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2011 | 20 | 1-2 | 73-79

Article title

Propositions, Possible Worlds, and Recursion

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
The issue of reduction of propositions to sets of possible worlds is addressed. It is shown that, under some natural assumptions, there always exist recursive propositions, i.e. decidable sets of possible worlds, which are not assigned to any sentence of a language. Some consequences of this result are discussed.

Year

Volume

20

Issue

1-2

Pages

73-79

Physical description

Dates

published
2011-06-01
online
2013-07-02

Contributors

  • Chair of Logic and Cognitive Science Institute of Psychology Adam Mickiewicz University Poznań, Poland

References

  • Berto, F. [2010], “Impossible worlds and propositions: Against the parity the- sis”, The Philosophical Quarterly 60: 471-486.[WoS]
  • Cresswell, M. J. [1972], “The world is everything that is the case”, AustralasianJournal of Philosophy 30: 1-13.
  • Kaplan, D. [1994], “A problem in possible-world semantics”, pp. 41-52 in: W. Sinnot-Armstrong, D. Raffman and N. Asher (eds.), Modality, Moralityand Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  • Lindstrom, S. [2009], “Possible worlds semantics and the liar. Reflections on a problem posed by Kaplan”, pp. 93-109 in: J. Almog and P. Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs, Oxford.
  • Montague, R. [1969], “On the nature of certain philosophical entities”, TheMonist 53: 159-194.
  • Stalnaker, R. [1970], “Pragmatics”, Synthese 22: 272-289.
  • Wiśniewski, A., and J. Pogonowski [2010], “Diagonalization in double frames”, Logica Universalis 4: 31-39.

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.doi-10_2478_llc-2011-0004
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