Rorty and Normativity

• Authors: Alexander Kremer
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.

Keywords

EN

Rorty; pragmatism; normativity; ethics; philosophy

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 17
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 71-77

Dates

published

2007-06-01

online

2007-06-20

Contributors

author

Alexander Kremer

• Department of Philosophy Faculty of Philosophy, University of Szeged, Petőfi S. sgt. 30-34. 6722 Szeged, Hungary

References

• Brandom, R. B.Rorty and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.
• Kremer, A. What is the Origin of Obligation? Human Affairs 13, 34-43, 2003.
• Rorty, R.Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
• Rorty, R.Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
• Rorty, R.Philosophy and Social Hope. Harmonsworth: Penguin Books, 1999.

Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/v10023-007-0007-8