When will we ever learn ?

• Authors: Vicki Johansson
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper puts forward the argument that Performance Measurement Systems (PMSs) foster rational, self-interested behaviour and vested values at all levels within organisations, which weakens moral barriers preventing fraud, fabrication of data and bribery. It argues that the longer a PMS is in operation, the greater the probability that rational self-interested behaviour in conflict with fundamental values and goals will be consolidated, aggravated and disseminated within organisations that operate within public welfare policy. If implemented, common incentives aimed at counteracting undesirable behaviour aggravate and speed up this process rather than reversing it. In a worst-case scenario, PMSs are the first step toward corruption, even though PMSs have been implemented with the good intention of improving public policy and strengthening accountability.

Keywords

EN

performance measurement systems; implementation; rational behaviour; intrinsic values

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 8
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 149-170

Dates

published

2015-12-01

online

2016-01-29

Contributors

author

Vicki Johansson

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/nispa-2015-0013