Against Smallism And Localism

• Authors: Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira , Anthony Chemero
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.

Keywords

EN

extended cognition; reductionism; internalism; affordances; dynamical systems; tool-use; social interaction; cognitive institutions

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 41
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 9-23

Dates

published

2015-06-01

online

2015-07-24

Contributors

author

Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira

• University of Cincinnati, USA

author

Anthony Chemero

• University of Cincinnati, USA

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/slgr-2015-0017