On a Cognitive Model of Semiosis

• Authors: Piotr Konderak
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems (Zlatev, 2002) like animals, or even plants (Krampen, 1992). It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that (at least some) semiotic processes are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial (computational) systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general.

Keywords

EN

semiotic systems; sign; Peirce; artificial cognitive agents; semantic networks; GLAIR/SNePS architecture

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 40
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 129-144

Dates

published

2015-03-01

online

2015-04-10

Contributors

author

Piotr Konderak

• Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/slgr-2015-0007