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Journal
2011 | 21 | 3 | 272-279
Article title

Is Rorty a linguistic idealist?

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this causal independence of things and the sense of our discourse being guided by them with our autonomy with regard to the construction of various “vocabularies” with which we describe, or cope with, reality. In the final part, I address in some detail Rorty’s animadversions concerning the idea of the intrinsic nature of reality. I show them to be only partly successful.
Publisher
Journal
Year
Volume
21
Issue
3
Pages
272-279
Physical description
Dates
published
2011-09-01
online
2011-09-22
Contributors
References
  • [1] Davidson, D. (1984). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 183–199. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • [2] Davidson, D. (1999). Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Discussion with Rorty. In U. Żegleń (Ed.). Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge, pp.15–17. London: Routledge.
  • [3] Farrell, F. (1995). Rorty and Antirealism. In H. J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Ed.). Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics, pp.154–188. Nashville and London: Vanderbilt University Press.
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  • [5] Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and Necessity. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
  • [6] Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  • [10] Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • [11] Rorty, R. (1991). Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, Ethnocentrism, and Liberalism. In his Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, pp.1–17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • [12] Rorty, R. (1995). Response to Frank Farrell. In H. J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Ed.). Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics, pp. 189–195. Nashville and London: Vanderbilt University Press.
  • [13] Rorty, R. (1998). Charles Taylor on Truth. In his Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers Vol. III, 84–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625404.005[Crossref]
  • [14] Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin.
  • [15] Steib, J. A. (2005). Rorty on Realism and Constructivism. Metaphilosophy 36, 272–294. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00369.x[Crossref]
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.doi-10_2478_s13374-011-0028-2
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