxing; Risk; Systemic risk; Public management

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Economic Themes
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 53
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 449-466

Dates

published

2015-12-01

received

2015-11-24

accepted

2015-12-17

online

2016-04-15

Contributors

author

Fred Thompson

• Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University, Salem OR, USA

author

Polly Rizova

• Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University, Salem OR, USA

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/ethemes-2015-0026