2014 | 37 | 1 | 11-38
Article title

Distributive Justice: From Steinhaus, Knaster, and Banach to Elster and Rawls - The Perspective of Sociological Game Theory

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This article presents a relatively straightforward theoretical framework about distributive justice with applications. It draws on a few key concepts of Sociological Game Theory (SGT). SGT is presented briefly in section 2. Section 3 provides a spectrum of distributive cases concerning principles of equality, differentiation among recipients according to performance or contribution, status or authority, or need. Two general types of social organization of distributive judgment are distinguished and judgment procedures or algorithms are modeled in each type of social organization. Section 4 discusses briefly the larger moral landscapes of human judgment – how distribution may typically be combined with other value into consideration. The article suggests that Rawls, Elster, and Machado point in this direction. Finally, it is suggested that the SGT framework presented provides a useful point of departure to systematically link it and compare the Warsaw School of Fair Division, Rawls, and Elster, among others.
Physical description
  • Woods Institute for Environment and Energy, Stanford University, California and Department of Sociology, University of Uppsala, Sweden,
  • Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Bialystok, Poland,
  • Lisbon University Institute, Centre for Research and Studies of Sociology, Lisbon, Portugal,
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