What is a Genuine Intuitionistic Notion of Falsity?

• Authors: Yaroslav Shramko
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

I highlight the importance of the notion of falsity for a seman- tical consideration of intuitionistic logic. One can find two principal (and non-equivalent) versions of such a notion in the literature, namely, falsity as non-truth and falsity as truth of a negative proposition. I argue in favor of the first version as the genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity.

Keywords

EN

Intuitionism; truth; falsity; negation

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 3-23

Dates

published

2012-03-01

online

2013-07-02

Contributors

author

Yaroslav Shramko

• Department of Philosophy Kryvyi Rih National University 50086 Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2012.001