Against representation: A brief introduction to cultural affordances

• Authors: Tibor Solymosi
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Cognitive science and its philosophy have been far too long consumed with representation. This concern is indicative of a creeping Cartesianism that many scientists and philosophers wish to evade. However, their naturalism is often insufficiently evolutionary to fully appreciate the lessons of pragmatism. If cognitive neuroscience and pragmatism are to be mutually beneficial, the representational-friendly scientists and the anti-representational pragmatists need an alternative to representation that still accounts for what many find so attractive about representation, namely intentionality. I propose that instead of representations we philosophers and scientists begin thinking in terms of cultural affordances. Like Gibsonian affordances, cultural affordances are opportunities for action. However, unlike Gibsonian affordances, which are merely biological and available for immediate action in the immediately present environment, cultural affordances also present opportunities for thinking about the past and acting into the future-tasks typically attributed to representations.

Keywords

EN

cognitive science; neuroscience; pragmatism; neuropragmatism; representation; affordances

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 23
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 594-605

Dates

published

2013-10-01

online

2013-09-28

Contributors

author

Tibor Solymosi

• Bowie State University

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/s13374-013-0151-3