Models of Possibilism and Trivialism

• Authors: Luis Estrada-González
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper I probe the idea that neither possibilism nor triv- ialism could be ruled out on a purely logical basis. I use the apparatus of relational structures used in the semantics for modal logics to engineer some models of possibilism and trivialism and I discuss a philosophical stance about logic, truth values and the meaning of connectives underlying such analysis.

Keywords

EN

Possibilism; trivialism; anti-trivialism; semantic minimalism

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 175-205

Dates

published

2012-06-01

online

2013-07-02

Contributors

author

Luis Estrada-González

• Facultad de Humanidades Departamento de Filosofia Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Morelos (Mexico) IEXE, School for Public Policy (Puebla, Mexico)

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2012.010