Practices, Norms and Recognition

• Authors: Titus Stahl
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following.

Keywords

EN

Rule-following; practice; recognition; collective attitude

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 17
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 10-21

Dates

published

2007-06-01

online

2007-06-20

Contributors

author

Titus Stahl

• Institute of Philosophy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, Grüneburgplatz 1 60629 Frankfurt a. M. Germany

References

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• Pettit, P. The Reality of Rule-Following. Mind 99, 393, 1990.
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• Sellars, W. Some Reflections on Language Games. In Science, Perception and Reality. London: Routledge, 1963.
• Wittgenstein, L.Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed., Oxford 1958 (English-only reprint of 1968).
• Wright, C.Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. London: Duckworth, 1980.

Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/v10023-007-0002-0