Affectivity And Time: Towards A Phenomenology Of Embodied Time-Consciousness

• Authors: Marek Pokropski
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness and embodiment. However, I do not discuss the Husserlian account of consciousness of time in its full scope. I focus on the main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily feelings. In the first part, I outline the main ideas of Husserl’s early phenomenology of consciousness of time. In the second part, I introduce the phenomenological account of bodily feelings and describe how it evolved in Husserl’s philosophy. Next, I discuss the idea of bodily self-affection and the affective-kinaesthetic origin of consciousness’ temporal flow. In order to better understand this “pre-phenomenal temporality”, I analyse the dynamics of non-intentional, prereflective bodily self-affection. In the third part, I try to complement Husserl’s account by describing the specific dynamics of bodily experience. In order to do so, I appeal to Daniel Stern’s psychological account of dynamic bodily experience, which he calls the “vitality affect”. I argue that the best way to understand the pre-phenomenal dynamics of bodily feelings is in terms of the notion of rhythm.

Keywords

EN

phenomenology; time-consciousness; embodiment; affectivity

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 41
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 161-172

Dates

published

2015-06-01

online

2015-07-24

Contributors

author

Marek Pokropski

• University of Warsaw, Poland

References

• Depraz, N. (2000). Hyletic and kinetic facticity of the absolute flow and world creation. In J. B. Brough & L. Embree (Eds.), The many faces of time (pp. 25–35). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Husserliana III. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenlogie und phänomenlogischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (W. Biemel, Ed.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1950.
• Husserliana IV. Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (M. Biemel, Ed.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.
• Husserliana XI. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungs-manuskripten, 1918–1926 (M. Fleischer, Ed.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
• Husserliana X. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (1893–1917) (R. Boehm, Ed.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
• Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, First Book (F. Kersten, Trans.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, Second Book (R. Rojcewicz, Trans.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
• Husserl, E. (1991). On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917). (J. B. Brough, Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Husserl, E. (2001). Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental logic (A. J. Steinbock, Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Kortooms, T. (2002). Phenomenology of time: Edmund Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Landgrebe, L. (1981). The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. London: Cornell University Press.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (2005). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge.
• Preester de, H. (2007). The deep bodily origins of the subjective perspective: Models and their problems. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 604–618.
• Stern, D. N. (1985). The interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. London: Karnac Books.
• Stern, D. N. (2004). The present moment in psychotherapy and everyday life. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
• Stern, D. N. (2010). Forms of vitality: Exploring dynamic experience in psychology, the arts, psychotherapy, and development. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullow (Ed.), Before speech (pp. 321–348). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Varela, F. J. (1999). The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness. In J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, & J.-M. Roy (Eds.), Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 266–329). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Zahavi, D. (1998). Self-awareness and affection. In N. Depraz & D. Zahavi (Eds.), Alterity and facticity (pp. 205–228). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-Awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation. Evanstone, IL: Northwestern University Press.
• Zahavi, D., & Overgaard, S. (2012). Time, space and body in Bergson, Heidegger and Husserl. In Baiasu, R. Bird, & G. Moore (Eds.), Contemporary Kantian metaphysics: New essays on space and time (pp. 270–298). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/slgr-2015-0026