Being Reasonable

• Authors: David Botting
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Where do the rules of critical discussion get their normative force? What kinds of norms are involved? Unreasonable behaviour in the critical discussion - e.g., continuing to assert the contradictory of a proven standpoint, performing some action pragmatically inconsistent with a proven standpoint, or the same with regard to the starting-points agreed to in the opening stage - is liable to moral sanction. Thus, a moral/ethical norm is involved and the rules must have a moral force. Pragma-dialectics as it stands does not seem to account for this moral force. I will attempt to fill this gap in pragma-dialectical theory.

Keywords

EN

pragma-dialectics; normativity; strategic maneuvering; collective intentionality; co-operation

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 42
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 17-36

Dates

published

2015-09-01

online

2015-11-26

Contributors

author

David Botting

• Universidade Nova de Lisboa

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Identifiers

DOI

10.1515/slgr-2015-0028