Contextualism and the Use-Mention Distinction

• Authors: Štefan Riegelnik
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The use-mention distinction is considered as a fundamental concept in the philosophy of language. So it goes without doubt that a comprehensive theory of language has to account for this distinction. In this paper I explore what it means to account for such a distinction and I argue that the main ideas of contextualist theories of language are in conflict with the distinction in question.

Keywords

EN

use-mention distinction; contextualism; minimalism; truth-conditional semantics

• Publisher: De Gruyter Mouton
• Journal: Lodz Papers in Pragmatics
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 7
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 281-290

Dates

published

2011-01-01

online

2012-01-05

Contributors

author

Štefan Riegelnik

• Vienna University of Economics

References

• Cappelen, Herman and Ernest Lepore. 2005. Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Davidson, Donald. 2001. Truth and Meaning (1967). In: Donald Davidson (ed.), Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 17-36.
• Recanati, François. 2001. Open Quotation. Mind 110/439. 637-687.
• Recanati, François. 2004. Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Recanati, François. 2005. Meaning and Ostension. From Putnam's Semantics to Contextualism. Talk given at the conference "Les defies d'Hilary Putnam", 22-24 March 2005. Paris. http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000599_v1/.
• Recanati, François. 2010. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Philosophical Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell.

Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/v10016-011-0015-4