The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved (Long Ago)

• Authors: Marcin Miłkowski
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in naturalized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would either have to embrace representationalism or turn to semantic nihilism, which is, as I argue, an unstable and unattractive position. Hence, I conclude, their book does not offer an alternative to representationalism. At the same time, it reminds us that representational talk in cognitive science cannot be taken for granted and that information is different from mental representation. Although this claim is not new, Hutto and Myin defend it forcefully and elegantly.

Keywords

EN

representation; Hard Problem of Content; satisfaction conditions; information

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 41
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 73-88

Dates

published

2015-06-01

online

2015-07-24

Contributors

author

Marcin Miłkowski

• Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/slgr-2015-0021