Distinguishing facts from beliefs: fuzzy categories

• Authors: Mitchell Rabinowitz , Maria Acevedo , Sara Casen , Myriah Rosengarten , Martha Kowalczyk , Lindsay Blau Portnoy
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper presents results from five studies that investigate how people perceive the distinction between facts and beliefs. The central question being asked is whether the features that distinguish the categories of facts and beliefs are distinct or overlapping. In each of the five studies, participants are presented with content statements and asked the degree to which they agree with a given statement, the degree to which they think others would agree with it, and whether the statement was a fact or a belief. From these ratings, six possible patterns were derived. The results showed that in many content areas the patterns that describe the statements they categorized as facts and those that they categorized as beliefs had considerable overlap. In addition, participant consensus as to which statements were to be considered facts versus beliefs varied from high to low depending on the specific content being evaluated.

Keywords

EN

concepts; categorization; naive conceptions

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Psychology of Language and Communication
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 17
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 241-268

Dates

published

2013-12-01

online

2013-12-31

Contributors

author

Mitchell Rabinowitz

• Fordham University, New York

author

Maria Acevedo

• Fordham University, New York

author

Sara Casen

• Fordham University, New York

author

Myriah Rosengarten

• Fordham University, New York

author

Martha Kowalczyk

• Fordham University, New York

author

Lindsay Blau Portnoy

• Fordham University, New York

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/plc-2013-0016