Paranormal modal logic – Part I. The system K? and the foundations of the logic of skeptical and credulous plausibility

• Authors: Ricardo S. Silvestre
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this two-parts paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics - including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic - can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility.

Keywords

EN

paraconsistent logic; paracomplete logic; modal logic; inductive plausibility

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 65-95

Dates

published

2012-03-01

online

2013-07-02

Contributors

author

Ricardo S. Silvestre

• Department of Philosophy Federal University of Campina Grande Rua Aprígio Veloso 882 Campina Grande-PB, Brazil, 58429-900 [phone]

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2012.005